

THE MALAYSIAN GENERAL ELECTION OF 1969

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SINGAPORE KUALA LUMPUR
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1972

Oxford University Press, Ely House, London W.1.
GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON
CAPE TOWN IBADAN NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA ADDIS ABABA
DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACCA
KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE HONG KONG TOKYO

Bangunan Loke Yew, Kuala Lumpur

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304-585

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14057

Printed By *Mun Sun Press Kuala Lumpur.*

26 NOV 1973
Perpustakaan Negara
Malaysia

For Anamika and Latika

Preface

This study was completed in early 1970; only the last chapter on elections in East Malaysia was added later. It is a result of the several visits that I have made to Malaysia since 1963 and the insights I have gained through close contacts with the political leadership in the country at different levels. I am grateful to the Research Committee of the University Grants Committee of New Zealand which made it possible for me to spend four months in Malaysia in 1968-69 just before the general elections. In Malaysia, I am indebted to a large number of people without whose help and generosity this work would not have been possible. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, Dr. Lim Chong Eu and V. Veerappen of the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia; S.P. Seenivasagam of the People's Progressive Party, and C.V. Devan Nair, Lim Kit Siang and Goh Hock Guan of the Democratic Action Party. Here in New Zealand my thanks are due to Alex McLeod and Dr. Garry Hawke who kindly read the manuscript and made many useful comments.

Victoria University of Wellington
23 April 1971

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THE POLITICAL SETTING

THE General Elections held in Malaysia on 10 May 1969 were reminiscent both of the year 1959, when the first country-wide elections after independence were held, and also of the immediate pre-independence period of 1956-7, when the country was confronted with the problem of the future of the non-Malay communities, their cultures, languages and education. Similarly, during the 1969 General Elections, the people of Malaysia were again forced to face the crucial problems of the political position of the non-Malays and the role of their languages and cultures just as they had before independence. Both in 1965-7 and at the time of the general elections in 1959, the non-Malay communities, except for an extremist fringe among the Chinese influenced by the Malayan Communist Party, were not sure of themselves; they were on the defensive. They were not sure that Malaya was their home. The country was passing through a period of vital transition and with the future uncertain they were possibly willing to concede that Malaya belonged to the Malays in so far as they were the *bumiputras* (the indigenous people). This reflected the fact that they themselves had not made up their minds whether they were going to identify themselves with the country of their adoption. The attitude was also a remnant of the British policy of treating the Malays alone as the *bumiputra* and the rest as aliens who had come to the country in search of employment and wealth. Furthermore, the existing political parties had not been able to articulate their ideas on the serious issues facing them and the country. The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), which around this time had conceded a superior position within the Alliance to the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), was not in a position to emphasize these issues and articulate and lead Chinese opinion. The other non-Malay political organizations were too weak and lacked the mass base to perform this task. Consequently, even though the far-reaching concessions made by the MCA and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) were not exactly the compromise that

these communities had hoped for, there was little that they could do about it. No doubt they expressed dissatisfaction; and there was even some rioting and demonstrations on the issues of language and education. But the situation never became completely unmanageable and did not cause irreparable damage to relations between the Malays and the non-Malays. However the situation in 1969, as we shall see later, was entirely different. The compromises made in 1956-7 and 1959 now proved less acceptable to the non-Malays, who during the intervening period had become more certain of themselves, and were willing to consider more positive action.

The 1959 elections were the first held after independence. Thus all the issues which had concerned the non-Malay communities just before the transfer of power by the British were revived and played a central role in the election campaign. Also the crisis in the Alliance, just before the parliamentary elections, aggravated the situation and fanned the fears of the non-Malays, forcing the opposition parties, except the Malay Pan Malayan Islamic Party, to base their election campaigns on the issues of Chinese and Tamil schools, languages and cultures. Elections were held in a highly charged atmosphere and resulted in significant losses by the MCA, which was able to win only 19 of the 31 seats allocated to it by the Alliance. More important, MCA candidates were successful only in constituencies with a sizeable Malay vote. In those with a predominantly Chinese electorate and a very small number of Malay voters the MCA candidates were defeated. That is, the MCA was able to win only in those constituencies where the defection of substantial number of Chinese voters could be compensated for by the votes of the Malays who supported the Alliance candidates.¹

However the intervening elections of 1964 were held during the period of 'Indonesian

¹ For details see R.K. Vasil, 'The 1964 General Elections in Malaya', *International Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1, July 1965, pp. 49 and 62-3.

confrontation' which lent an artificial air to the political situation in the country, and the MCA was able to recover the losses it had suffered in 1959. The ruling party, the Alliance, had been successful in projecting 'confrontation' as the principal election issue, and the election was presented as a test of the loyalty of the non-Malays; if they voted for the opposition, all of whom had opposed the formation of Malaysia, this would be taken as a proof of their disloyalty to the country.² Also, the fact that opposition to Malaysia meant being pro-Indonesia alienated many Chinese voters, except the strongly left-wing elements. The Indonesian treatment of the Chinese in Indonesia had angered many Chinese who were not inclined to vote for the non-Malay opposition which was opposed to Malaysia and thus, by implication, assumed a pro-Indonesian position.

In order to understand the situation at the time of the recent elections in the country and its impact on the election results, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the inter-communal alliance and the basis of its working. Since independence the object of the ruling Alliance Party and the Malay leadership (which has ruled the country in the name of the 'multi-racial' Alliance) has not been so much to achieve a rapid integration of the different racial groups in Malaysia on the basis of equality but to maintain racial balance and communal peace through a kind of separation of powers. This meant that the Malays, the *bumiputra*, enjoyed a dominant control over politics, government and administration, while the non-Malay communities were given a more or less free play in the economic and commercial spheres, the purpose for which these communities had in the first place emigrated to Malaya. It was a kind of *quid pro quo* arrangement: the non-Malays would not make too many encroachments on the preserve of the Malays, and the Malays in return would not make serious incursions into the spheres of activity of the non-Malays. It was, however, not an absolute separation of power and activity. Each community had to be given some share in the sphere of influence of the other to keep it happy and pacified. For this reason the MCA did not show much concern when some half-hearted attempts were made by

the government to promote Malay participation in trade and commerce. These attempts were made by the leaders of the UMNO chiefly to satisfy the Malay demand for a share in the economic and commercial life of the country. UMNO leaders knew full well that if they promoted Malay participation in trade and commerce too strongly it would seriously damage the *quid pro quo* and prompt the MCA to make demands, on behalf of the Chinese community, for an increased share in politics, government and administration.

This *quid pro quo* was established during 1952 and 1957, just before independence. In order to understand the origin of the arrangement one must examine the development of the Alliance in the 1950s. The Alliance—a freak of history—came into being early in 1952. It began as a purely temporary alliance between the Selangor State branch of the MCA and the Kuala Lumpur branch of the UMNO with the sole aim of jointly contesting the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections in February 1952 against the non-communal Independence of Malaya Party, which was seen as a serious threat by both.³ It was set up without the prior knowledge of either the UMNO or MCA leaders. The arrangement proved such a great success that it spurred the national leadership of the two parties to use the idea in the subsequent elections in which it was again a great success. This led to the organization of the Alliance on a more permanent basis. The idea worked so well and so profitably that the substantial opposition to it from within UMNO by those who were distrustful of the Chinese and were afraid of them was weakened. But the real basis on which the Alliance was to be acceptable to UMNO was to become clear only later, after it had to operate within the framework of an independent polity when the 'protecting power', the British, who had always protected the Malays against the supposedly more enterprising Chinese and Indians, was no more. This was the honeymoon period of the Alliance, or at least that of UMNO and the MCA. The fear of the Chinese among the Malays did not manifest itself very strongly when the

³ The IMP was established by Dato Onn bin Jaafar on 16 September 1951 when the UMNO rejected his plan to open its membership to non-Malays and convert it into a non-communal national party.

² Ibid. pp. 39-44.

British were still there to protect them, and when the main preoccupation was with obtaining independence. As a result, during this period the MCA, because of its superior organization and greater financial capacity, secured an equal position with the UMNO in the Alliance. As long as elections were held at the municipal levels only, the MCA was able to assert this position, for a very large part of the electorate in the urban centres was Chinese and it was mainly their vote that the Alliance was attempting to gather.

The situation started changing drastically with the advent of independence. At the time of constitution-making in early 1957, the MCA was not able to assert a position of equality with the UMNO and it could not safeguard the interests of the Chinese community as strongly as UMNO pushed the interests of the Malays. The MCA, along with the MIC, had to accept a secondary position in the Alliance. It also had to make substantial concessions to UMNO with regard to issues of vital interest to the Chinese community.⁴ An important area where the non-Malays were forced to accept a compromise considered unfair by them was the issue of Chinese and Tamil education and languages. In September 1955, soon after the Alliance had won office following its victory in the Federal Legislative Council elections, the government of the Federation of Malaya appointed a high-level Education Committee (including a few representatives of the MCA) under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Education, Dato Abdul Razak bin Hussein (now Prime Minister of Malaysia). The Report of the Committee was published in mid-1956; in late 1957, legislation incorporating the recommendations was enacted. The main objective of the report and the legislation was to establish 'a national system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation'. To the Chinese, however, this meant an attempt to curb the nationalistic (Chinese) orientation of instruction in the Chinese-medium schools. They expressed their opposition with considerable vehemence. *The Straits Times* wrote in an editorial: 'It (the Razak Report) is now being openly challenged by a section of the Chinese community, perhaps

a very large section. Everything—even the Emergency—is dwarfed by the threat of communalism.'⁵ Interestingly, however, all 15 representatives of the MCA in Parliament fully supported the enactment based on the Razak Report.

The relationship of the three partners in the Alliance was settled, once and for all, in mid-1959 when the joint organization was forced to face a serious crisis resulting from the complete change of national leadership in the MCA in 1958. From the time of its formation in 1949, the MCA was led by a group who were all very prosperous businessmen. These leaders—Tan Cheng Lock, Yong Shook Lin, Leong Yew Koh, H.S. Lee—all English-educated and not many of them fluent in any of the Chinese dialects, did not, by and large, represent the aspirations of the rank and file of the Chinese community. Many of them were in politics not because of any deep political convictions or elevated aims but because they had found that their business interests would be better served through political links. They therefore had no hesitation in making substantial concessions with regard to the vital interests of the Chinese community. They were willing to accept a secondary position for the MCA in the Alliance if that was the lowest price to be paid for its remaining a part of the ruling coalition.

However, the ferment within the Chinese community in 1956 and 1957 and the grave dissatisfaction of the Chinese with the concessions made by their communal organization led to the emergence of a younger and more vigorous group within the MCA. In early 1958, it was reported that this group was making a bid to depose Tan Cheng Lock and was attempting to reorganize the MCA 'to protect more strongly the interests of the Chinese'.⁶ To the rival group the primary purpose of the MCA's existence was to protect the rights and interests of the Chinese community; they felt that the old guard of the MCA, in order to maintain the Alliance, had not fought strongly enough for the interests of the Chinese community. The leaders of the new group were Dr. Lim Chong Eu (Chairman of the important Political Sub-Committee of the MCA), Too Joon Hing (Secretary-General), and Tan

⁴ For details see R.K. Vasil, *Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, Chapter 1.

⁵ 13 August 1956.

⁶ *The Straits Times*, 3 March 1958.

Suan Kok (Chairman of the Youth Section). The showdown took place on 23 March 1958 at the annual meeting of the Central General Committee of the MCA, when the group nominated Lim Chong Eu as its candidate for the Presidency of the MCA against Tan Cheng Lock, who had founded the MCA and had been its President since its formation in 1949. Victory came to them when Lim Chong Eu was elected President, defeating Tan Cheng Lock by 89 votes to 67. Too Joon Hing defeated Ong Yoke Lin, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare and a leading member of the old guard, for the post of Secretary-General. At the same time they captured all other important positions in the organization. This development was viewed by UMNO with great concern; in fact, some of its leaders had earlier attempted to influence the election in favour of Tan Cheng Lock and the old guard.

The new leadership was soon to assert equality for the MCA within the Alliance. On 30 November 1958, Lim Chong Eu declared in Ipoh that the basic desire of the Chinese in Malaya was:

Firstly, we want equality in this country.

Secondly, we are for an assurance of our way of life, our language, and our schools.

Thirdly, we express the hope that we shall find economic advancement and economic equality.⁷

Under the circumstances a showdown with UMNO was bound to take place sooner or later, for this assertion of equality was a clear challenge to the entire basis on which the Alliance had worked since 1956 and on which alone the Alliance idea was acceptable to UMNO. The occasion was provided by the Parliamentary elections of 1959 held soon after the State elections. During the elections the extremist PMP had campaigned on the basis that after the Parliamentary elections it would attempt to amend the Constitution to make it more strongly pro-Malay, with the aid of other Malay members of Parliament (which meant aid from the UMNO). This caused serious concern among the new MCA leaders. The Central Working Committee of the MCA after a meeting on 9 July demanded:

1. That the MCA should be given 40 seats in the Federal elections because in at least 39 constituencies the Chinese voters outnumbered the Malays, and
2. That the Alliance Manifesto must clearly express its intention to review in general the implementation of its educational policy so that the medium of examinations in Chinese schools could be the medium of instruction.⁸

In the first point in the MCA demands, the real issue was not the fight over the number of seats to be given to the MCA, but the fear that if the MCA was not given a minimum of one-third of the total number of seats in Parliament the Malay representatives would be able to amend the Constitution without the consent of some representatives of the Chinese, a threat previously made by the PMP in the State elections. In a letter to Tengku Abdul Rahman, the release of which was the starting point of the crisis, Lim Chong Eu, the new President of the MCA, asserted:

The fear of Malaysians of other racial origins—Chinese, Indians, Eurasians—is simply one of fear of Malay communalism. A fear that this unbridled attitude can not only destroy the kind of progress as Malaysians, which the Alliance plans for, but further that it can also lead to constitutional oppression of the minorities.

... in the parliamentary sense, the danger of communalism can only be the danger of Malay communalism, for only the Malays can obtain the two-thirds majority necessary in Parliament to affect any changes in the Constitution.⁹

The Tengku, as the leader of the Alliance, reacted violently and branded Lim's letter to him an 'ultimatum' and 'a stab in the back'. At the same time he announced that the Alliance would contest all 104 seats in the federal elections without the MCA group led by the MCA President, Lim Chong Eu, implying that the Chinese seats would be given to the displaced old guard of the MCA willing to co-operate with the UMNO on terms dictated by the latter.¹⁰ Later in a press conference, the Tengku announced that he was taking over all functions of the Alliance National Council (the supreme decision-making body of the Alliance) and would personally undertake the selection of candidates and the allocation of seats among the three partners of the Alliance. On 12 July, Lim Chong

⁸ *Malay Mail*, 10 July 1959.

⁹ *The Straits Times*, 10 July 1959.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 11 July 1959.

⁷ *Ibid.* 1 December 1958.

Eu met the Tengku and was offered a deal which he reported to the Central General Committee of the MCA in the following terms:

With regard to the allocation of seats it is most likely that we shall be allocated 32 seats. With regard to the nomination of candidates [it] will be made by Tunku alone, because of the shortness of time, but before finalising the list I would be consulted and I presume after my consultation it would be presented to the Alliance National Council. ...with regard to this highly publicised clause now on education, this clause will not be included in the manifesto but the Government will implement it by Administrative Directive as soon as possible.¹¹

Under the circumstances the MCA Central General Committee had little choice but to accept the Tengku's terms. In a somewhat pathetic speech revealing the MCA's weak position within the Alliance, Lim Chong Eu told the Central General Committee before the crucial vote on the Tengku's terms:

The question now is no longer a simple question of allocation of seats, of candidates or of conditions in the manifesto and so on. It is only a question of the reiteration of your faith in the Alliance and the leadership of the Alliance. *What will happen with regard to the seating and allocation and manifesto and so on, I do not know. But I have reason to believe that if confidence is restored in the Alliance then what we have gained so far in negotiations can be sustained. This is only my belief.* That, Gentlemen, is the position. I am very sorry that the Central Working Committee cannot give you any clear guidance in this matter.¹²

The final allocation of seats made by the Tengku, announced late on 12 July, gave the MCA 32 seats out of a total of 104.

Many leaders of the MCA felt that the UMNO leadership had taken a 'dictatorial attitude towards us' and treated the MCA as a 'satellite' of UMNO. Completely disappointed and disillusioned, many left the MCA. They chose this course rather than withdrawing the MCA from the Alliance, for the latter was too drastic an

action and could plunge the country into communal chaos. And it was not long before the old guard of the MCA returned and reassumed their control of the organization. In 1961, Tan Siew Sin, the son of Tan Cheng Lock, was elected President and the MCA once again began operating on the pre-1958 basis.

The crucial consequence of this was that UMNO was tempted to re-establish the *quid pro quo* arrangement between itself and the big business leadership of the MCA rather than face squarely the outstanding communal issues and seek acceptable and lasting solutions to them. UMNO was quite happy to push these issues below the surface and operate the Alliance on the earlier basis of UMNO's dominant position in the inter-communal coalition. In subsequent years, the MCA leadership, lacking a popular appeal among the Chinese, became more and more subservient to UMNO. UMNO, on its side, over-confident about its own power and MCA's subservience, adopted an increasingly pro-Malay position. They believed that every Chinese wanted only money and a good life; as long as the Chinese maintained a reasonable level of economic progress and prosperity they would be busy making money rather than worrying about their share of political power. This they felt would enable the *quid pro quo* to continue. However, the most serious miscalculation was about the attitude of a large number of Chinese-educated Chinese and the other under-privileged Chinese who had come to feel completely cheated. The *quid pro quo* did not give them anything. Chinese economic power, the basis of the *quid pro quo*, was in the hands of only a small number of Chinese families; the loss of an equal share in political power was their loss alone and not that of the prosperous Chinese who were content with their booming businesses. Even the Malay attempt to force some Malays into trade and commerce tended to affect the small Chinese businessman rather than the prosperous Chinese *towkay*.

As a result ordinary Chinese and Indians became increasingly concerned about their future for they feared that they were benefiting little from the prevailing political conditions.

¹¹ MCA, Minutes of Central General Committee Meeting, 12 July 1959, p. 17.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 8 (Emphasis added).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE 1964 AND 1969 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Singapore in Malaysia (1963-1965)

THE first and most important development between the two elections of 1964 and 1969 was the forced exit of Singapore in mid-1965 from the Federation of Malaysia, which it had joined only about two years earlier. The chief architect of Malaysia was not Tengku Abdul Rahman; it was largely the creation of the British and the People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore who had far stronger and more compelling reasons for the establishment of the larger federation. For the British this was the best way of decolonizing the Borneo territories and at the same time maintaining the security of their economic interests and capital investments. For the PAP leadership in Singapore it was a matter of sheer survival. The only reason the Tengku was persuaded by the British to accept the idea was the increasing influence of Chinese chauvinists and communists in the island of Singapore. The Tengku came to believe that it was better to have them within the Federation, where their activities could be controlled and their influence curbed, than allow them to remain outside as a Communist Cuba to the United States. The analogy with Cuba was often used in Malaya during the period.

Opposition to Singapore within UMNO

But many others in UMNO, the dominant partner in the Alliance, had grave doubts about the proposal and gave it only a conditional approval. They, especially those belonging to the extremist faction—Syed Jaafar Albar, Syed Nasir, Ghafar bin Baba—warned the Tengku that he was playing into the hands of the British and committing certain folly.¹ They tried to convince the Tengku that Lee Kuan Yew, the leader of the PAP, had larger ambitions and that he would not be satisfied with his limited role in Singapore. He would eventually attempt to extend his

¹ Interviews with Syed Jaafar Albar and Syed Nasir, Kuala Lumpur, August and September 1963.

influence across the causeway into the Federation through the local Chinese and Indians. UMNO finally gave in to the Tengku on the understanding that in the federation the new states would only be accorded the same status as enjoyed by the existing member States of the Federation of Malaya, such as Selangor, Perak or Penang.² It is interesting to note that the UMNO resolution of 4 November 1961 giving the Tengku the mandate to go ahead with the formation of Malaysia, and also other UMNO documents, never used the term Malaysia; they always referred to it as *Melayu Raya* (The Great Malay Fatherland).

However, the Tengku went far beyond his mandate in the negotiations for the formation of Malaysia. In exchange for a significantly lower representation in the Malaysian Parliament,³ Singapore was given control over labour and education. This was unacceptable to the extremists in the UMNO⁴ and they did not

² The Tengku, addressing the UMNO General Assembly on 4 November 1961 when UMNO gave him the mandate to proceed with the formation of Malaysia, himself had said: 'As I have already stated in the Parliament, our aim is to organise a federation of states called the Persekutuan Melayu Raya or Malaysia Raya which will include those States which now form the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu and the States in Borneo. They all will enjoy an equal status.' *Penyata Tahun* 1961 (Annual Report), UMNO, p. 50.

³ Singapore, which accounted for about 16 per cent of the total population of Malaysia was given only 15 seats (9.3 per cent) in the Malaysian Parliament out of a total of 159.

⁴ Syed Jaafar Albar told this writer that 'these are the two areas where communists operate. They do not have jungles in Singapore where the communists can hide. They thrive only in Chinese schools and labour unions.' Interview, Kuala Lumpur, September 1963. The fear was that this would make it difficult for the Federal government to curb and contain the activities of Chinese communist and chauvinist elements in Singapore. They also believed that Singapore, enjoying autonomy in the field of education, would pursue its own educational policy, giving recognition to Chinese and Tamil schools and according official status to the Chinese and Tamil

easily give in; they even tried to stop the creation of Malaysia only days before it actually came into being. In early September 1963, Syed Jaafar Albar, Syed Nasir, Datin Fatimah (Head of the UMNO *Kaum Ibu*)⁵ and Hussein Noordin, sent a strongly worded letter to Tengku Abdul Rahman alleging that he had gone far beyond the mandate on Malaysia originally given to him by UMNO. It was an open challenge and an ultimatum. They expressed their lack of confidence in his leadership and asked him to convene an emergency meeting of the UMNO General Assembly to thrash out the whole issue. But the Tengku knew full well that in the larger body—the General Assembly—he would have serious difficulties in persuading the more than 200 delegates to accept Malaysia on terms negotiated by him. Conscious of the power of the extremists (or 'ultras'), he was even afraid of facing the smaller UMNO National Executive (annually elected by the UMNO General Assembly). Eventually, a meeting of the UMNO Executive was convened at Tun Razak's house. It was not attended by the Tengku, though he was in town, and the author was told that during the meeting word was spread around quietly that the Tengku could not attend the meeting because he suffered a mild heart attack as soon as he received the letter by the four leaders of the UMNO challenging his leadership and his conduct of negotiations relating to Malaysia. The meeting lasted for about ten hours and some important concessions were made to pacify the extremists. For example, at this meeting it was settled that one of the two key positions (Chief Minister and Governor) both in Sabah and Sarawak would be held by a Malay.⁶ It was only on the basis of the arrange-

languages. This, they believed, would make it impossible for Alliance educational policy, based on national schools (eventually Malay-medium) and Malay as the sole national language, to be accepted by the non-Malay communities. This would encourage the Chinese and Indians to look towards Singapore and seek the same policy in peninsular Malaya. Also, it would give the Singapore PAP a special appeal.

⁵ Women's Section.

⁶ It was a result of this arrangement that a new position, Minister of Sarawak Affairs, was created for Temenggong Jughah, the leader of the Ibans in Sarawak, to satisfy him and his community. No similar position was created in Sabah for there was no problem in satisfying the two key leaders in Sabah with jobs.

ments made and assurances given at this crucial meeting that a showdown was averted and the 'ultras' were refrained from forcing the issue and publicly opposing Malaysia. However, this was not to be the end of the problem as the 'ultras' were only biding time and waiting for the chance to reopen the issue at the earliest opportune moment.

The PAP and the 1964 General Elections

The occasion offered itself with the sudden decision by the People's Action Party of Singapore to contest the general elections in Malaya in 1964 with

the immediate objective to ensure that the Socialist Front does not benefit from the substantial protest votes against the MCA. An increase of votes for the Socialist Front would certainly be interpreted in Indonesia as support for Indonesia's 'crush Malaysia' policy.⁷

On 1 March 1964, only days before the nomination day for the elections, Dr. Toh Chin Chye, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Chairman of the PAP, while inaugurating a new Tamil newspaper in Singapore surprised everybody by diverging from the prepared speech to announce that the PAP would field a small number of candidates in the Malaysian elections. Dr. Toh said that the PAP, which had played a very important part in the formation of Malaysia, must consider itself a national party and must therefore contest the elections. However, he had hastened to add that the PAP had no intention of fighting the central government or the United Malays National Organization.

Far from it. It is our purpose to cooperate with UMNO and the Central Government of Malaysia to help Malaysia succeed. We will therefore play a token part....

If we are content only to remain a political party in Singapore, our task to build a happy and prosperous Malaysia will be restricted.... This election must be won by the pro-Malaysian parties. It is a matter of life and death for us that the Federation of Malaysia should succeed.⁸

The PAP, in an attempt to placate UMNO, soon after nomination day withdrew the candidature of its small number of Malay candidates who had been fielded against UMNO nominees in

⁷ *Election Manifesto of the People's Action Party*, March 1964, p. 1.

⁸ *Straits Times*, 2 March 1964 (emphasis added).

Johore. The Prime Minister of Singapore went to the extent of saying on 15 March that the Malay leadership of Tengku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak in the UMNO 'is vital to the survival and success of Malaysia'. He further asserted:⁹

... it is in Malaysia's national interest to see that every UMNO candidate is supported in all the rural areas of Malaysia.... If UMNO is returned in strength, then the policy of a Malaysia separate from Indonesia presented by the Tunku and Tun Razak would be that much underscored by the mass of the rural people.... But no Malaysian will get any joy in seeing the policy presented by the Tunku and Tun Razak weakened by diminishing support in the rural areas through defections to obscurantist groups using religious bigotry as their main weapon to bring Malaysia closer to absorption by Indonesia.

The PAP leadership bent backwards a long way to make these statements. Showing full understanding of the situation, Lee Kuan Yew, in a speech on 17 March, clearly expressed the dilemma of the PAP, a progressive socialist political party forced by peculiar circumstances in the country into supporting the essentially traditionalist and feudal leadership of UMNO.¹⁰

It is true, if we wish to demonstrate the desire of the urban population of Malaya to support economic and social policies designed to provide more equal opportunities, that we should field as many candidates as there are seats in the urban areas.

We will not do this for very compelling reasons. We believe that any massive intervention in the election can be misinterpreted and will be presented to the rural Malays as an attempt to challenge UMNO.

This will be bad for Malaysia for it will encourage extremist Malay elements to work up feeling that with merger and Malaysia, the position of the Malays has been endangered and the Chinese in the towns are making a bid for power.

He went on to say:

If their [Tengku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak] policy of a separate Malaysia in which our various communities are participating in full in the political, economic and social life of the country, can be made by Malay extremists, to appear to lead to the Malays losing their safeguarded political position, then a dangerous situation will arise.

⁹ Ibid. 16 March 1964 (emphasis added).

¹⁰ Ibid. 18 March 1964.

For then the way is open for pro-Indonesian groups either inside or outside UMNO to emerge and replace the present leadership.

In fact, in a later speech in Singapore on 18 April 1964, Lee Kuan Yew stated very explicitly that the Singapore government would abide by its pledge to respect the rights of the Malays as spelt out in the Malaysian Constitution.¹¹

These attempts were of no avail. The 'ultras' in UMNO, who had never fully reconciled themselves to the inclusion of Singapore in the Federation of Malaysia, or even to the creation of the larger federation, used the Singapore decision to contest the elections in Malaya, even though it was a decision to contest in a limited manner and also not to oppose UMNO at all, to point out that their warnings at the time of the formation of Malaysia were now coming true. They said this decision showed that Lee was not content with his position in Singapore and was now attempting to extend his influence across the causeway into Malaya. They were not to be taken in by the neat arguments of the PAP intellectuals, for to them it was nothing less than a PAP design to gain control over the mainland areas of the federation. Haji Hassan, the *Mentri Besar* (Chief Minister) of Johore and a senior leader of the UMNO, bluntly put forward their views on 2 April 1964:¹² 'Mr. Lee is just like a hungry dog. You feed him out of pity when you see his pathetic look. But when he is well fed, he turns around and bites you.' It was also considered a serious 'breach of faith' on the part of the PAP. It was suggested that there had been a gentleman's agreement before the formation of Malaysia between the Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew that the PAP would not participate in Malayan politics and would restrict its political role to the island of Singapore.

The PAP made it clear during the election campaign that as far as it was concerned the sole election issue was Indonesian confrontation; its principal aim was to defeat the Socialist Front in the urban areas of the country by exposing it as a pro-Indonesian Communist front organization. The election manifesto of the PAP said:¹³

¹¹ Ibid. 19 April 1964.

¹² Ibid. 3 April 1964.

¹³ PAP, 'Election Manifesto of the People's Action Party', March 1964, p. 1.

We must realise quickly that the Socialist Front ... is the advance guard of the Indonesian Communist Party just as the PMIP is the beach-head in Malaya for Indonesian racialism....

The UMNO can deal with the PMIP in the rural areas. In the urban areas, because of the ineffectiveness of the MCA, the PAP has to help in the battle against the anti-Malaysia Socialist Front. The task of the PAP is to ensure that protest votes in urban areas do not become votes against Malaysia and for Sukarno.

The genuine fear of the PAP leadership was that the MCA had lost the confidence of the Chinese and that consequently the urban Chinese voter, in order to show his disapproval of the MCA and its policies, might be left with no option but to cast his ballot as a protest vote in favour of the Socialist Front. With regard to the long term future of Malaysia as a genuine multi-racial society the PAP felt that the MCA was completely irrelevant. They began to see themselves more and more as the organization to perform this role of cooperation with the leadership of the Malays in building an integrated new nation and at the same time retaining the confidence of the non-Malay communities, especially the Chinese. They created an impression that they would be happy to replace the MCA in the Alliance. This attempt, however, was nipped in the bud, for soon the Tengku spurned the idea in no uncertain terms. In an eve-of-election speech on *Radio Malaysia* on 23 April 1964 he said that it was obvious that the PAP aimed to take the place of the MCA as a partner of UMNO in the Alliance, but he would have none of it. He added:¹⁴

... I have said before that the MCA have served the Chinese and the country so well that even if there are only five members of the MCA left, I will still support this organisation because of its achievements and its commendable objectives.

The PAP attacks on the MCA created strange allies; the UMNO extremists and the MCA were

¹⁴ *The Straits Times*, 24 April 1964. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's response to this statement by the Tunku was the following: 'In the heat of elections, it is said that even though there are only five MCA MP's left, UMNO will carry on with the MCA. That may well be. But can UMNO leaders go through the awful predicament of pretending for the next five years that these five MCA MP's really represent the urban Chinese—five men who have won by UMNO's leave and license in Malay rural areas.' *Ibid.*, 25 April 1965.

brought together in their hostility towards the PAP. The UMNO extremists saw in this a useful opportunity; initially, instead of directly attacking the PAP and its leader, Lee Kuan Yew, they believed it would be more effective to channel their denunciation of the PAP through the MCA. The common strategy of the two groups was to denounce the PAP as a hidden communist organization committed to totalitarian ways. Considerable ire was directed against the person of the Singapore Prime Minister. Tan Siew Sin, the Malaysian Minister of Finance and President of the MCA, alleged in an important speech that the PAP had 'collaborated with the communists in a big way', and said that 'we in the Alliance maintain that the PAP is a grave security risk to this country'.¹⁵ He further asserted:

For a time the policies of the PAP were indistinguishable from those of the communists. As a result of massive communist support they won the 1959 election in Singapore

Not so long ago Mr. Lee Kuan Yew went to Moscow. In fact, he went there from London and it is significant that although a few of us were there at the time, he did not choose to tell any of us about his mission, not even the Tunku. The reasons for his silence can be guessed at. Recently it transpired that he had been in communication with Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister.

The PAP was equated with the Socialist Front as a threat to Malaysia. The Chief Minister of Malacca and a leading UMNO 'ultra', Ghafar bin Baba, said that if either the Socialist Front or the PAP came to power that would be the end of democracy in the country.¹⁶

A 'Notes for Speakers at Rallies' circulated by the MCA within its organization during the election campaign for the 1964 elections said:

In Singapore Lee Kuan Yew is a big bully and those who strongly oppose him are sent to jail. But here in Malaya we can talk more freely and tell the truth.

Lee Kuan Yew claims to be the saviour of the Chinese in Malaya but really he is a coward and an imposter. He licks the boots of the Malays and is quiet like a mouse whenever he is attacked by any of the top Malay leaders.

Why does he not reply to the Tunku and to Syed Jaafar Albar? Instead he is very apologetic. He dare not offend the Malay leaders.

¹⁵ *Sunday Mail*, Kuala Lumpur, 29 March 1964. (emphasis added).

¹⁶ *The Straits Times*, 30 March 1964.

Lee Kuan Yew is well-known for his double-face, double-talk and double-cross. He talked publicly to the Chinese that he was for them and then secretly he told the leaders of the Alliance that relaxation of the Citizenship Act allowed too many Chinese to become citizens of Malaya, which he said was wrong because the Chinese politically were a doubtful proposition.

The little pocket dictator from Singapore who claims to represent Chinese interests in Malaya is nothing but a selfish, conceited and arrogant imposter.

His attitude towards his own parents shows the kind of man he really is. While he is prosperous himself he allows his father to go about selling watches for a living, while his mother has to give cooking lessons to supplement her meagre income.¹⁷

Another similar document 'From Here and There in Malaya and Singapore' issued by the MCA for its party workers said:

The PAP, on their past records, are a GRAVE SECURITY RISK to Malaysia, a secret Trojan Horse to capture Malaysia not from outside but from inside—also for the communist world, e.g. (Here repeat: L.K.Y.'s (Lee Kuan Yew's) Moscow visit, his secret letter to Chou En-lai before his Afro-Asian tour, his connections with Pfen and secret protection given to him,¹⁸ his so-called 'non-communist' policy and pro-communist deeds, his present pro-Alliance vs. Sukarno as against his past record of being lukewarm to the rallies in Singapore against Sukarno, his legal firm Lee & Lee being legal advisors to the Indonesian Consulate General in Singapore—his present and past fellow leaders who were leading communists before, and secretly are very likely still communist at heart (e.g. Jek Yuen Thong, C.V. Devan Nair, self-confessed Gerald de Cruz, etc.) ...)

The PAP is the most dangerous enemy of UMNO and the Alliance—more dangerous than the Socialist Front. . . .

The PAP—pro Malaysia? The real truth—the PAP is secretly pro-communist....¹⁹

Referring to a 'winds of change' speech by the Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, an MCA document said:

Such are the PAP's 'winds of change'—winds of destruction that are trying to weaken the unity of the

¹⁷ 'Notes for Speakers at Rallies', MCA Headquarters, March 1964 (mimeographed). A photocopy of the document is in the possession of the author.

¹⁸ See Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore 1961, pp. 44-7.

¹⁹ Mimeographed (photocopy in the possession of the author). Emphasis in the original.

people in the Federation, winds of destruction that are trying to sow the seeds of hatred between urban Chinese and rural Malays, winds of destruction that will one day blow our independence, our freedom and our future completely away, thereby clearing the ground for the final conquest of this country by the Communists which Harry Lee Kuan Yew and his clique still serve.²⁰

The basis of the PAP strategy during the election campaign was to debunk the MCA and to seek cooperation with the leadership of the Malays. However this did not work. The PAP was unable to allay the fears of the Malays,²¹ and it did very badly in the elections. Of the 15 seats it contested in the State elections it secured none and was able to collect only 0.9 per cent of the total vote. In the Parliamentary elections it fielded 11 candidates, only one of whom was returned. A large number of its candidates lost their deposits.²² Also, during the election campaign it had become quite clear that UMNO would stand by the MCA even if the MCA was able to secure the support of only a small section of the Chinese community.

Their strategy having failed, the leadership of the PAP decided to make a direct approach to the Malay masses on a class basis and the party's socialist character and programme. This was a desperate long-term strategy for the party knew full well that it could not capture political power unless it had some mass base within the Malay community. This is what had impelled the party earlier during the election campaign to seek cooperation with UMNO and replace the MCA as a partner of UMNO in the Alliance.

²⁰ 'Beware of PAP's Destructive Winds' (mimeographed) issued by the MCA Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur, 20 April 1964 (photocopy in the possession of the author). Emphasis added.

²¹ In a 'Statement of Objectives and Policy by the Central Executive Committee of the PAP on its Tenth Anniversary', the party itself conceded: 'The fears and anxieties of the Malay rural base, which would be aroused by large urban crowds mainly of Chinese and Indians rallying to our party banner, was under-estimated'. PAP, *Our First Ten Years*, Tenth Anniversary Souvenir, 21 November 1964, p. 111.

²² The failure of the PAP to gain substantial electoral support did not necessarily mean that it lacked attraction for the non-Malays. It was very largely the result of lack of proper organization in Malaya, suitable candidates, and the party's negative election campaign. For details see Vasil, 'The 1964 General Elections in Malaya'.

The Party, in a 'Statement of Objectives and Policy by the Central Executive Committee of the PAP on its Tenth Anniversary', asserted:

Our hope of orderly and sensible development is that more and more educated Malays trained in the humanities and the sciences will emerge as a leavening force in the Malay leadership. Such men, understanding the real reasons for Malay poverty and slowness in economic and social advancement, will find themselves in sympathy with the policies of the PAP....

It is the role of the PAP in Malaysia to convince the moderate leadership of the Malays that there is a rational economic method to abolishing rural poverty. There is an identity of purpose here between us and the moderate Malay leadership....

It is probable that democratic socialist policies as represented by the PAP may find acceptance and support in other areas in the Peninsula. *This will come about more quickly not by present PAP leaders taking an aggressive lead and setting the pace of politics, but more by helping to quicken the emergence of like-minded leaders domiciled in the Peninsula.* The immediate role of the PAP therefore is to provide a catalyst, through ideas and examples for the emergence of like-minded leaders in the Peninsula sympathetic to the democratic socialist cause.²³

An influential leader of the PAP told the author that they felt that eventually the Malays would give up extreme Malay nationalism and realize that it did not help them in the long run. 'But the PAP only hopes that his realisation comes before there is serious trouble. What we have decided and started doing is to launch an ideological offensive. We hope to attract the Malays to the PAP through ideology.'²⁴

Relations with the Malays in Singapore

In the meantime Singapore itself had its own communal problems. In mid-1964, there were serious communal riots in Singapore, which coincided, not without reason, with the mounting of UMNO propaganda against the PAP and its most important leader, Lee Kuan Yew. In the crucial elections of September 1963 the local Malays, by and large, had chosen to vote for the Malay candidates of the non-communal PAP rather than the Singapore branch of UMNO which they had

traditionally supported. The result was that UMNO lost to the PAP in all the Malay-majority constituencies where the latter had fielded its own Malay candidates.²⁵ This was considered an ominous development by the UMNO 'ultras' in Kuala Lumpur, who considered it a dangerous threat to Malay unity. They felt that if the PAP could attract Malays in Singapore, unless the trend was immediately stopped, it could spread to the Peninsula. The UMNO leadership believed that UMNO must have the support of all the Malays not only in Malaya but also in Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore; it was only on this basis that they were willing to accept the larger federation of Malaysia which included these territories. They would in no circumstances permit the Malays to look towards non-communal political parties. It was in this situation that the extremist leadership of the central UMNO decided to intervene in Singapore and attempt to stop the local Malays from coming to an understanding with the PAP. Having gained the support of the Malays in the 1963 elections, which had proved crucial, the PAP leadership was encouraged to attempt a more lasting relationship with the Malay community. With this in mind, soon after the elections, the PAP established contact with the Malay community and its many social, cultural and semi-political organizations. At the same time the PAP leadership gave very definite assurance to the Malays that in Singapore, too, they would enjoy a special position,²⁶ and there were indications that the Malays were responding.

On 12 July 1964, the UMNO sponsored a convention of about 150 Malay organizations in Singapore which was attended by Syed Jaafar Albar (Secretary-General of UMNO) and Ali bin Ahmad (Assistant Secretary-General). The convention appointed a 23-man 'action committee' to represent and speak for all the Malay organizations in Singapore in future dealings with the Singapore government. Syed Jafaar Albar and Ali bin Ahmad had played a key part in the appointment of the committee and had ensured that it consisted of people loyal to UMNO and having views identical to those of the UMNO 'ultras'. A lot of emphasis was given

²³ PAP, *Our First Ten Years*, pp. 111 and 112 (emphasis added).

²⁴ Interview with S. Rajaratnam, Foreign Minister of Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, December 1964.

²⁵ *The Straits Times*, 22 September 1963.

²⁶ *Asian Almanac*, Singapore, 19-25 July 1964, p. 667.

to the 'unfair treatment' of Malays in Singapore. The convention further took the important decision to boycott the Singapore government-sponsored meeting of the Malay organizations of 19 July to discuss problems affecting Malays in Singapore. The following speech was made by Syed Jaafar Albar, then Secretary-General of UMNO, at a large gathering of Malays in Singapore on 12 July 1964, only days before the communal riots began:

We have our last strength to rely upon. We are weak in all fields. We are economically weak. We are weak in the educational sphere. But we still have one last weapon of strength which we could use as an insistence [*sic*] upon others to recognise our existence and our presence, in this island of Singapura. This weapon is none other than our unity. This is the last force that is left in our hands, the hands of the Malays and the Muslims of this island. With this unity we will save our people, we will better our lot.

... If this unity persists, by the will of God, I tell you, no power ... on earth ... can trample on us, no power can look down upon us and belittle us.²⁷

At first the PAP considered this 'manifestation of extreme Malay nationalism as a temporary inevitable phase',²⁸ but very soon with the growing vehemence of the UMNO propaganda and the ascendancy of the extremist leaders within the UMNO, the PAP made a reappraisal of its policy. Another contributory factor could have been the suspected inadequacy of the earlier approach which had not brought any significant electoral support for the party in the 1964 general elections in Malaya, and also had not been successful in establishing a relationship with the UMNO. As Lee Kuan Yew put it in a speech at Kuala Lumpur on 24 February 1965:²⁹

The last three weeks starting with the Tunku's Chinese New Year Message mark the beginning of a new phase of Malaysia. It is a turning point, for recent Alliance speeches give expression to a fundamental decision, which must have been taken by their leaders to write off any hope of winning over large urban areas like Singapore. By their series of public pronouncements they have

disabled themselves from competing for mass support in Singapore and other sophisticated urban areas in Malaysia. Their primary interest now is to hold on to their rural base in Malaya.... He [Tengku Abdul Rahman] urged 'leaders of Singapore should concentrate their thought, efforts and work to build Singapore into the foremost city and the biggest port in Asia, because if they do so how happy it would be for all.' I find this a frank statement. If they wanted to compete, they must offer a better alternative government. Instead, here was frank admission that Singapore could not be won over by an Alliance type party. Therefore, as the Tunku added, all would be happy if Singapore leaders should concentrate all their energies to make this the biggest and best city in Asia.

What was left unsaid and so all the more underlined was that the People's Action Party should get out of Malaya and stop offering democratic socialism as an alternative to Allianceism, i.e. the policies of conservative Malay traditionalist leaders collaborating with Chinese compradores and capitalists for mutual benefit.

The Concept of a 'Malaysian Malaysia'

It was at this stage that the Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, introduced the unspecific but extremely effective slogan of 'Malaysian Malaysia'.³⁰ The leaders of UMNO immediately charged that Lee Kuan Yew, his party having miserably failed to win support in the last elections, was now making a communal appeal through the demand for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' to the non-Malays, especially the Chinese. They argued that Lee Kuan Yew did not enter the new federation with his eyes closed. The formation of Malaysia had been preceded by long negotiations and he was fully aware of the bases on which the new federation was being established. They asked what was the material change in the situation between March-April 1964, the time of the elections in Malaya when Lee Kuan Yew and the other PAP leaders were paying tributes to the Malay leadership of the government and were even attempting to replace the MCA in the Alliance, and later in 1965 when the Singapore Prime Minister made the demand for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' which by implication meant that Malaysia was not then truly Malaysian.

²⁷ Transcript of Syed Jaafar Albar's speech at Singapore, 12 July 1964. A photocopy was provided to the author by Syed Jaafar Albar.

²⁸ Interview with S. Rajaratnam, Singapore Foreign Minister, Kuala Lumpur, December 1964.

²⁹ Lee Kuan Yew, *Towards a Malaysian Malaysia*, Ministry of Culture (Singapore), 1965, pp. 1-2 (emphasis added).

³⁰ The idea of 'Malaysian Malaysia' was formulated in three speeches by Lee Kuan Yew in February-March 1965. They have been collected in the publication *Towards a Malaysian Malaysia*.

According to the PAP the 'fundamental principles' on which Malaysia was founded were the following:

(a) Malaysia should be a democratic society where legitimate differences of views provided they accept undivided loyalty to the Malaysian nation should be permitted and where individuals and political parties should have full freedom to persuade its citizens, by constitutional means, to their particular point of view.

(b) Malaysia being a multi-racial and multi-cultural society must show respect and tolerance for legitimate diversity provided these do not weaken Malaysian unity or hamper loyalty to Malaysia.

(c) Malaysia was conceived as belonging to Malaysians as a whole and not to any particular community or race.³¹

Further, the PAP leadership felt that the chauvinistic elements within the UMNO had grown bolder and more assertive 'because those who believe in a Malaysian Malaysia have remained passive and have been timid about declaring their loyalty to the concept of a Malaysian Malaysia'.³² Therefore the PAP undertook the task of organizing and uniting the pro-'Malaysian-Malaysia' forces within the country. Early in 1965, the PAP held informal discussions with these groups and launched the Malaysian Solidarity National Conference. In this they were able to acquire the support of the People's Progressive Party of Malaya, the United Democratic Party of Malaya and important political groups in Sabah and Sarawak. This development, an attempt to unite all the 'non-Malay' opposition, was viewed with very great concern by the leaders of the UMNO, and was seen as a proof of the dangerous ambition of the Singapore Prime Minister to extend his political influence and eventually control over the Peninsula.

The threat to the Malays and their position in the country thus became too great to be countered by less than an extreme and drastic measure. The Tengku decided to force Singapore out of the Federation of Malaysia even though this meant a loss of face for him, since he had been the

person in UMNO responsible for the creation of Malaysia with Singapore as a member State.

The Effects of Singapore's presence in Malaysia

These two developments—the polemics between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and the final exit of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia—had an important impact on the political situation in the country. The PAP, through its criticism of the MCA and its demand for a 'Malaysian Malaysia', had not only brought once again to the surface the outstanding issues of the political role of the non-Malay communities and the position of their cultures and languages but also through the debates that took place it had acted as a catalyst and had articulated the views of the non-Malay communities. The vigour and dynamism displayed by the PAP leadership, especially Lee Kuan Yew, was something new on the Malaysian political scene and proved highly contagious. Whereas earlier the Chinese and Indian communities had largely reconciled themselves to the situation (for they lacked a political organization that could properly express their desires) now the same groups were suddenly roused to action. They began to worry and think about the future of their communities and consequently the issues became alive and began to be debated publicly. The articulateness and strength of the PAP leadership gave them courage, and they felt for the first time that a well-organized political force was behind them. They were considerably shaken by the exit of Singapore for they believed that Singapore was forced out of the federation only because it had raised these issues and demanded a 'Malaysian Malaysia' which they themselves had always cherished and hoped for in the future.

Closely related to these developments (in fact to some extent resulting from them) was the considerable intensification of the communal antipathies between the Malays and the non-Malays. For the first time in independent Malaya, and later Malaysia, serious communal riots took place in Singapore and Bukit Mertajam (Penang) during July 1964. Starting on 12 July, serious communal riots occurred in Bukit Mertajam. Two people were killed and several injured. In Singapore, riots began on 21 July and by 25 July at least twenty-one people had been killed and

³¹ 'Statement by the Convenors of the Malaysian Solidarity National Conference', undated (mimeographed), a copy with this writer.

³² *Ibid.*

about 500 injured.³³ The reasons for these riots have already been discussed.³⁴

The National Language Bill 1967

Racial tension in West Malaysia was further aggravated by the controversy during late 1966 and early 1967 in connexion with the National Language Bill and the fears and antipathy generated by it both amongst the Malays and the non-Malays. The 1957 constitution of the Federation of Malaya had provided that 'the national language shall be the Malay language', but at the same time it had stated that 'for a period of ten years after Merdeka day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, the English language may be used in both Houses of Parliament, in the Legislative Assembly of every State, and for all other official purposes'.³⁵ This period of ten years came to an end on 31 August 1966 and the government led by the Alliance wasted no time in announcing its intention of proposing legislation to make Malay the sole official language from 1 September 1967.

The Malay extremists, led by Tuan Syed Nasir bin Ismail, had made early preparations to put pressure on the government to ensure that no concessions were made to the non-Malays. In early 1965, they set up the National Language Action Front ('Barisan Bertindak Bahasa Kebangsaan') whose 'primary aim is to assist the government in the implementation of Malay as the official language by 1967'.³⁶ In February 1966, the National Language Month Conference headed by Tuan Syed Nasir called on the government to implement Article 152 of the Constitution and do away with the use of English as an official language and make the national language the sole official language on 1 September 1967.³⁷

In response to the Malay extremist pressure, groups both within the Chinese community and the Malaysian Chinese Association began making

demands on behalf of the Chinese community. At the beginning of October 1966, the Selangor State branch of the MCA passed a resolution calling upon the national body to secure a 'more liberal use' of the Chinese language for official purposes.³⁸ Immediately the Selangor branch was joined by the Perak branch, where support was pledged in a resolution passed at an emergency meeting of the branch working committee on 4 October. A spokesman of the branch stated that the request for greater use of the Chinese language had been accepted by MCA headquarters. He added: 'The present members of the central working committee of the MCA headquarters were elected in February on this platform. Therefore, the central working committee members ought to support the resolution'.³⁹ In another resolution the Perak branch called on the National Language Action Front to cease comment on the issue of greater use of Chinese language for official purposes 'as such action does not promote racial harmony'. On 9 October it was announced that MCA youth leaders, led by Lee Siok Yew and Lee San Choon,⁴⁰ would soon make a country-wide tour to gather support for more liberal use of the Chinese language.⁴¹

The MCA national organization first attempted to disown the demands by several of its important State branches. The President, Tan Siew Sin, and the Secretary-General, Khaw Kai Boh, issued public statements condemning the attempts to create an issue over language. However, the central working committee of the party, realizing the intensity of the feelings among certain sections of the Chinese community, in an emergency meeting 'pledged its support for more liberal use of Chinese language in selected fields and in government notices,

³⁸ *The Malay Mail*, 4 October 1966.

³⁹ *The Straits Times*, 5 October 1966. Soon the Penang MCA also passed a resolution affirming support for more liberal use of the Chinese language.

⁴⁰ Lee Siok Yew was then an Assistant Minister of Education and the Secretary-General of MCA Youth. Until February 1966, Lee Siok Yew was the Secretary-General of the MCA. Lee San Choon was at that time a Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Labour and the President of MCA Youth.

⁴¹ *The Straits Times*, 10 October 1966.

³³ *Asian Almanac*, Singapore, 19-25 July 1964, p. 670.

³⁴ See pp. 11-12.

³⁵ *The Constitution of Federation of Malaya*, Article 152, Clauses 1 & 2.

³⁶ *The Straits Times*, 6 April 1965.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 26 February 1966.

forms and son'.⁴² Khaw Kai Boh said on 20 October 1966 that the MCA stood firm on the existing status of the Chinese language and for its liberal use as on signboards, notices and announcements.⁴³ He further asserted that 'the Alliance has established its action committee to solve the language problem. The chairman of the committee, Inche Mohammad Khir Johari, has given assurances that the Chinese language will not be sacrificed.'

The non-Malay attempt to secure guarantees that a liberal use of Chinese and Tamil would be permitted after 1 September 1967 was successful. Clause 3 of the National Language Bill presented to the Parliament in February 1967 affirmed: 'Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the Federal Government or any State Government to use any translation of official documents or communications in the language of any other community in the Federation for such purposes as may be deemed necessary in the public interest.' Further, Clause 4 provided that 'The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may permit the continued use of the English language for such official purposes as may be deemed fit'. Clauses 5-8 provided for the continued use of English in the courts, the Federal Parliament and in State Assemblies, and in the texts of laws.

Large sections of the Malay community, both within UMNO and outside, considered the concessions a betrayal of their cause by the UMNO leadership, in particular by Tengku Abdul Rahman.⁴⁴ Within UMNO there was considerable dissatisfaction and dissension. Many branches and leaders at the low levels had to be disciplined by the national organization. Outside the party various groups joined together under the leadership of the National Language Action

Front and showed their hostility to the bill in no uncertain terms. Several demonstrations took place during the period and there was one incident when effigies of the Prime Minister were burnt by angry Malays. The Malays' faith in the Tengku was considerably undermined and he was never again to enjoy the position of the unchallenged leader of the Malay community that he had enjoyed for the past fifteen years. This was later to have an effect on the elections for the Tengku was no longer in a position to attract substantial number of Malay votes through his personal appeal.

Malay hostility was basically two-fold. First they were opposed to the continued use of English provided for by the Bill. They were especially angered by the fact that the Bill did not stipulate any time limit to the use of English for official purposes. They believed that so long as English was allowed to be used for official purposes Malay would never attain the status of the real national and official language. Non-Malays would tend to use English and ignore and not learn Malay. And they would continue to maintain their pre-eminent position in business, industry, the professions, and state services through the English language. Second, they felt that the Bill had accorded Chinese and Tamil a sort of semi-official status, and had indirectly introduced multi-lingualism.

In spite of the substantial opposition by a section of the Malay community the government went ahead and the bill was passed by the Dewan Raayat on 3 March 1967 by 95 votes to 11. Only the nine representatives of the Pan Malayan Islamic Party, S.P. Seenivasagam (People's Progressive Party) and C.V. Devan Nair (Democratic Action Party) voted against the bill. The rest of the opposition was not present when the vote was taken.

This controversy had reopened the emotive issue of language and education. In the Malay community there was a widespread feeling of having been let down by Tengku Abdul Rahman and the Alliance. On the side of the non-Malays, it gave parties such as the Democratic Action Party and the People's Progressive Party a handy issue to project themselves as the champions of the cause of the Chinese and Indian communities and utilize this to secure the support of these communities during the elections.

⁴² Quoted in M. Roff, 'The Politics of Language in Malaya', *Asian Survey*, May 1967, p. 323.

⁴³ *The Straits Times*, 21 October 1966.

⁴⁴ Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman speaking on the bill in the Dewan Raayat had himself said: 'I learn, however, that there has been suspicion among the Malays that I and my friends and leaders in the UMNO and the Alliance have failed to carry out our promises and that we have relegated the Malay language to a secondary position instead of making it the official language of the country. They also suggest that we have sold the Malays down the drain.' *The Straits Times*, 3 March 1967.

The Formation of the DAP and the Gerakan

It was in the context of this developing disharmony between the Malays and the non-Malays that two important new political parties—the Democratic Action Party and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement)—were launched. The important point was that they (especially the DAP) were far more homogeneous than any opposition parties formed previously and they presented a more coherent and clear-cut policy and programme. As a result, they were able to provide the leadership and rallying point for non-Malay discontent and disillusionment with the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress, and emerge as the major opposition parties.

After Singapore left Malaysia one of the principal leaders of the PAP and its only representative in the Malaysian Parliament from peninsular Malaya, C.V. Devan Nair, remained in Malaysia because he was a citizen by birth. Under his leadership 'a completely Malaysian-based PAP took over, in a much more modest fashion, of course, from where the largely Singapore-based PAP had left'.⁴⁵ However, the Malaysian government was not willing to allow the party to operate in Malaysia on the grounds that it now had its base in a foreign country. The party was de-registered on 9 September 1965. Thereupon, the leadership of the party sought registration of a new party, the Democratic Action Party, with the same programme. After considerable controversy, the government finally approved the registration of the new party on 19 March 1966.

Initially, the new party put itself forward as the champion of a 'Malaysian Malaysia' as presented by Lee Kuan Yew, the leader of the Singapore PAP. They did not at the beginning attempt to define fully what 'Malaysian Malaysia' meant. It was only when the general elections were drawing near that it felt that the vague slogan would not be effective enough to attract mass support and it began to define the 'Malaysian Malaysia' that it sought to establish. In its definition of the phrase, it significantly went beyond the position taken earlier by the PAP.

The Party's 'basic guiding policy and principles' were contained in 'The Setapak Declaration' announced on 29 July 1967. It committed itself to 'the ideal of a free, democratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the principles of racial equality, and social and economic justice, and founded on the institutions of parliamentary democracy'.⁴⁶ It called for the implementation of the principle of racial equality 'at all levels of national life and in all fields of national endeavour—political, social, economic, cultural and educational'.⁴⁷ It laid great emphasis on demolishing the idea of racial hegemony by one community for it was not only undesirable but also impractical because of the composition of the population in the country. It maintained that each community in Malaysia, by itself, is outnumbered by the others so as to make the idea of racial hegemony completely impractical. It then took exception to the classification of citizens into *bumiputras* and *non-bumiputras* and rejected the system of discrimination against citizens in matters of 'appointments and promotions, particularly in the public sector and now increasingly in the private sector on grounds of race'.⁴⁸ This was a clear attack on the Malay special position guaranteed by the Constitution of Malaysia and thus far never challenged by any political party, except the Perak-based People's Progressive Party. Even the PAP, when it had introduced the slogan of 'Malaysian Malaysia', did not attack the special position of the Malays as contained in the Constitution of Malaysia, but had publicly committed itself to uphold these privileges.

On the contentious issue of language, culture and education of the non-Malay communities, the new party again moved significantly away from the position earlier taken by the PAP. It rejected the premise that 'the propagation and permanence of the national language can only be finally secured on the basis of the eventual deculturation of two major communities in Malaysia—the Chinese and the Indians'.⁴⁹ It maintained that the Malaysian Constitution did recognize the multi-lingual and multi-cultural nature of the society and provided for the free

⁴⁵ Democratic Action Party, 'Central Executive Committee Report to the First Party Conference', 17 March 1968, quoted in 'Who Live if Malaysia Dies', 1969, p. 53.

⁴⁶ Democratic Action Party, 'The Setapak Declaration', p. 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 4.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 5-6

use of the languages of the Chinese and Indian communities. It asserted that this constitutional guarantee had been 'rendered sterile by an educational policy which did not permit the free use of the Chinese and Tamil languages, as media of instruction and of examination in national-type secondary schools'.⁵⁰ It committed itself to restore the constitutional guarantee and seek the use of Chinese and Tamil languages for official purposes in addition to Malay and English. On these issues the party did not stop here and just before the 1969 general elections, it made its position more explicit and adopted a more extreme posture in order to attract large popular support.⁵¹ With this new orientation the party attracted a significant number of younger people in the Chinese and Indian communities, and its later emphasis on the languages and educational systems of the non-Malay communities was to give it the support of an even wider cross-section of the non-Malay communities, especially the Chinese. This caused it to emerge as the main non-Malay opposition party.

While the Democratic Action Party was emerging as a powerful political force, a new party, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, was inaugurated on 24 March 1968. The key sponsors of the party were Dr. Tan Chee Khoo and V. Veerappen (both former leaders of the Labour Party), Dr. Lim Chong Eu (the foremost leader of the United Democratic Party), and a few well-known non-party men, Professor Wang Gungwu (then Professor of History, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur), Professor Hussein Alatas (Professor of Malay Studies, University of Singapore) and Dr. J.B.A. Peter (President of the Malaysian Medical Association). Besides the small number of well-known individuals, the nucleus of the new party was provided by the English-educated moderates of the Labour Party and the non-chauvinist Chinese of the United Democratic Party led by Dr. Lim Chong Eu. In

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 6.

⁵¹ During the 1964 general elections the PAP gave the impression of accepting Malay as the sole official language of Malaysia. But during the house-to-house campaign when PAP workers were asked about their party's position on the issue of official language, they did not give a clear answer but told them to look at the situation in Singapore where Malay, English, Chinese and Tamil, all enjoyed an equal status of official languages, thus

order to understand why these leaders of other parties decided to form a new party, it is worth giving a brief background of these parties.

The Labour Party of Malaya was formed in the early 1950s by a group of English-educated leaders of trade unions of government employees.⁵² Starting from 1954, the party came under the influence of a group of professional men, Tan Phock Kin, D.S. Ramathan, Lee Kok Liang and V. Veerappen, all English-educated and moderate in their socialist orientation. Between 1957 and 1960, a large number of Chinese-educated Chinese joined the party. The leadership of these groups came from the National Union of Factory and General Workers, a powerful pro-communist trade union organization of Chinese-educated Chinese workers. The registration of the Union was cancelled by the Registrar of Trade Unions on 30 April 1958 because of its suspected links with the outlawed Malayan Communist Party. As noted earlier, the crisis in the Alliance in mid-1959, just before the Parliamentary elections, had created widespread dissatisfaction in the Chinese community and many who had traditionally supported the Malayan Chinese Association were disillusioned with its role and left it. In the non-Malay majority States of Penang, Selangor, Johore and Malacca,⁵³ these Chinese-educated Chinese, finding no other alternative, swelled the ranks of the Labour Party, and by 1961, the Chinese-educated Chinese were able to establish full control over the Labour Party.

The English-educated leaders and the small rank and file were cosmopolitan in outlook and genuinely non-communal in their orientation and showed little inclination towards exploiting communal issues for purposes of gaining mass support for the party. The Chinese-educated came from a very different background. Almost all of them were of working class origin coming from the small towns and New Villages. They were all educated in Chinese-medium schools,

implying that the PAP supported multi-lingualism.

⁵² For the full story of the Labour Party see Vasil, *Politics in a Plural Society. A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in Malaysia*, chapter 3.

⁵³ In Perak these were attracted by the Perak-based People's Progressive Party which had already established itself as a pro-Chinese organization.

centres with a long tradition of Chinese nationalism. Basically most of them, except their small number of ideologically articulate leaders, were Chinese chauvinists. Ideological extremism was only incidental. Their basic commitment was to China and its great culture. They did not like the English-educated leaders of the party at all. To them the most important function of the Party was to educate the masses for the eventual and inevitable victory of socialism. They did not attach great importance to elections. Until the mid-1960s, they tolerated the English-educated leadership and allowed them to remain in the party and occupy high positions at the national level of party organization (at the State levels the party had come under the complete control of the Chinese-educated) for they gave the party a certain respectability which was useful in the existing situation in the country. Also the presence of the English-educated Chinese in the party made it difficult for the government to take drastic action against it.

But Malaysia and 'Indonesian confrontation' created an unbridgeable gap between the English-educated and the Chinese-educated. During the period of 'Indonesian confrontation' the Chinese-educated established close links with the new Barisan Sosialis in Singapore which had broken away from the pro-Malaysia and non-communist PAP. Under the influence of the Barisan Sosialis, the Labour Party adopted an extreme left-wing and Chinese chauvinist line. It also took an extreme anti-Malaysian and pro-Indonesian position. The Chinese-educated gave up all pretence of operating within the constitutional framework and came out openly in support of a mass struggle to secure political power. At the 13th National Conference in Penang in August 1967, the party in an important resolution said:

... our party must break the old bondage of 'legalism' and must shatter the superstition of 'parliamentary path'. We must resolutely take the line of mass struggle and we must adopt the policy and tactic of mass struggle in conjunction with parliamentary struggle while using mass struggle as the main form of struggle.

... the party must repudiate the thought of the 'parliamentary maniacs' and right opportunism that dominated the party for a long time⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Labour Party of Malaya, 'The Resolution of the 13th National Delegates' Conference' (mimeographed), August 1967.

The new orientation was completely unacceptable to the English-educated leadership and rank and file who thereupon left the party. Many withdrew themselves from politics completely. But some key leaders, Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, Tan Phock Kin and V. Veerappen, started thinking in terms of a new political organization representing their moderate views with regard to socialism and communal issues.

At the same time, the leading figure in the United Democratic Party, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, had been doing some rethinking with regard to his own political future and the future of his party. The party had been inaugurated in late 1962 with high hopes and had been led and participated in mainly by pro-Chinese elements who had left the Malayan Chinese Association in 1959 at the time of the Alliance crisis. The new party, under the leadership of the moderate Dr. Lim Chong Eu, committed itself to a reasonable, non-communal programme, against the wishes of the extremists who saw the party as a strongly pro-Chinese organization. It also invited a well-known Malay, Dato Zainal Abidin bin Abas (a former leader of the UMNO and later of Party Negara), to become its chairman. In its further attempt to give the party a non-communal image, it fielded a very large number of Malay candidates in the 1964 general elections, unfortunately all of whom lost and many of them, including Dato Zainal Abidin, forfeited their deposits.⁵⁵ This defeat of the party in the elections strengthened the position of the extremist pro-Chinese elements who argued that with its strictly non-communal image the party was not getting anywhere. It failed to make any impact on the Malay community, and in the process, it had lost the confidence of the large numbers of Chinese who had looked towards the party to protect their interests and position. This had created serious pressures within the party and it seemed probable that Dr. Lim would not be able to maintain the non-communal position of the party for long.

As a result, when the Chinese-educated took over the Labour Party and made it impossible for the English-educated leadership and rank and file to continue to remain within the party, Dr. Lim Chong Eu saw his opportunity and

⁵⁵ See R.K. Vasil, 'The 1964 General Elections in Malaysia', p. 51.

established contact with these people. Initially, strong attempts were made to seek cooperation with the Democratic Action Party. They believed that a united opposition was imperative in the context of the growing cleavages between the Malays and the non-Malays and the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the government under the Alliance Party. They suggested to the leadership of the DAP that they should dissolve their own party and join hands with them in the formation of a new joint political organization. The DAP leaders were not very keenly attracted to this idea because their party had already emerged as a significant political force with a strong appeal for non-Malay youth, and they were unwilling to lose the identity of their own separate organization. There were also fairly important policy differences. C.V. Devan Nair asserted⁵⁶ that the DAP was 'amenable' to any serious proposal for a united opposition party provided:

- (a) the programme was pro-Malaysia, multi-racial and non-communist;
- (b) the name and symbol of the D.A.P. be retained;
- (c) while leaders like Dr. Lim Chong Eu, Tan Chee Khoo and Alatas would be given places in the Central Committee, the applications from their rank and file supporters would only be considered on their individual merits. This was because the D.A.P. had, right from its inception, been very cautious about admission of members to the party, and had set its face against any mass membership drive. We did not want the party to suffer from the effects of indiscriminate membership campaigns, like the Labour Party. The result would have been heavy infiltration by the communists, the Special Branch, or by both.

Devan Nair further stated:

There were other policy differences, which were not so serious and might have been circumvented. For example, the D.A.P. was not prepared to forego its support in principle for the Internal Security Act, whereas all the others were ready to play up to the gallery by denouncing the Internal Security Act in principle but quietly agreeing to its need in practice.

Negotiations dragged on over a period of several months without achieving anything. Disheartened, the present leadership of the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia decided to launch a new political party of its own in March 1968.

⁵⁶ Personal statement to the author, 12 March 1970.

From the beginning the leadership made a special effort to attract the support of the trade unions.⁵⁷ At the second meeting of the *pro tem* committee of the party Yeoh Teck Chye, a leading trade unionist and the President of the Malaysian Trades Union Congress, was elected a vice-chairman, and another well-known trade union leader, V. David, was elected Deputy-Secretary-General. Since independence in 1957, by and large, trade unions and their leaders had kept out of politics. As a result there was no political party in the country closely identified with this numerous and well-organized political force. The Gerakan leadership considered the support of the trade unions vital for the success of the movement and therefore attempted to give the party the image of being a party of the working classes. In early November 1968, it issued a Workers' Charter outlining the party's policy concerning problems being faced by workers and the trade union movement. It asserted that the trade union movement in Malaysia had been placed under severe restraints and undemocratic restrictions by the Alliance government through a series of anti-labour laws such as The Trade Unions Ordinance of 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act of 1967.⁵⁸ The party committed itself to abolish these and other such legislation 'as a matter of great urgency'.

At the same time the party made a special effort to attract Malays to the leadership and rank and file of the party so that it could emerge as a genuinely non-communal party. The party elected a respected and well-known Malay, Professor Syed Hussain Alatas, as its first Chairman. Five of the sixteen members elected to the *pro tem* committee of the party were Malays. The fundamentals of the party's policy and programme announced on 15 April 1968 laid great emphasis on non-communalism and made a special mention of the needs of the Malay community.

We recognise the need to accord special attention and emphasis on the economically weak Malays and other indigenous peoples. Their problems require a special

⁵⁷ K. George, a vice-President of the Malaysian Trades Union Congress, attended the inaugural meeting of the party in his private capacity.

⁵⁸ Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Workers' Charter (mimeographed), 3 November 1968. (See Appendix 1(c) III for the full text.)

approach and special remedies. They should be protected from exploitation and assisted to compete with other communities on a just basis in business, trade and the professions.⁵⁹

With regard to the problem of nation-building it said:

We strive for a Malaysian nationhood evolved out of the existing communities in Malaysia. The process of formation should be left to historical growth. The state participates in its formation by eliminating obstacles to

harmony and inter-community acculturation. It should not impose cultural elements or indulge in artificial experiments such as introducing a common dress, dance, ritual and ceremony without regard to the receptivity of the communities in Malaysia. We emphasise common experience and the sense of a common destiny as the decisive essentials of nationhood rather than cultural, religious or ethnic uniformity.

We shall see later that when the details were worked out the party presented a programme which proved to be attractive to the Malays.

⁵⁹ An mimeographed document circulated by the party on 15 April 1968.

ELECTION ISSUES AND CAMPAIGN

Electoral 'Arrangement' of the Opposition Parties
 As noted in the preceding chapter, the newly formed Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia placed great emphasis on the unity of the opposition. Its leaders believed that in the past the undoing of the opposition was largely a result of the divisions within their ranks. Therefore, having failed in their attempts to establish a single united opposition party, they made a strong effort to secure an electoral alliance, or at least an electoral understanding, among the different opposition parties. The idea of an electoral understanding appealed even to the Democratic Action Party which earlier had shown little interest in the unity of the opposition parties. This, however, did not prove to be easy to accomplish. With elections drawing near, prolonged negotiations were held between the DAP, the PPP, and the Gerakan Rakyat during the months of January and February 1969. There was very considerable mutual bickering and distrust. Several times they almost reached an electoral arrangement, and on many occasions they came almost to a complete parting of the ways.

There were, however, two crucial considerations which eventually led to a measure of cooperation and an electoral understanding of a limited nature among the main opposition parties, the Gerakan, the DAP and the PPP. This excluded the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the other important opposition party. These dominant considerations were:

1. The Alliance had amended [the Constitution] on several occasions using its more than two-thirds majority in the Parliament. There was strong fear among the opposition parties—and in this they were all united—that there had already been substantial curtailment of fundamental rights and liberties of the people under Alliance rule, and if the Alliance was to return to power again with more than a two-thirds majority this would lead to a further and greater curtailment of civil liberties. More important, it would make it that much more difficult for the opposition parties to operate and gather popular support.

2. Past experience had shown that disunity among the opposition had been to the advantage of the Alliance. A

multiplicity of opposition candidates in the preceding elections had almost invariably led to Alliance success. Therefore, there was a strong wish to avoid a multiplicity of opposition candidates.¹

The response of the opposition parties to these considerations varied, and there were sharp differences within the parties. Only the Gerakan showed a great desire for cooperation and joint action by the opposition. In the case of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party these considerations had little significance. The PMIP's preoccupation was solely with a defeat of the inter-communal Alliance which was the greatest obstacle to its efforts to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia. More important, as an extreme Malay communal party, it could not afford to reach any understanding with the other opposition parties, all of whom were essentially non-Malay in composition.

The PPP leadership did not show much interest because it had no major worries with regard to the second consideration. First, the party's electoral support had been restricted entirely to the State of Perak where the other opposition parties (except the PMIP which, being a Malay communal organization, could anyway not affect the fortunes of the PPP) had attracted little support until the 1969 elections. And secondly, it had already established close links and an electoral understanding with the DAP, the only opposition party which could significantly cut into its electoral support. Even in the 1964 general elections there had been an understanding between the PPP and the PAP, the forerunner of the DAP. Consequently, it was only the first consideration mentioned above which influenced the thinking of the PPP leadership on the issue of electoral understanding. But here also the party, not being a country-wide organization, was not as strongly concerned about amendments to the constitution as was the Gerakan. Moreover, the party had never fully accepted the constitution, and it had serious reservations about issues such as that of official language, the special position

¹ Interviews with V. Veerappen and Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, Kuala Lumpur, January 1969.

of the Malays etc. As a result, while not being opposed to the idea, the PPP did not put very great emphasis on obtaining electoral understanding among the different opposition parties.

In the case of the DAP the situation was far more complicated. Firstly, the party, as noted earlier, had shown great concern for preserving the unambiguity of its orientation and policy position during earlier negotiations with Gerakan leaders in their attempts to create a united opposition party. It had a definite feeling that the coming elections would be fought on outstanding issues which had caused concern in the minds of the non-Malay communities since independence and that the fortunes of the different parties would be decided on the basis of the position they took on these vital issues. And having decided to attempt mainly to secure the support of the non-Malay communities at this time (the attempt to attract Malays to the party was only to be effected later, once the solid support of the non-Malay communities had been secured) it wished to present its policy position in an unadulterated and uncompromising form so as to have maximum impact on the non-Malay communities. The implicit assumption was that championing the cause of the non-Malays would bring substantial support from the Chinese and Indians. This ruled out an electoral alliance with Gerakan, for that would imply a certain affinity at the policy level between the two parties. Because of the Gerakan's a different approach to the problem of securing Malay support and maintaining the non-communal character of the party, its leadership had fears that association in any form with the Gerakan would confuse the non-Malay electorate and reduce significantly the effectiveness of its own position on the important issues of language, education, and special position of the Malays.

On the other hand, the Gerakan leadership throughout placed a great emphasis on attracting Malay support, however insignificant it might be initially, and maintaining the non-communal character of the party right from the beginning. They did not share the DAP view that the party, in order to emerge as a viable and effective entity, had first to build up a mass base, even if it meant only among the non-Malay communities, and only later attempt to attract Malay support. Consequently, the Gerakan placed considerable emphasis on presenting its policies so as not to

alienate the Malay community and with the positive aim of attracting them. In fact, the party at the time of its formation had elected a prominent Malay as its Chairman. Therefore the DAP pursued a very cautious approach to the whole issue for it did not want to affect in any way its appeal among the non-Malay communities. It was therefore willing only to consider an electoral arrangement and not an electoral alliance which would only mean an agreed distribution of constituencies among the different opposition parties with the sole aim of avoiding multi-angular contests.

Secondly, there was a more extreme group within the DAP who doubted the efficacy of an electoral arrangement with the other opposition parties, which in effect meant only with the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia. Here they argued that such an arrangement would be more beneficial to the Gerakan than to their own party. They believed that their own party had achieved a breakthrough in building up a popular image and attracting the support of the non-Malay communities; intervention by Gerakan candidates in some constituencies during the elections would only be of very marginal significance. But the arrangement would be of immense benefit to the newly formed Gerakan which had yet to build up an effective party organization and a popular image. They also argued that without the electoral arrangement it was very likely that the Gerakan would suffer serious reverses in the elections and might be forced to disband. They believed that it was important to destroy the Gerakan at this stage, before it had time to build up its organization, for this was the only party which could in future become a serious competitor to their own party. Here they pointed out the significant result of the by-election in the Serdang (neighbouring Kuala Lumpur) State constituency held on 28 December 1968. Serdang had been a traditional Socialist Front stronghold and the Chinese-educated in both the Labour Party and the Party Raayat had enjoyed very substantial influence among the large numbers of Chinese and Indian voters. In both the 1959 and 1964 general elections the seat had been won by the Socialist Front.² The result of the by-election,

² The by-election had been caused by the resignation of Chin Kek Kum, the sitting member of Party Raayat, who had been under detention since July 1968.

in which the Alliance, the DAP and the Gerakan fielded candidates, was as follows:

Thuan Paik Phok (Alliance-MCA)	6,535 votes
Lim Kit Siang (DAP)	5,928 votes
Tan Han Swee (Gerakan)	1,330 votes

The Gerakan fared very badly in the election in spite of the fact that some of its leaders who had earlier been associated with the Socialist Front were well-known in the area and had done considerable campaigning. On the other hand, the DAP did very well, even though this was the first time it had contested in the area and its leaders were not at all known in the constituency. Based on the result of the by-election, this group in the DAP argued that the Gerakan would suffer the same fate in the general elections and would be destroyed. They maintained that as in the by-election the Labour Party campaign calling upon people to boycott the elections would seriously affect the Gerakan, and the DAP by entering into an electoral arrangement with it would only save it from certain destruction. It was the consciousness of this very weakness that motivated the leadership of the Gerakan to place great emphasis on seeking an electoral arrangement with the DAP.

However, within the DAP a considerable section of opinion led by its founder, C.V. Devan Nair, was not so certain of the party's own strength and mass support and therefore was less hesitant about agreeing on an electoral arrangement with the Gerakan. They feared that without such an arrangement the two parties could destroy each other and allow the Alliance to emerge with significant victories in the multi-party contest. This fear, and the persistence and perseverance of the Gerakan leadership, eventually resulted in February in a three-way electoral arrangement among the DAP, the PPP and the Gerakan. Instead of a tripartite electoral arrangement not to field candidates against each other, they entered into separate agreements, each one of them with the other two. But the net result was the same. They allocated both the Parliamentary and State constituencies to each of the three parties on the basis of its organization and an estimate of electoral support in the constituency.

The Alliance Campaign

In spite of the electoral arrangement, the opposition parties faced the elections with a

considerable measure of uncertainty and lack of confidence. But the Alliance, by contrast, faced the elections with a great deal of confidence and optimism; there was no inkling of the impending disaster which faced them once the counting of the votes began. They had no idea of the changed mood of the non-Malay electorate and their evaluation of their prospects in the elections was based negatively, as before, on the multiplicity of the opposition parties and the existing differences among them on a personal and policy level. What they did not realize was that instead of the opposition parties going to the non-Malay electorate to secure their vote, in their new mood it would be the electorate which would seek out the opposition to deliver their support. In the preceding two general elections, in 1959 and 1964, the Alliance had been successful not because of its own strong positive appeal among the voters but because of the disunity of the opposition, on its being the party which had brought independence to the country and on its position as the party in power with a monopoly over the distribution of patronage and favour.³ The approach of the Alliance to elections had always been very casual, and it had made little effort to build up an effective and positive popular image. This had been successful in the past, and not sensing any visible change in the political situation the Alliance leadership did not face the electorate in a positive manner.

The Philippines Claim to Sabah

Conscious of the tremendous boost given the Alliance by Indonesian confrontation at the time of the 1964 general elections, at the beginning the Alliance leadership showed keenness to build up the Philippines' claim to Sabah and the resulting tension between the two countries as the key election issue. In this the initiative had been taken by Tun Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister and heir apparent to the Tengku, who made considerable play of 'threats' and 'mounting of troops' by the Philippines. At the very beginning of the election campaign, during March 1969, in a period of a few days, Tun Razak appeared in front page headlines on three occasions:

³ See Vasil, 'The 1964 General Elections in Malaya', and 'Constituency Studies, Batu', in Ratnam and Milne, *The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964*, Singapore, 1967, pp. 242-65.

'SABAH: NO DROP IN THREATS FROM THE PHILIPPINES'—TUN RAZAK;
'MANILA MASSING TROOPS, WE HAVE ENOUGH EVIDENCE'—RAZAK;

'FILIPINO TROOPS MASSING—WE MUST REMAIN ON GUARD'—TUN RAZAK.⁴

The opposition view of this attempt was well expressed by Dato Asri, the President of the PMIP, when he described the statements by Tun Razak that the Philippines had massed troops on islands around Sabah as 'a political gimmick'. He asserted:

The massing of the troops is an old matter. But Tun Razak has chosen to disclose it now as a political gimmick.... The central government is trying to instil fear in the minds of the people so that the Alliance will be returned to power again.⁵

However, this attempt was doomed right from the start. The dispute with the Philippines differed significantly from Indonesian confrontation in its nature and in the response of the opposition parties, and therefore could not be successfully exploited to mobilize mass support for the ruling Alliance party. First, the Philippines government never showed the same intensity and hostility as was shown by Indonesia during the period of the Indonesian confrontation, and it did not pursue the matter with tremendous zeal and so it did not create an atmosphere of mass hysteria as had been done in Indonesia by Soekarno, Subandrio and others. Secondly, the Philippines government had never been as blatantly anti-Chinese as the Indonesian government had been. Consequently, the Alliance government failed to stir up the Chinese in Malaysia against the Philippines as it had done with considerable effect at the time of Indonesian confrontation. And thirdly, at that time the entire opposition had opposed the Alliance approach to the formation of Malaysia, whereas with regard to the Philippines' claim the entire opposition stood solidly in support of the government. For the first time in the Malaysian Parliament a motion was passed unanimously when the government moved a resolution rejecting the Philippines' claim. On the other hand, at the time of Indonesian confrontation the Alliance had used the opposition parties' rejection of Malaysia to brand them as disloyal,

⁴ *The Straits Times*, 18, 20 and 22 March 1969.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 22 March 1969.

pro-Indonesian and by implication anti-Chinese, and it was successful in creating a general antipathy among the Chinese electorate against the opposition parties. Further, in its attempt to build up Indonesian confrontation as the sole election issue it was helped by the Singapore PAP which had intervened in the elections with the sole purpose of defeating the anti-Malaysia parties. Also the Socialist Front, the major opposition party, had itself unwisely attempted to project Malaysia as the central election issue.⁶

Campaign against the PMIP

In 1969 the campaign strategy of the Alliance, dominated by UMNO, was determined to a considerable degree by the latter's fears of the PMIP which had increased substantially since the formation of Malaysia in September 1963, especially since the worsening of relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and the exit of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in mid-1965. This period had seen a significant revitalization of the PMIP and a substantial increase in its appeal among the Malay masses. As mentioned in Chapter II, after the 1964 general elections there had been a considerable intensification of the communal antipathies. The Singapore and Bukit Mertajam (Penang) communal riots, the exit of Singapore from Malaysia, the domination of the Labour Party and the Socialist Front by the Chinese-educated chauvinists, and the national language controversy in early 1967, all had contributed greatly to this.

The communal riots in Penang in November 1967, following the Malaysian government decision to devalue the old Malaysian currency, had an especially severe impact on the Malays living in the states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, and Kedah and North Penang, areas where they form a vast majority of the population and where, in the absence of significant numbers of non-Malay peoples living among them, they have generally remained insulated and more conservative. As a result of these developments the Malays in these areas had come to feel strongly that the Alliance government, based on the principle of inter-communal cooperation, had failed to protect them against the non-Malays. They had

⁶ See Vasil, 'The 1964 General Elections in Malaya', pp. 39-45.

become disillusioned with the Alliance policies and had started looking for alternatives to protect their community and its interests. For instance, they had already organized the small private religious armies which had played havoc during the Penang riots. This is where the attraction of the PMIP came in. Even though the PMIP had failed badly in achieving rapid economic progress in Kelantan, where it had retained the control of the State government in the 1964 general elections, the party continued to enjoy the support of the Malays. It is less the lack of rapid economic development that stirs the Malay community than the basic fear of the non-Malays and their growing role in the administration, politics, government and economy, and the anxiety that unless it is stopped it would inevitably lead to their being 'reduced to the status of Red Indians striving to live in the wastelands of America'.⁷ This is where the PMIP assumed a far greater attraction than UMNO for it was felt that only the PMIP went to the root cause of the Malay predicament, that is, the presence of large numbers of non-Malays in the country and the great freedom they enjoyed in the political and economic spheres.

This new mood of the Malay masses was seen as a great threat to UMNO and in turn to the Alliance, to its very political base and the relationship of the three partners within it. The Alliance and the entire fabric of politics in the country had been built up around a strong UMNO, and therefore it could not afford to suffer any serious electoral reverses at the hands of the PMIP. It was thus imperative to ward off the serious threat posed by that party. There were two other important factors which made UMNO place the primary emphasis on retaining the Malay support for it, especially for the UMNO candidates. First, since the 1964 general elections, during which it had recaptured many of the seats lost to the opposition in 1959, the MCA had to a certain extent revived and revitalized its organization. The successes in the 1964 elections had led to the infusion of new blood into the MCA. A number of younger people, particularly Chinese-educated Chinese, had joined the MCA. The 'old guard' had begun losing its influence and a number of younger new

leaders had emerged. Significantly, the President of the party, Tan Siew Sin, earlier closely identified with the 'old guard', had started identifying himself more and more with the younger group of leaders. This had led to a consolidation of his leadership and a definite weakening of the influence of the old guard, mostly prosperous businessmen with substantial commercial interests. Consequently, it was expected that the MCA would do reasonably well in the elections and it was not thought to be facing a serious threat.

Secondly, in view of the serious losses suffered by the opposition parties in the 1964 elections and the persisting disunity and general demoralization within their ranks, the UMNO leadership did not believe that they would pose a serious threat to the Alliance, especially the MCA. Since the 1964 elections the major opposition coalition, the Socialist Front, had disintegrated. In late 1968 the Labour Party and the Chinese sections in the Party Raayat had decided to withdraw their representatives from the State and Federal legislatures. And more important, the larger of the two parties, the Labour Party, now completely controlled by Chinese-educated extremists, had decided to boycott the representative bodies and the general elections, and they had also mounted a strong campaign asking people to boycott the elections. The UMNO leadership believed that this boycott would be effective in keeping a large part of the more radical Chinese electorate away from the polls. This would certainly help the MCA and adversely affect the chances of the opposition parties. It was with this evaluation in mind that during the election campaign, the Alliance, especially the MCA, encouraged the Labour Party to intensify its campaign of asking the electorate to boycott the general elections and abstain from casting their vote.⁸

Taking these factors into account, the Alliance placed primary emphasis during its election campaign on the threat from the PMIP. Here the strategy was two-fold. First, the Alliance attempted to link the PMIP with the remnants of the Malayan Communist Party across the border in neighbouring Thailand. Secondly, and more

⁷ Letter to the Editor by 'Kampong Malay', *The Straits Times*, 7 July 1951.

⁸ Towards the end of March 1969, at the beginning of the election campaign, the government released 118 left-wing politicians (mostly from the Socialist Front) who

important, it emphasized the failure of the PMIP to achieve any measure of economic progress in Kelantan controlled by that party since the 1959 general elections. A crucial consequence of this emphasis on the threat from the PMIP was that on the whole the Alliance attempted to present its image, past achievements and promises for the future chiefly in terms of attraction to the Malay community.⁹ It did not make any special effort to attract non-Malay support, and the MCA and the MIC were generally left to their own devices. This emphasis on attracting Malay support placed a severe constraint on the MCA and the MIC in that the Alliance began acquiring an increasingly pro-Malay image. The secondary position of the MCA and the MIC was further reinforced and the non-Malay communities, by and large, became more and more convinced that the Alliance was entirely dominated by UMNO and was primarily committed to promoting and protecting the interests of the Malay community.¹⁰ It was this disenchantment with the Alliance which was largely responsible for the shattering election results.

With regard to the link between the PMIP and the Malayan Communist Party, at first the Alliance attempted to establish that the communists had revised their earlier approach, pursued also during the Emergency from 1948

were among 159 subversives arrested during the police swoop on militant 'communists' during November 1968. (*The Straits Times*, 28 March 1969.) Many in Malaysia saw this as an attempt on the part of the government to allow these to organize a boycott of the elections by the radical and chauvinist Chinese.

⁹ During the election campaign for the Kampong Bahru by-election in Kuala Lumpur on 7 January 1967 the Alliance very prominently displayed a banner which had different messages for different communities. In Malay it said: 'Vote for the interest of your race, religion and native land.' But in Chinese it read 'Vote for peace, progress and prosperity' and in Tamil 'Vote for peace, justice and prosperity'.

¹⁰ A number of actions of the Alliance party and the government around this time strengthened this feeling among the non-Malay communities. In 1965, the Alliance Constitution was amended to include the following as one of its objects: 'to promote the economic and social well-being of the indigenous people in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia', ('Constitution of the Malaysian Alliance Party', mimeographed, 16 April 1965). The earlier Constitution of the party had made no mention of the indigenous people and their well-being.

to 1960, of attempting a revolution mainly through the non-Malay communities. A White Paper, 'The Path of Violence to Absolute Power', issued by the Malaysian government in early November 1968, said in a special section on 'Exploitation of the Malay Masses':

The C.P.M. [Malayan Communist Party] realised long ago that the revolution could never fully succeed without mass Malay support.... Islam and Communism are however diametrically opposed in ideological concept and purpose, and this has rendered the Malays, as followers of Islam, largely impervious to Communist propaganda efforts to win them over.

To overcome this obstacle, the C.P.M. has devised a different approach. It now preaches the spurious doctrine that Islam and Communism share the same ideals and that the two can consequently harmonise in pursuit of a common goal, i.e., the so-called 'Liberation' of 'Malaya' from 'imperialist' domination allegedly being perpetuated by a 'reactionary' Government 'servile' to foreign capitalist domination. To complete the stage setting, the C.P.M. has also set up various ostensibly Malay-inspired facade organisations based in the Malaysian-Thai border area which purport to champion the cause of Malay nationalism. This concentrated effort to drive a wedge between the Malay masses and the Government is being directed by the Central Department of Malay Work (C.D.M.W.) of the C.P.M.¹¹

During the election campaign the Alliance leadership placed considerable emphasis on defending the special rights of the Malays. In a broadcast to the nation on the eve of the election the Tengku said: 'The Malays have gained for themselves political power. The Chinese and Indians have won for themselves economic power. The blending of the two with complete goodwill and understanding has brought about peace and harmony, coupled with prosperity to the country.' (*The Straits Times*, 9 May 1969.)

In March 1968, the government issued an order setting out the basis of allocation of government contracts. The directive ruled that: 'works amounting to less than \$10,000 should be given to Malay contractors only; when the total is not more than \$25,000, Malay contractors should be given a 5% preference; for tenders between \$25,000 and \$50,000, 2½% preference must be given to the Malays.' This had created quite a controversy in the country and there was very substantial opposition to it. During the midst of the election campaign the Master Builders Association wrote to the Prime Minister urging him to rescind the order but nothing was done. *The Straits Times*, 10 April 1969.

Also, during the election campaign it was indicated by the government that all existing English-medium schools would soon be converted into the Malay medium.

¹¹ Government of Malaysia, 'The Path of Violence to Absolute Power', Kuala Lumpur, November 1968, p. 28.

An important Malaysian political leader told the author at the time that this was only the first step in the Alliance strategy and that soon the Alliance would implicate the PMIP. The existence of certain radical left-wing elements in the rank and file and leadership of the PMIP would be used by the Alliance to link the PMIP with the Malayan Communist Party as had been done by the Alliance during the period of the Indonesian confrontation and the 1964 general elections.¹² The UMNO knew that it could hardly hope to destroy the PMIP through issues of religion and race. The only effective way to demolish the appeal of the PMIP among Malays was to link the party with the communists. In fact even before the elections, in mid-November, the Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, had said in a speech at Alor Star (Kedah) that some members of the PMIP had worked with communists in South Thailand.¹³

When the election campaign began, this attempt by the Alliance was intensified and many top-ranking leaders of UMNO made statements in the northern and east coast states alleging that the PMIP had links with the Malayan Communist Party. During mid-April 1969, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting and a senior leader of UMNO, Senu bin Abdul Rahman, alleged in a speech at Kota Bharu in Kelantan that communists had infiltrated into border villages and were campaigning for the PMIP. He said:

This assessment issued by the Government, however, was spurious. There were very definite indications that the Malayan Communist Party which during the 1960s had made special efforts to penetrate the Malay community had come to believe that because of the special hold of religion and feudalism on the Malay masses it was futile to wait for the Malay masses and therefore had decided to promote the revolution through non-Malay, especially Chinese, support. An indication of this new approach was the break up of the Socialist Front in late 1965 when the Malay Party Raayat and the essentially Chinese Labour Party parted company. Also, the decision of the Labour Party, now completely dominated by the Chinese-educated, to boycott the 1969 general elections and place all emphasis on mass struggle was a reflection of this new orientation of the Malayan Communist Party.

¹² Interview with V. Veerappen, Kuala Lumpur, December 1968.

¹³ *The Straits Times*, 15 November 1968. In fact, a few days earlier in a general round up of more than 140 people a PMIP State Assemblyman for Rantau Randjang

I have received reports that the Communists and their sympathisers have crossed the Malaysian-Thai border and infiltrated into *kampongs* at Batu Melintang and Batu Gajah and are calling on the people to vote for the PMIP. This is no election gimmick and it clearly goes to show the actual inclination of the PMIP.¹⁴

However, this attempt was not at all successful, for it was too far-fetched to have any impact on the Malay community.

The more important aspect of the Alliance campaign to counter the threat posed by the PMIP was to emphasize the latter's failure to achieve any economic advance in Kelantan since it had gained control of the State government in 1959. A grim picture of economic stagnation and decay was painted. On 10 April 1969, Tun Razak said at Kota Bharu that PMIP talk of forming a Malay government was 'a grand illusion like the *Melayu Raya* and *Nusantara* concept of deposed Indonesian President Sukarno' and was being brought up 'clearly to cover up its failures to develop the State [of Kelantan]'.¹⁵

The UMNO leaders considered the threat from the PMIP so great that on 10 April the party issued a special election manifesto for the State of Kelantan, the stronghold of the PMIP. The Alliance 'New Deal' Manifesto contained a \$550 million blueprint outlining measures that the Alliance would take should it win the elections. Tengku Abdul Rahman, in a foreword to the manifesto said: 'I have made this statement with all sincerity as a man who wants to see that the people of this country enjoy the benefits of prosperity and with a hope that the people of Kelantan would not be left in their state of poverty'.¹⁶ The manifesto pledged to redeem 700,000 acres of land in Kelantan which the PMIP, according to it, had mortgaged to foreign firms. The 'new deal' included provision of low cost housing, boats (for fishermen), and bicycles (for students)—all on easy terms. It offered further help to students by granting them \$250,000 for school books under a special

in Kelantan, Ahmad bin Yatim, was detained. He was also a member of the PMIP Executive. *The Straits Times*, 12 November 1968.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 15 April 1969.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 11 April 1969.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 11 April 1969.

aid fund, and promised a 'proper' religious education and more than \$10 million to be spent on building mosques, prayer houses and religious schools. It promised the construction of a \$7 million general hospital and \$5 million for clinics. The manifesto made the following further offers:

\$68.8 million for agriculture, land irrigation and drainage schemes,

\$50 million for opening up of land for various settlement schemes,

\$32.2 million for education, including the construction of 10 secondary schools, a special school to teach science, and a religious girls school, catering for classes up to the pre-University level,

\$175 million for the construction of roads and bridges,

\$10 million for setting up a State Economic Development Board to plan for new industries to create employment,

\$15 million for water supply, and

\$2.5 million for distribution of cattle and other livestock to farmers.

The President of the PMIP, Dato Mohammad Asri, called it 'daylight political bribery'.¹⁷

UMNO also attempted to emphasize that it was a greater champion of the religion of the Malays and that it had done more to promote Islam than the PMIP. Tun Razak suggested in an election meeting: 'While the PMIP uses religion as its political platform, it had done nothing to uplift it. In fact, most of the schools, mosques and *sarauts* in Kelantan were built by the central government.'¹⁸ In order to project UMNO as the true champion and promoter of Islam, the government convened a conference of Islamic nations during the election campaign period. The conference, attended by 100 delegates representing 20 countries, began its deliberations in Kuala Lumpur on 21 April 1969, only three weeks before the elections.¹⁹ At the opening meeting, Tun Razak said, in an obvious reference to the PMIP:

... the Government is faced with difficulties by a certain group of Muslims exploiting the conservatism of some of the people—saying that progress and development programmes now being implemented are contrary to the teachings of Islam. However, this group

is losing its influence as more and more Muslims understand the true teachings of Islam and become more enlightened.

The Menteri Besar of Selangor was soon to allege that certain elements (an obvious reference to the PMIP) were going around the villages spreading the idea of an Islamic Republic—without Sultans—in Malaysia.²⁰ 'These elements are telling the *kampung* folks that it is a waste of public money to have the Sultans.'

However, towards the end of the election campaign Tengku Abdul Rahman made a far more serious charge against the PMIP. On several occasions he alleged that there was a close link between the DAP and the PMIP. This was aimed to hit both at the PMIP and the DAP. The purpose was to condemn the PMIP in the eyes of the Malays by showing that it was cooperating with a Chinese chauvinist organization controlled from Singapore, and at the same time malign the DAP by demonstrating to the Chinese that it was not a genuine champion of the Chinese cause since it was willing to cooperate with the Malay extremist PMIP. On 18 April 1969, in an election meeting, the Tengku went a step further when he alleged that the DAP was getting assistance from a very close neighbour 'which I don't care to name' to finance PMIP candidates.²¹ 'The sole purpose of this is to break solidarity within UMNO so that there will not be any more Malay power in politics. That is why the PMIP is even contesting in constituencies where non-Malay voters outnumber Malay voters.' Later in the month, the Tengku 'disclosed' that several Singaporeans had been ordered out of the country for meddling in the election campaign.²² According to him they had crossed the causeway to help the DAP and to provide money to the PMIP. He charged that the People's Action Party of Singapore was assisting the PMIP through the DAP to enable it to contest in all constituencies where the MCA had fielded candidates with the aim to split the vote. He said: 'The PMIP is fielding 63 parliamentary

²⁰ Ibid. 30 March 1969. A similar charge was later made by the UMNO Secretary-General and the Minister of Education, Mohammad Khir Johari, on 6 April 1969. *The Straits Times*, 7 April 1969.

²¹ Ibid. 19 April 1969.

²² Ibid. 1 May 1969.

¹⁷ Ibid. 16 April 1969.

¹⁸ Ibid. 30 March 1969.

¹⁹ Ibid. 22 April 1969.

candidates knowing fully well that they will win fewer than 10 seats. But the PMIP is not worried as it is not their money.' For instance, the Tengku said, he knew of one parliamentary constituency in Perak where there were 30,000 non-Malay voters and only 2,000 Malay voters. Yet the PMIP had fielded a candidate in that constituency to split the vote so that the DAP would win. He described that as the PMIP's 'greatest treachery' to the Malays. This campaign was pursued with such vehemence and regularity that eventually the Singapore government was forced to intervene and on 6 May the Singapore Foreign Minister handed a note to the Malaysian High Commissioner which said:

We chose until now to attribute these unjust outbursts against the Singapore Government to the stress and strains of a General Election. ...our silence could be interpreted not only in Malaysia, but also in other friendly countries, as an admission of guilt. It is in order to set the record straight that we are compelled to categorically repudiate the allegations persistently made by Malaysian leaders.²³

However, this had the opposite effect. The very next day the Tengku addressing an election meeting asserted, now with greater vehemence, that the PAP leaders in Singapore were 'hoping to win over the Government in this country'. He said:

Knowing that they have no chance of winning the Chinese votes, they have no alternative but to split the Malays. So they are using the PMIP as their agent.

Singapore can deny our charges, but we have proof to substantiate our claim.²⁴

In retaliation, a counter-campaign alleging that the Alliance had received funds for the elections from foreign governments and CIA was mounted by the PMIP and the DAP. This was taken so seriously by the Alliance that it finally led in early May to both the Tengku and Dato Mohammad Asri taking oaths in a mosque that neither they nor their parties had received any money from foreign sources for the election campaign.²⁵

Campaign against the non-Malay Opposition Parties

With regard to the rest of the opposition the

Alliance singled out the Democratic Action Party, for they suspected that it was the only party which could emerge as a significant threat to them by using the widespread appeal of Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP and by championing the cause of the non-Malay communities. The two themes of the Alliance attack on the DAP were first, that the party was an anti-Malay communal party working to deprive the Malays of their rights, and secondly, that it was a mere adjunct of the Singapore PAP, operated and controlled by the latter. In an election meeting the Tengku warned that the DAP was out to destroy the Malay rights. Suggesting that the policy of the DAP would anger the Malays, he added: 'After all, what do the Malays have? All the wealth in this country is in the hands of the non-Malays. The factories and commercial organizations are in the hands of the non-Malays, so if they grab the rights of the Malays, the Malays will have to flee to the jungle.'²⁶ The President of the MCA, Tan Siew Sin, even suggested that the DAP posed a greater threat to Chinese interests than the PMIP. 'Indeed the DAP is a destroyer of Chinese unity. It is a wonderful tool for dividing the Chinese and making them fight one another.'²⁷

Persistent attempts were made by the Alliance leadership to establish that the DAP was controlled and manipulated by the leaders of the PAP in Singapore to promote their own interests in the federation. The Tengku asserted that the DAP was only an offshoot of the PAP in Singapore and was pursuing the concept of a 'Malaysian Malaysia' which had been initiated by the PAP. He described the concept as a mischievous policy aimed at creating antagonism between the Malays and the non-Malays. 'It was because of this and to prevent possible racial strife that we divorced Singapore. As a result, they nurtured a feeling of animosity towards Malaysia and were bent on vengeance. That is why the PAP is taking an active part in this election.'²⁸ Suspecting that the Alliance attacks on the DAP would mainly relate to its links with the Singapore PAP, the party's founder and the only leader with very close personal links with the leadership of the PAP, C.V. Devan Nair, had

²³ Ibid. 7 May 1969.

²⁴ Ibid. 8 May 1969.

²⁵ Ibid. 9 May 1969.

²⁶ Ibid. 15 April 1969.

²⁷ Ibid. 13 April 1969.

²⁸ Ibid. 19 April 1969.

taken the decision a year before the elections not to seek re-election. As Devan Nair put it: 'I have officially withdrawn from public life in Malaysia in order to ensure that the DAP got off the Singapore hook'.²⁹ However, this did not deter the Alliance from portraying the DAP throughout the election campaign as a front organization of the PAP, and using this as the main basis of their objection and attack on the DAP.

The People's Progressive Party, being an entirely Perak-based party, was not considered a significant threat to the Alliance and therefore was not given a great deal of attention during the election campaign. Also, a few months before the elections, the party's most dynamic leader and the one with considerable charismatic appeal, D.R. Seenivasagam, had died. Many believed that without D.R. Seenivasagam it would be difficult for the party to hold together and attract the significant popular support that it had secured during the earlier elections in Perak. It was expected that the party's extreme Chinese chauvinist elements (a large part of the Chinese rank and file and leadership) and the moderates (mostly the non-Chinese membership and a few Chinese leaders) would pull in different directions and cause the disintegration of the party. In the circumstances, the Alliance lumped the PPP in general with the DAP and branded it as a Chinese communal organization attempting to destroy the rights of the Malays.

The newly formed Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, with a moderate programme and a strictly non-communal posture, was generally spared serious attacks by the Alliance. The attitude of the Alliance towards the party was well expressed by the Tengku when he said that it consisted of a group of intellectuals who were in no position to formulate policies which would benefit the common people.³⁰ He asserted that the leadership of the party had imported its policies from Europe but that what was good for Europe was not necessarily suitable for Malaysia. The Alliance believed that these intellectuals would have little success in mobilizing mass support during the elections.

²⁹ C.V. Devan Nair in a personal statement to this writer, 11 June 1969. See also *The Straits Times*, 3 April 1969.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 11 April 1969.

The Party Manifestos

The Alliance attempt to build up its own positive popular image was expressed chiefly through its election manifesto, in which emphasis was given to the economic progress achieved in the country under Alliance rule. Here the tone was set by the Tengku, who said in the preface to the election manifesto: 'I have always described myself as the happiest Prime Minister in the world. This is because I enjoy the support of the people, and with it this country has progressed so well and so fast since Merdeka that it has become a "shining star" in the Asian horizon'.³¹

The Alliance manifesto was divided into two parts, consisting of its Policy (pages 5-13), and its Programme (pages 14-48). The first part dealt with matters of broad policy such as 'our economic approach', 'defence and security', 'foreign affairs', etc. The second, which covered a major part of the manifesto (an indication of the emphasis placed on it), consisted of a detailed record of the achievements of the Alliance government in various fields, along with promises for the future. Through the help of a large number of tables regarding gold and foreign exchange reserves, foreign trade, the production of various crops, mineral production, the number of primary and secondary schools, trade unions and their membership, transport facilities, health facilities, the manifesto underlined the great achievements of Alliance rule. It promised a rise in per capita income from its present level of about \$1,000 to at least \$1,500 by 1985.

The parties in opposition placed great emphasis on their manifestos, for this was the only means through which they could project their image and gather support. The DAP put forward a summary of its two major policy documents, 'The Setapak Declaration' and 'D.A.P. and Cultural Democracy', as its manifesto under the title, 'Towards a Malaysian Malaysia'. According to it the triple objectives of the party were: political democracy, social and economic democracy, and cultural democracy. By political democracy it meant a state where all citizens, regardless of race, language or religion, enjoy

³¹ 'Alliance Manifesto 1969; An Even Better Deal for All', p. 1, Kuala Lumpur, April 1969. See Appendix 1 for the section on Policy in the Alliance Election Manifesto.

equal political status, rights and opportunities. The Alliance, however, according to it, tended to divide Malaysians 'into two unequal classes of citizens'—*bumiputras* and non-*bumiputras*. It rejected this and demanded for all Malaysians 'an equal place under the sun'. It further condemned the repressive powers of the government as incompatible with political democracy and called for a review of the provisions of the Internal Security Act and other police regulations. This was to satisfy radical elements in the Chinese community who had always shown great hostility to the Internal Security Act. In the earlier important policy document, 'The Setapak Declaration', issued in July 1967, the party had only called for 'the utmost public vigilance' with regard to the Internal Security Act and had sought no revision of the Act. It said:

... The D.A.P., as a sober and realistic party, cannot share the enthusiasm of well meaning but nevertheless starry-eyed and unrealistic persons, who call for the total repeal of the Internal Security Act.

We recognise that it must be one of the paramount concerns of any Malaysian Government, even of a D.A.P. Government, to protect the security and integrity of the nation against the forces of foreign-inspired subversion.

*We therefore, support, in principle, the need for internal security legislation. We must nevertheless urge the utmost public vigilance in regard to the exercise of the powers vested in the government by the Internal Security Act.*³²

Under the concept of social and economic democracy it sought the eradication of the exploitation of man by man, class by class, and race by race. It rebutted the Alliance charge that the party was anti-Malay and maintained that high priority must be given to the elimination of Malay peasant poverty and the raising of the standards of living of Malay peasants. But it added:

The Alliance Government ... ignores the principle of the indivisibility of Malaysian prosperity and social justice. They often forget that the have-nots in Malaysia are of all races. They are found in rural areas as well as in urban slums. The campaign against poverty and backwardness must accordingly be a national campaign, based on the criteria of need and not on that of race.

It further sought the elimination of unemployment and under-employment, a more equitable

³² 'The Setapak Declaration', pp. 13-14. Emphasis in the original.

distribution of wealth, revision of labour laws to ensure industrial justice,³³ land for landless farmers regardless of race, state social security, low cost housing, and elimination of corruption at all levels of public life. Interestingly, the party made no attempt to project itself as a socialist party given to radical social and economic changes even though many of its leaders had strong socialist sympathies and the party itself had established close links with the Socialist International.³⁴ It is certain that the party's leadership believed that strong commitment to socialism would not attract popular support and it was only their stand on the issues of the special position of Malays, the status of Chinese and Tamil languages and schools, and the political position of the non-Malay communities which would determine their party's fate in the elections.

The party therefore placed great emphasis on its concept of cultural democracy and asserted that it was compatible and consistent with the development of national unity and the sense of national identity. Here it referred to the success of multi-racial and multi-lingual nations such as Switzerland, Canada and the Soviet Union. It maintained that the Alliance policies had given rise to a deep feeling of 'cultural insecurity' among non-Malays. It put forward the following as its major objectives:

(a) OFFICIAL STATUS for the Chinese, Tamil and English languages, and acceptance of Malay as the national language to serve as the common language of expression and communication among Malaysians.

(b) FREE USE of Chinese, Tamil and English in the Parliament, State Assemblies, and in public notices and government correspondence.

(c) ABOLITION of the distinction between national and national-type schools.

(d) ADOPTION of an integrated education system, where schools using the major languages as media of instruction and examination are recognised as

³³ See below footnote 39 for DAP attitude towards the trade union movement in Malaysia.

³⁴ In the manifesto for the earlier Serdang by-election held on 28 December 1968 the party had committed itself 'to help bring about a new Malaysia where there is socialist and cultural democracy'. But the term 'socialist' was dropped from the party manifesto for the general elections and was substituted by political and social and economic democracy.

National Schools, provided the content of education imparted is Malaysian-orientated and the National language is taught as a compulsory second language.

(e) RETENTION of the services of an impartial Cambridge Examinations Syndicate to conduct the School Certificate and Higher School Certificate examination, to remove any possibility of the use of racial criteria in the marking of examination papers if this was done under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.

(f) IMMEDIATE solution of the question of recognition of Nanyang, Formosan, Indian, Middle Eastern and Indonesian degrees and qualifications, on the basis of internationally accepted standards of assessment.

(g) GOVERNMENT SUPPORT for the National University and the Merdeka University projects.

(h) DEVELOPMENT OF a Malaysian culture from the free interplay and interaction of the diverse cultural elements in Malaysia, and not proceeding from the hegemony of any one culture.

Here the party's main aim was to project itself as the sole champion of the rights and interests of the non-Malay communities. It was the only major political party to have fully supported the establishment of a 'Merdeka' University, sponsored by certain sections of the Chinese community to provide facilities for higher studies to Chinese-educated Chinese students. These students had no facilities for higher studies available to them within the country and therefore traditionally they had gone either to Nanyang University in Singapore or to Formosa, depending on their political convictions. But the number of those who could afford to go abroad had always been restricted and this had made it difficult for Chinese-medium secondary schools to attract many students because they had little future. Many had come to believe that the only way to ensure the existence of Chinese-medium secondary schools was by providing facilities for higher education within the country, and therefore there had been a tremendous response from the Chinese community to the idea of a 'Merdeka' University. The sponsors were able to raise finances through voluntary contributions. The government, however, looked on the scheme with great disfavour and stalled over the issue of the registration of the institution. The MCA, knowing full well that it could not afford a rejection of the scheme, immediately initiated

the idea of a Tengku Abdul Rahman College with the same aim of providing a new channel for Chinese-medium students who could not find places at the University of Malaya or universities abroad. Hurriedly, the MCA set up the college with the help of the government and enrolled about 1,200 students by April, just before the elections. And having set up the college it began inviting the sponsors of the Merdeka University to cooperate with them in making the Tengku Abdul Rahman College a successful venture. However, it had little impact, for the Chinese community saw the establishment of the College as an attempt to sabotage the idea of a 'Merdeka' University. The episode certainly helped the DAP in establishing itself as the main champion and spokesman of the Chinese cause.

The image that the DAP attempted to project at the national level had already been acquired by the PPP since independence in 1957 in the state of Perak where it had established itself as the protector of the interests of the non-Malay communities.³⁵ At the time of the first federal elections in 1955, two years before independence, the policy of the PPP was a very moderate one; there was no significant difference between its policy and that of the Alliance on the contentious issues of the special position of the Malays, and the status of Chinese and Tamil languages and education. However, soon after independence, in late 1957, the party radically altered its policy on these issues in order to attract mass support among the non-Malay communities. It rejected the special position of the Malays and demanded official status for Chinese and Tamil languages. It had been the only party in the post-independence period until the emergence of the DAP to have committed itself explicitly to this policy and built up its mass appeal among the non-Malays mainly on the basis of its position on these issues.

With the intensification of the communal antipathies and the assumption of an increasingly pro-Malay posture by the Alliance, the PPP now sought to champion the cause of the non-Malay communities with greater vehemence. Unlike the DAP with which the party was closely linked and which showed some caution in not explicitly condemning the special position of the

³⁵ See Vasil, 'The 1964 General Elections in Malaya', pp. 33-4.

Malays, the PPP election manifesto borrowed the slogan of 'Malaysian Malaysia' from Lee Kuan Yew as its ideal and interpreted it to mean, 'that the nation and the State is not identified with the supremacy, well-being and the interests of any one particular community or race'.³⁶

As before it sought recognition of Chinese and Tamil as official languages in addition to Malay. It demanded an educational policy which provided for media of instruction and examination in accordance with the wishes of parents, i.e. Malay, Chinese, Tamil or English. On foreign policy, it rejected any attempt to form an alliance or bloc on grounds only of racial or religious affinity with any other nation or group of nations. On the whole, the party's main attempt was to maintain its appeal among the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, in Perak on an essentially communal basis. The difference between the DAP and the PPP was that while the former had projected its policy on these contentious issues more in terms of general principles, the latter had not attempted to do so and had emphasized the specifics. The result was that the PPP tended to give the impression of communalism and attract the communally orientated non-Malays.

The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, which had been established only about a year before the elections, attempted to build up its appeal mainly on three bases—non-communalism, moderate socialism, and democracy. As noted before, the party was established by a group of English-educated moderate leaders with certain socialist sympathies. And since the key leaders of the new organization had left existing political parties when they had been converted into essentially Chinese communal organizations, they placed great emphasis on building up the new party as a strictly non-communal one.

The party's political programme issued on 15 April 1968 asserted that 'the most favourable political order to live and struggle in' is a constitutional and political democracy; it was only in such a political order that the party's objectives could be attained. It further maintained that a just and equitable distribution of wealth requires that 'certain vital means of

³⁶ 'Malaysia for Malaysians', People's Progressive Party of Malaya Manifesto 1969, 2 May 1969, p. 2. See Appendix 1(d) for the full text.

production be owned by the community'. It explained this further:

We believe in the public ownership of the vital means of production if the benefit accruing therefrom is more than the previous status before the transfer of ownership. We classify such transfer into two types, destructive and constructive. A constructive transfer is one that:

- (a) does not incur serious losses to the community,
- (b) does not lower efficiency, and
- (c) does not curtail the freedom of the workers to strive for their legitimate interests.

It recognized the need to accord 'special attention and emphasis on the economically weak Malays and other indigenous peoples' and maintained that they should be protected from exploitation and assisted to compete with other communities 'on a just basis' in business, trade and the professions. Thus it did not oppose the special position of the Malays as guaranteed by the Constitution of Malaysia.

The Party's position with regard to the contentious issues of language and education was formulated by the Working Committee in August 1968 when it advocated the following steps to solve the problem:

1. To expand the University of Malaya and expedite the setting up of Penang University.
2. To create more facilities to absorb students from the national language, Chinese and Tamil educational backgrounds into the University of Malaya.
3. To recognise School Certificate and Higher School Certificate examinations in Chinese and Tamil.
4. To increase higher secondary educational institutions in the national language.
5. To set up an all party, academic, administrative and multi-community education body to advise the Government on the entire problem of education so that any solution adopted is lasting and acceptable to all without prejudice to our aim at creating a united Malaysian nation with a common national language, national education philosophy, and a common sense of destiny.
6. As it is in Indonesia, the promotion of the national language is achieved without competitive conflict with regional ethnic community languages such as Javanese, Sundanese. Similarly in Malaysia the promotion of the national language in the fields of education should not be considered in the light of conflict with other languages.
7. It is our conviction that the existence of Chinese and Tamil education up to Higher School Certificate will not conflict with the aim of promoting the national language and unifying the Malaysian communities. We see no reasons for Government not to grant aid to Chinese Secondary Schools, and if there are Tamil Secondary

Schools, without them giving up their Chinese and Tamil mediums of instruction. Given the national syllabus and proper leadership, pupils from these schools can be as good and patriotic Malaysians as those from existing Government Schools.

8. We recognise the Alliance Government's neglect of Malay education and the fate of the Malay school leavers. We recognise the need for more schools and colleges in the national language to absorb the growing number of pupils....³⁷

This was a compromise between the demands of the non-Malays and the position of the Malay community. Even though it did not advocate official status for the languages of the non-Malay communities, it made a substantial concession to the non-Malays when it said that the existence of Chinese and Tamil education up to Higher School Certificate level was not inimical to the aim of creating a united Malaysian nation and the development of the national language. It further supported the demand of the Chinese schools that as long as they accepted the syllabus and curricula prescribed by the government they should be entitled to government grants.

The party's 30-point manifesto was an essentially unemotional document. It did not attempt in any way to attract electoral support from any of the communities on a communal basis. The Party, however, placed special emphasis on attracting the support of workers and for that reason issued a 'Workers Charter' outlining a New Deal for them.³⁸ In the Charter it condemned the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act of 1967, both of which had been vehemently opposed by the trade union movement in Malaysia. It promised to revoke these and 'other undemocratic and distasteful regulations as a matter of great urgency'.³⁹ It further said:

³⁷ Minutes of the 3rd Working Committee meeting of the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, 24 August 1968.

³⁸ The party was also fielding a number of prominent trade union leaders as its candidates, the important ones among them being Yeoh Teck Chye, the President of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress, and V. David, a veteran trade union leader.

³⁹ It is important to note here that the DAP did not place any special emphasis on establishing a link with the trade union movement in the country so as to secure the workers' vote through it. According to C.V. Devan Nair, the basic policy of the DAP towards the trade unions was as follows:

The existing trade union laws in Malaysia run contrary to all international labour standards, deny workers their legitimate and fundamental rights and give the government unlimited powers to curb, control and if necessary, crush the workers' movement in the country. It is the aim of the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia to fight for the labour laws that may restore the workers to their rightful position.

In its 'New Deal' it promised an adequate living wage as the minimum protection against indiscriminate termination of their employment, social security scheme, equal pay for equal work, adequate participation of workers in the control and management of public services and industries, adequate and proper housing, and recognition of the workers' unhindered right to organize.

In all, the party, emphasizing its commitment to democracy, attempted to attract electoral support through projecting 'only one big issue: the danger to the ordinary man should the

'To establish links with the trade unions in the country, but not to capture the leadership of the trade union movement or of any section of it. Such an attempt was deemed wrong, as it was felt that once a non-communal party like the DAP attempted to capture the leadership of trade unions, then the trade union movement would become prey to similar attempts by communal political parties, and there would be a resultant risk of fragmentation along communal lines. So a Trade Union Bureau of the party was set up, including several trade unionists, which scrupulously refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of any trade union and saw its role purely as a body to take up particular trade union issues.' (A Personal Statement to this writer, 12 March 1970.)

Devan Nair further stated:

'The only reason, therefore, why the D.A.P. did not wade into the trade union movement in the same big way as the Gerakan did, was not because we lacked any capacity in that direction, but simply because our order of priorities did not demand this. We valued our trade union links, but not because we credited the trade union movement as a whole with anything more than a marginal electoral significance.'

However, some leaders of the trade union movement in Malaysia suggest that it was because of the fact that in Singapore since 1958 the PAP had passed labour legislation which was generally considered reactionary and anti-labour by them. Consequently, the DAP, having been closely linked with the PAP, was in no position to condemn Alliance policies towards workers which were considered no worse than what the PAP had done in Singapore. And therefore, according to them, the DAP support of the demands of the Malaysian trade union movement would not have carried conviction for the same had been denied to the movement in Singapore by the PAP.

Alliance get the two-thirds majority they need to muck about with the Constitution'.⁴⁰ Addressing an election eve rally in Kuala Lumpur the party's key leader, Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, said:

The simple message that I wish to put across to the voters of this country is this: DENY THE ALLIANCE PARTY THE TWO THIRDS MAJORITY IT NEEDS TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION.

If the voters of this country do just that then there is hope that democracy can stand the stress and strain of a multi-racial society.⁴¹

Further, the party concentrated its efforts very much on capturing the State government in Penang, the home state of many of its leaders, especially Dr. Lim Chong Eu. They also believed that in Penang, where the people were generally more articulate and where there had been a long tradition of intellectual vigour and communal toleration, the party could make a successful debut. For this reason, in Penang, the party utilized the considerable personal appeal of Dr. Lim Chong Eu, and at the very start of the election campaign made it known that if it was successful in securing a majority of the seats in the State legislature it would designate Dr. Lim as the next Chief Minister of the State. It also attempted to promote certain special interests of the people of Penang. Here they emphasized two main issues: namely, the free port status of Penang and the construction of a bridge linking Penang with Province Wellesley, both aimed to revive the economy of the state which had stagnated since the beginning of Indonesian confrontation and the establishment of Malaysia,

⁴⁰ Dr. Tan Chee Khoo in a personal statement to this writer, 22 September 1969.

⁴¹ Text of the speech supplied by Dr. Tan. Emphasis in the original.

which had meant the loss of free port status for Penang.⁴² On 11 April 1969, at the outset of the election campaign, Dr. Lim Chong Eu announced in an election rally that the Gerakan would build a bridge linking Penang with Province Wellesley so that the whole state 'can be one integrated unit'.⁴³ The Penang Branch of the MCA immediately issued an 'open letter' to the public questioning the ability of the opposition to build the bridge. It asked: 'Can the Gerakan borrow from a foreign government to pay for the cost?' It further said that if Gerakan captured the State government, the central government would have no faith in it and would not give it the money to build the bridge. Dr. Lim was quick to describe it as 'political blackmail' and further said: 'The Alliance is doing the same thing in Kelantan.... This kind of autocratic political blackmail can destroy the concept of a federation of states. This kind of mailed-fist central politics can lead to a disaster.'⁴⁴ The issue created such popular interest that the Tengku was forced to intervene and make a definite statement that the central government had decided to build the bridge at a cost of \$70 million. Announcing the decision on 5 May, only days before the election, the Tengku said:

One thing was that we did not get a clear report about the project. Now that a report has been given to me only today, I believe we can carry out this project.

It is rather embarrassing for me to have to make this statement during the elections, but the fact is the report on the feasibility of the project has just been received.⁴⁵

⁴² V. Veerappen in a personal statement to this writer, September 1969.

⁴³ *The Straits Times*, 12 April 1969.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 14 April 1969.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 6 May 1969.

IV THE ELECTION RESULTS

THE results of the elections had an immediate electrifying impact, not so much in terms of the actual number of seats wrested by the opposition parties from the Alliance as in the psychological dimension of the opposition's victory. The results were seen by the Malays as the beginning of the end of the *quid pro quo* arrangement which had ensured their supremacy in the politics, administration and government of the country since independence in 1957. To the Chinese and Indians it was a great step forward in the direction of establishing a Malaysian Malaysia where people, regardless of their race, religion and different cultural backgrounds, should get a just share of the good things of life as citizens of equal worth.

The Alliance suffered serious reverses, but the crushing blow was dealt mainly on the MCA. In the State elections the Alliance secured only 162 out of a total of 282 seats and 47.95 per cent of the vote whereas it had won 206 (55.52 per cent) and 241 (57.62 per cent) seats in the 1959 and 1964 elections respectively. Similarly, in the parliamentary elections, it won 66 seats out of a total of 104 and 48.41 per cent of the vote whereas it had captured 74 (51.78 per cent) and 89 (58.37 per cent) seats respectively in 1959 and 1964. The Alliance therefore lost not only what it had gained in 1964 but compared with the 1959 elections its majorities were reduced in both State and Parliamentary elections. The losses of the Alliance were important, even though they were not of great significance in terms of the overall majority in Parliament since it still retained a comfortable majority. The significant point is that the main aim of the opposition (which had made them come together and effect an electoral understanding) was to deny the Alliance a two-thirds majority in Parliament so that it could not amend the Constitution without support from some of the opposition parliamentary representatives. In this the opposition was successful. With the Alliance having secured only 66 seats out of a total of 104 in West Malaysia it seemed almost impossible

that it would capture more than two-thirds of the total of 144 seats in the Malaysian Parliament, once elections were held in Sarawak and Sabah. The general feeling was that in Sarawak and Sabah the Alliance could not expect to gain very much more than a bare majority.

Furthermore a number of senior ministers and top-ranking leaders of UMNO and MCA were not returned. Senu bin Abdul Rahman, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting and the Chairman of UMNO Youth Section, lost to the PMIP in his home area in Kedah. Dr. Lim Swee Aun, holding the key post of Minister of Commerce and Industries and the Deputy President of the MCA, lost to an unknown Gerakan candidate in his home constituency of Larut Selatan. Another important and up-and-coming leader of the MCA and the Minister of Social Welfare, Ng Kam Poh, lost in his home town of Teluk Anson. The other important casualties were the secretary-generals of the MCA and the MIC, Kam Woon Wah and Murugesu. Dr. Mahathir, who had emerged as one of the key leaders of UMNO with substantial support among the youth and extremists, was humbled in his home state of Kedah by a PMIP candidate. Further, the majorities of almost all the ministers were drastically reduced as follows:

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman from 11,647 to 3,504 votes

Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak from 10,147 to 8,925

Finance Minister Tun Tan Siew Sin from 13,327 to 7,300

Education Minister Khir Johari from 10,680 to 2,275

Minister of Works Tun Sambanthan (President of MIC) from 6,099 to 146

Labour Minister V. Manickavasagam from 6,099 to 495

Minister of Local Government, Khaw Kai Boh from 5,213 to 1,523

An even more important aspect of the results was the substantial losses suffered by the Alliance in the State elections. Not only had it suffered a serious loss in the percentage of votes which fell from 55.52 per cent in 1959 and 57.62 per cent in 1964 to 47.95 per cent in 1969, but it also

lost a large number of seats in many of the States. Here the losses were suffered by both UMNO and MCA. UMNO lost heavily in the predominantly Malay States of the north and the east coast. In Kedah, UMNO won only 14 of the 24 seats, whereas it had won 23 and 24 seats respectively in the 1959 and 1964 elections. In Trengganu, its majority was substantially reduced and the PMIP made considerable gains. However in Kelantan, the State ruled by the PMIP since the 1959 elections and where UMNO had concentrated its effort, it was able to improve its position marginally.

But the most critical losses suffered by the Alliance were in the predominantly non-Malay States of Selangor, Penang and Perak where the MCA was almost completely demolished. (Losses suffered by UMNO in these States were not very substantial, except in Penang.) In Selangor, the Alliance was able to capture only 14 seats out of a total of 28, thus depriving it of a majority in the state legislature. UMNO won 12 seats and the MCA and the MIC both secured 1 seat each. (In the earlier elections the position was: in 1959, UMNO 14, MCA 8 and MIC 1; in 1964, UMNO 13, MCA 9, MIC 3.) In Perak also the Alliance was deprived of a majority; it won only 19 of the 40 seats, whereas it had held 31 seats in 1959 and 35 in 1964. Here again the major losses were suffered by the MCA: the UMNO losses were not very substantial. The UMNO won 18 seats and the MIC 1. (Their position in the earlier elections was: in 1959, UMNO 21, MCA 9, and the MIC 1; in 1964, UMNO 22, MCA 12 and MIC 1.) But the most crushing defeat was suffered by the Alliance in Penang where it was able to secure only 4 seats out of a total of 24; it had captured 17 in 1959 and 18 in 1964. Here the losses were suffered not only by the MCA: UMNO too was seriously affected. All the 4 seats won by the Alliance were contested by UMNO: the MCA and the MIC were not able to capture a single seat. (In the earlier elections their performance was: in 1959, UMNO 10, MCA 6, and MIC 1; in 1964, UMNO 10, MCA 6 and MIC 2.)

The losses were reflected not only in terms of seats won but in the popular vote as well. In Selangor, the Alliance was able to secure only 41.56 per cent of the total vote in 1969 when it had polled 57.55 and 55.54 per cent respectively

in 1959 and 1964. The MCA's share was 22.62 per cent in 1959, 24.22 per cent in 1964 and only 17.50 per cent in 1969. The position was no different in Perak; in 1969 the Alliance polled only 43.63 per cent of the total, whereas it had secured 54.65 and 54.74 per cent in 1959 and 1964 respectively. Here the MCA's share of the popular vote dropped to 15.45 per cent of the total as against 21.48 per cent in 1959 and 21.61 per cent in 1964. As in the case of seats lost, the loss of the popular vote by the Alliance was the greatest in Penang. It was able to secure only 34.59 per cent of the total in 1969, whereas it had polled 50.88 and 47.18 per cent in 1959 and 1964 respectively. The MCA's share was only 13.95 per cent in 1969 as against 20.58 per cent in 1959 and 19.66 per cent in 1964.

The destruction of the MCA and the resultant loss of the Alliance majority in the predominantly non-Malay States of Selangor, Penang and Perak were of the greatest concern to the Malays and their leadership. In Penang the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia had emerged with a clear majority and was in a position to form the State government. In both Selangor and Perak there was considerable confusion following the elections as to who would form a government as neither the Alliance nor the non-Malay opposition had emerged with a clear majority. Eventually in both the States the Alliance was able to form governments after considerable manoeuvre and manipulation. This situation was seen by the Malays as the beginning of the end of the Alliance system, which was based on the *quid pro quo* arrangement between the UMNO and the MCA, the end of the MCA as the representative organization of the Chinese community, and of the position of pre-eminence enjoyed by the Malays in the politics, government and administration of the country.

In the other non-Malay states—Malacca and Negri Sembilan—the Alliance, especially the MCA, also suffered reverses, but less shattering than those in Penang, Perak and Selangor. In these States the UMNO losses were not very significant but the MCA, as elsewhere, suffered serious reverses. In Malacca, the Alliance captured 15 seats out of a total of 20 (it had secured all the 20 in 1959 and 18 in 1964). In Negri Sembilan, it was able to secure only 16 seats out of 24. In 1969, UMNO 11, the MCA 4 and the MIC 1.

(In the earlier elections the relative positions of the three constituents of the Alliance were: in 1959, UMNO 11, MCA 7, and the MIC 2; in 1964, UMNO 14, MCA 9, and MIC 1.) In these States, the main reason why the Alliance, especially the MCA, suffered less severe losses was that the opposition parties—the Gerakan, the DAP and the PPP—had concentrated their attention on the other predominantly non-Malay States and that they lacked a strong organizational base in these States.

Relationship between the Results and the Racial Composition of the Electorates

Let us relate the results to the racial composition of the electorate in the parliamentary constituencies. First, in the case of UMNO it is interesting to note that in the predominantly Malay States (Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu) its wins against the PMIP were mainly in those constituencies where the Malay electorate was less than 90 per cent of the total, and its losses to the PMIP were in most constituencies where the Malay electorate comprised over 90 per cent of the total. In these States, where there were no candidates of the non-Malay opposition parties, the non-Malay voter tended to vote for the Alliance and unless the non-Malays constituted at least 10 per cent of the electorate the UMNO candidates tended to lose to the PMIP. In the predominantly Malay constituencies, in the absence of a sizeable non-Malay electorate, PMIP candidates tended to succeed on the basis of their communal appeal among Malay voters. The relationship can be seen in Table 1.

TABLE 1

UMNO Performance and the Racial Composition of the Electorate—i

Constituencies where UMNO candidates	90 per cent or above of electorate	Below 90 per cent of electorate	Constituencies where Malays are
↓	1959 Elections		
WON	2	11	
LOST	11	3	
	1964 Elections		
WON	4	15	
LOST	8	1	

1969 Elections

WON	4	13
LOST	8	3

A similar situation is to be found in States which are not predominantly Malay and where non-Malays constituted a majority or a near-majority of the total electorate. Here UMNO had to compete mainly against the non-Malay opposition parties. The interesting situation is that here the UMNO candidates were successful, by and large, only in those constituencies where Malays constituted at least 45 per cent of the electorate. Wherever Malays constituted less than 45 per cent of the electorate, opposition parties with a special appeal for non-Malays tended to defeat the UMNO candidates. The situation is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

UMNO Performance and the Racial Composition of the Electorate—ii

Constituencies where UMNO candidates	45 per cent or above of electorate	Below 45 per cent of electorate	Constituencies where Malays are
↓	1959 Elections		
WON	34	4	
LOST	—	4	
	1964 Elections^a		
WON	33	7	
LOST	—	—	
	1969 Elections		
WON	30	4	
LOST	2 ^b	3	

^a As noted earlier, the 1964 elections were held under special circumstances created by Indonesian confrontation. Exploiting this situation UMNO was able to win in all the constituencies where it contested in the predominantly non-Malay States.

^b In one of these two constituencies over 90 per cent of the electorate is Malay and the UMNO lost the seat to the PMIP and not to one of the non-Malay opposition parties.

Similarly, in the case of the MCA the predominant pattern was that its candidates were successful, by and large, only in those constituencies where at least 25 per cent of the electorate was Malay. Here, unless this Malay vote was split by the presence of PMIP candidates,

the MCA candidates were successful despite a split caused in the Chinese vote by the presence of candidates of the non-Malay opposition parties. However, in constituencies with a predominantly Chinese electorate and an insignificant number of Malay voters, the candidates of the MCA, by and large, were defeated by the candidates of the non-Malay opposition parties. This is to say, the MCA was able to win only in those constituencies where the defection of substantial numbers of Chinese voters could be compensated for by the votes of Malays who preferred to vote for MCA candidates rather than those of non-Malay opposition parties. This situation is illustrated in Table 3.

TABLE 3

MCA Performance and the Racial Composition of the Electorate—i

<i>Constituencies where MCA candidates</i>	<i>25 per cent or or above of electorate</i>	<i>Below 25 per cent of electorate</i>	<i>Constituencies where Malays are</i>
↓	1959 Elections		
WON	17	2	
LOST	4	8	
	1964 Elections		
WON	20	7	
LOST	6	—	
	1969 Elections		
WON	12	1	
LOST	8	12	

The aim here is to demonstrate a general relationship between the success of MCA candidates and the presence of a certain minimum Malay vote. In the 1969 elections there was such great disenchantment with the MCA that even in those constituencies where at least 25 per cent of the electorate was Malay many MCA candidates failed to win. But if we look at the situation with 30 per cent Malay electorate as the dividing line we can obtain a more satisfactory indication of the situation. (Table 4.)

Analysis of the Gains of the Opposition Parties

On the whole the PMIP was able to recover the serious losses it had suffered in the 1964

TABLE 4

MCA Performance and the Racial Composition of the Electorate—ii

<i>Constituencies where MCA candidates</i>	<i>30 per cent or above of electorate</i>	<i>Below 30 per cent of electorate</i>	<i>Constituencies where Malays are</i>
↓	1969 Elections		
WON	9	4	
LOST	2 ^a	18	

^a In both these constituencies, Bruas and Larut Selatan in Perak, the PMIP candidates secured 4,033 (19.9 per cent) and 4,962 (15.9 per cent) votes respectively.

elections. In 1959, the PMIP had emerged as a significant political force, especially in the predominantly Malay states of the north and the east coast where in addition to a sizeable vote, it was able to capture political power in the two states of Kelantan and Trengganu. It had won 43 seats in the different State legislatures and 13 seats in the national Parliament, all in the northern and east coast states. However in 1964, as a result of Indonesian confrontation and the success of the Alliance in projecting itself as the only party attempting to safeguard the independence and integrity of the nation, the PMIP suffered serious reverses; it secured only 25 seats in the State elections and 9 seats in the parliamentary elections, but it managed to retain control of the State government in Kelantan. In 1969, the interesting point was that in spite of the greater emphasis placed by UMNO on its campaign against the PMIP than against the non-Malay opposition parties, the PMIP was able to recover the losses it had suffered in 1964, and in spite of the tremendous effort by UMNO to dislodge the PMIP as the ruling party in Kelantan, it successfully retained its control of the state. The other important aspect of the results was that for the first time the PMIP seriously challenged the UMNO outside the two east coast States of Kelantan and Trengganu, making significant gains in Kedah, home state of Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman, and Perlis. As can be seen in Table 5 there was very little difference between the votes polled by PMIP and UMNO, especially in the larger and more important State of Kedah.

TABLE 5

Seats Won and Votes Polled by the PMIP in Kedah and Perlis

	Seats won			Votes polled—in percent		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
Kedah						
State elections	1	—	8	23.83 (52.88) ^a	25.21 (50.35)	41.55 (41.58)
Parliamentary	—	—	3	26.66 (54.05)	25.11 (56.48)	41.06 (45.20)
Perlis						
State elections	—	1	1	31.70 (52.35)	37.13 (48.71)	43.84 (53.51)
Parliamentary	—	—	—	40.37 (59.63)	31.07 (68.93)	42.14 (51.15)

^a Votes polled by UMNO are given in parenthesis.

The success of the PMIP was a direct result of the increasing emphasis on race and religion among the Malays, especially in the northern and east coast States. As noted in the last chapter the response of the Malay masses to the increasing articulateness of the non-Malay communities and their growing demand for a Malaysian Malaysia, was to emphasize more strongly the solidarity of their own race and religion. This situation heightened the appeal of the PMIP. The Malays, especially in the northern and east coast states where they have been more cut off and consequently have remained more isolated and conservative, had lost faith in UMNO and its way of protecting their interests through the inter-communal Alliance. Even the economic stagnation in Kelantan, the only State controlled by the PMIP, had only a limited effect and moved the Malay masses only marginally away from the PMIP.

As already noted, the UMNO wins against the PMIP in the predominantly Malay States of the east coast were only in those constituencies where the Malay electorate constituted less than 90 per cent of the total, and the PMIP nominees were successful only in those constituencies, by and large, where the Malays constituted at least 90 per cent of the electorate. The position is illustrated in Table 6.

During the election campaign persistent allegations were made by UMNO leaders that the PMIP had been provided funds by a foreign country through the Democratic Action Party to put up candidates in non-Malay areas to split the Malay vote. Following the elections, it was

TABLE 6
PMIP Performance and the Racial Composition of the Electorate

Constituencies where PMIP candidates	90 per cent or above of electorate	Below 90 per cent of electorate ←	Constituencies where Malays are
1959 Elections			
WON	11	2	
LOST	5	39	
1964 Elections			
WON	8	1	
LOST	7	37	
1969 Elections			
WON	9	3	
LOST	6	42	

suggested that the intervention of the PMIP was successful in causing the defeat of many Alliance candidates. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman said:

The intention of the PMIP was to divide the Malay votes so that the Alliance candidates standing in various constituencies would not be able to get in, and in this conspiracy of foul play they succeeded. Where the number of Malay voters in a constituency was not sufficient to return the PMIP with any chance of success, and in many cases even if they had won the Malay votes they might still have lost their deposit money, yet they still put up candidates.¹

¹ Tengku Abdul Rahman, *May 13: Before and After*, Kuala Lumpur, September 1969, p. 34.

TABLE 7
PMIP Vote in Constituencies Lost by the Alliance to
the Non-Malay Opposition

Constituencies	Votes Polled					Majority
	Alliance	Gerakan	DAP	PPP	PMIP	
1. Penang Selatan	14,196	20,196				6,000
2. Seberang Selatan	6,391	9,738			2,474	3,347
3. Seberang Tengah	12,017	16,808				4,791
4. Dato Kramat	5,635	17,272				11,637
5. Penang Utara	13,379		20,930			7,551
6. Tanjong	4,496	19,656		775		15,160
7. Batang Padang	7,082		7,188			106
8. Batu Gajah	6,812		12,240		901	5,428
9. Bruas	7,900			8,368	4,033	468
10. Ipoh	5,231			23,979		18,748
11. Larut Selatan	10,774	15,641			4,962	4,867
12. Menglembu	6,818			29,089		22,271
13. Sitiawan	7,964		11,607			3,643
14. Kampar	8,827		17,532		2,884	8,705
15. Teluk Anson	8,523		12,297		1,417	3,774
16. Ulu Kinta	7,591			10,706		3,115
17. Bandar Malacca	7,346		18,562			11,216
18. Seremban Barat	7,277		11,705			4,428
19. Seremban Timur	8,073		13,475			5,402
20. Batu	8,772	22,720				13,948
21. Bukit Bintang	9,137	18,488				9,351
22. Bungsar	9,648		37,050			27,402
23. Damansara	12,089		15,567			3,478
24. Setapak	13,871		17,137			3,266

This view tends to suggest that in many cases it was the intervention of the PMIP that made the non-Malay opposition parties win against the Alliance (the MCA) and there was not necessarily a substantial swing away from the MCA. However, as can be seen in Table 7, this was true only in two cases, Bruas and Larut Selatan in Perak, where Alliance candidates lost to the PPP and DAP respectively. One could argue that in these cases the opposition might possibly not have won if the Malay vote was not split by the PMIP since the PMIP secured the exclusive support of the Malay voter. But in the remaining 22 constituencies where the opposition candidates

defeated the Alliance and the PMIP intervention, which took place in only a few cases, had no significance.

With regard to the other opposition parties, except the PPP, the 1969 results are not comparable with the earlier elections because the two major opposition parties, the Gerakan and the DAP, were formed only after 1964.

All the opposition parties, which had started the election campaign without much optimism, were pleasantly surprised at the election results. Even in their most cheerful moments they had not expected to be so successful. The best performance was that of the DAP which emerged

as the largest opposition party in Parliament. It won 13 seats in the parliamentary elections and secured 13.73 per cent of the total vote. In the State elections it won 31 seats and 11.76 per cent of the total vote. It was a tremendous improvement on the performance of the People's Action Party, which in the 1964 elections had won only 1 seat in the parliamentary elections and none in the State elections even though it had contested in 11 parliamentary constituencies and 15 state constituencies.

The majority of victories for the DAP, as expected, were gained in the States of Selangor, Perak and Negri Sembilan where the party had concentrated its effort and where most of the party leaders were to be found. Out of the 13 seats it won in the parliamentary elections 11 were in these States. Similarly, in the State elections out of the total of 31 seats won by the party 23 were in these States. But the party's significant successes in Perak were certainly not expected. It had no important leaders in the State and the party organization there was very new and not strong. The only thing to the advantage of the party in Perak was its close link with the People's Progressive Party, an essentially Perak-based party well entrenched for over a decade. The PPP, not being able to put up a large number of candidates of its own, mainly because of lack of suitable men, finance and party organization, allowed the DAP to move into Perak and lent it support.²

Even though the party had two Malays elected on its ticket in the State elections (in Negri Sembilan and Perak), it emerged as the main representative of the non-Malay communities. The party's programme and policy proved extremely effective in attracting non-Malay support, which came not only from the Chinese, but also from the Indian community.

In spite of the fact that the Gerakan very zealously guarded its non-communal posture and avoided making any significant concessions to extremist elements in the non-Malay communities during the election campaign and in its policy and programme, it did exceedingly well in the elections. Even in their wildest hopes the party leadership had not expected such a successful

² In 1969, the PPP fielded only 6 candidates in the Parliamentary elections whereas it had put up so many as 19 in 1959 and 9 in 1964.

debut in its first elections. The party had concentrated its effort in the two States of Penang and Selangor, especially in the former where its predominant aim was to capture the State government. The main reason for this emphasis was that the party had been formed only a short while before the elections, its leadership was unsure of its organizational capacity, and there was a strong desire to avoid any dispersion of its resources. Moreover, most of the top leadership of the party came from these two States where many of them had considerable personal appeal. It was also believed by the party leadership that control over a State government would give it the opportunity to show to the people what it could do and provide it with a vital base for further extension of its influence. The party therefore placed major emphasis on securing control over the State government in Penang. In this the party was fully successful when it won 16 of the 24 seats in the elections. This was the greatest victory of the non-Malay opposition, being the first time in Malaysia that a party representing mainly the non-Malay communities had captured control of a State government in West Malaysia. Its importance lay not in the immediate present but in its being the trend of the future.

In the parliamentary elections the party won 8 seats and polled 8.57 per cent of the total vote. In the State elections it won 26 seats and secured 8.78 per cent of the vote. The party's decision to contest only in a limited number of constituencies, both in the parliamentary and State elections, was responsible for the low vote. Another important aspect of the results was that not only had the party put up a sizeable number of Malay candidates but that a significant number of them were successful. The party had fielded 9 Malays in the State elections and 3 in the parliamentary elections; 1 in the parliamentary and 2 in the State elections were returned. This was the first time that any Malays had been elected as candidates of a non-communal political party. (Two Malay candidates of the DAP were also successful in the State elections.) The considerable support given the party by the trade union movement was reflected in the election of two important leaders of the movement—Yeoh Teck Chye (President of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress) and V. David (a committee

member of the MTUC) to Parliament as Gerakan candidates. A few other important leaders of the trade union movement were also successful in the State elections. The Gerakan therefore emerged as the party with the closest links with the trade union movement in the country.

The PPP did extremely well in spite of the fact that it had suffered a very serious blow when its founder and the most effective leader, D.R. Seenivasagam, had died just before the elections. In the parliamentary elections the party was able to get 4 of its candidates elected to Parliament. In the State elections it improved considerably on its performance in the 1959 elections when 12 of its 16 candidates were returned. This was the closest it had ever come to in its primary aim of capturing control of the State government in Perak. The DAP, with which it had established close links, was able to secure 6 seats in the State elections in Perak and thus the two parties put together had secured 18 seats out of the total of 40 in the State legislature.

Reasons for Reduced Support for the Alliance and the Success of the Opposition Parties

In all, the election results were a clear evidence of the lack of confidence on the part of the Chinese and Indian electors in the communal organizations of their communities, the MCA and the MIC. Even the Malay voter had begun to show his disenchantment with UMNO and an increasing preference for the more extreme PMIP. Since the 1964 elections, the non-Malay communities were becoming restive and were now more willing to fight for the interests of their communities. This had a natural impact on the Malay community who sought stronger and securer guarantees for the protection of their own interests and special position. The UMNO, conscious that this situation would be exploited by the extremist PMIP to extend the area of its support among the Malays, tended to push more strongly the interests of the Malay community. It used the Alliance to give the Malays the assurance they were seeking for the protection of the position of the *bumiputra*. It was this increasing emphasis on the interests of the *bumiputra* in the Alliance that caused serious nervousness and concern among the non-Malay communities. The non-Malay communities were, by and large, disenchanted with the Alliance and

their own communal organizations which were members of the Alliance, and in order to register their opposition to the Alliance and its policies they themselves sought out the opposition parties and voted for their candidates.

Further, for some time before the elections the Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, had been making statements clearly indicating that his Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, would succeed him. In early 1967, at a party in Kuala Lumpur to celebrate his sixty-fourth birthday, the Tengku urged all Malaysians to give Tun Razak the same cooperation, support and help they had given to him. He said 'back Razak as you have backed me.... In Tun Razak you have a good man, an honest and conscientious man. Give him any job and he is capable of completing it'.³ The Tengku said this not just to please Tun Razak, who is a close friend. It was not meant as a formal gesture.

Just before the elections and during the election campaign itself there were strong rumours that the Tengku would be handing over the Premiership to Tun Razak soon after the elections. This created a certain sense of uncertainty about the future among many non-Malays. They were concerned whether the Alliance under Tun Razak would be as sympathetic to their cause as it was under the Tengku. Thus their vote against the Alliance was a reflection of their doubts and fears about the Alliance without Tengku Abdul Rahman.

Another important factor working against the Alliance and in favour of the opposition was the electoral understanding among the different opposition parties. This was the first time in the history of the country that the entire opposition (excluding the two Malay parties, the PMIP and the Party Raayat) had come to an electoral understanding, thus avoiding any dispersion of the opposition vote. Therefore the Alliance had to face straight contests. In the 1964 elections the opposition parties had lost many seats because they put up candidates against each other. But in the 1969 elections all these seats were won by the opposition parties and all were straight contests.

The DAP success was mainly a result of its effective use of the slogan of 'Malaysian

³ *Suara Malaysia*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1967, p. 3.

Followed by other members

Malaysia', first coined by the Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, early in 1965. The party's link with the People's Action Party of Singapore (in fact the party was a successor organization to the PAP) proved especially useful. During the period that Singapore was a part of the Malaysian federation its Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, had been able to establish a strong and widespread popular appeal among the non-Malay communities through his dynamism and toughness. During the election campaign the DAP leadership tried hard to deny the charge that their party was Singapore-directed and inspired and for this reason its founder and first Secretary-General, C.V. Devan Nair, withdrew from Malaysian politics long before the general elections, but it was the Alliance propaganda which continued to establish a close link between the DAP and Singapore in the minds of the non-Malays. The Alliance did not realise that this propaganda was doing no harm to the DAP; in fact it proved to be a distinct advantage and helped it to emerge as the main representative of the non-Malay communities. A Malaysian journalist has said:⁴

With regard to the Chinese, it should be recalled that every Alliance Minister was repeatedly saying during the election campaign that the Singapore Government is financing the DAP and the PAP of Singapore is fully backing them. Though the Singapore Government had denied the allegation at the last moment it did not carry any weight as it had already been established in the minds of the Chinese that Lee Kuan Yew is behind the whole show and he will come to Malaysia to save them. Whether it is possible or not is immaterial. The ordinary Chinese believed that Lee Kuan Yew will be the saviour of the Chinese community in this part of the world.

The slogan of 'Malaysian Malaysia' helped the party very considerably in securing large support from Chinese and Indians.⁵ When this slogan was originally introduced its details were not explicitly formulated. The DAP explicitly formulated and presented the details of the slogan.⁶ The slogan

⁴ A personal statement to this writer by a prominent Malaysian Journalist who covered the Malaysian elections, 24 May 1969.

⁵ A personal statement by C.V. Devan Nair to this writer, 11 June 1969. Also a Personal Statement by V. Veerappan, a top-ranking leader of the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, 15 August, 1969.

⁶ See pp. 16-17, in Chapter III.

thus presented proved far more effective and was largely responsible for the success of the DAP in establishing itself as the main spokesman of the non-Malay communities in Malaysia.

However, in the case of the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia the reasons for its success were different. It is noteworthy that it succeeded although it placed great emphasis on maintaining its non-communal posture and had made a strong effort to attract some Malay support for the party. It also successfully resisted the temptation to play along with the current feelings among the Chinese and Indian communities with regard to the issues of multi-lingualism, Chinese and Tamil education, and the special position of the Malays. It maintained its non-communal position and did not give in to expediency, as has been the general pattern for the conversion of genuinely non-communal political parties into essentially non-Malay parties. Therefore support for the party was not based on communal feelings. This was the first time that a non-communal political party had achieved a measure of success in the elections on the basis of its non-communalism rather than on the exploitation of communalism.

The success of the Gerakan was also very largely based on the personal stature and integrity of several of its leaders and the close links that the party was able to establish with the trade union movement in the country. The two pre-eminent leaders of the party, Dr. Lim Chong Eu and Dr. Tan Chee Khoon,⁷ are recognized as national leaders and enjoy widespread popular respect and support. The personal popularity of

⁷ Dr. Lim Chong Eu has been active in Malaysian politics since about 1950 and by 1955 had emerged as one of the top-ranking leaders of the MCA. He had defeated Tan Cheng Lock, the founder of the MCA and its President since its formation in 1949, for the presidency of the Association in 1958. He was the President of the MCA in 1959 when there was a serious crisis in the Alliance with regard to the issue of the position of the three partners in the Alliance (the crisis has been referred to in Chapter 1). Eventually he left the MCA and for some time, partly because of ill health, kept away from politics. But during the period of his tenure as President of the MCA and especially during the Alliance crisis he established himself as foremost leader of the Chinese community. Similarly, Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, first elected to the Parliament in 1964, has been able to build himself up as a popular leader through his hard work and honesty. He was so effective in the Parliament as an opposition leader that he is popularly known as 'Mr. Opposition' throughout the country.

these two leaders, especially in Penang and Selangor, brought the party considerable support.

As already noted, the Gerakan was able to attract support from trade unions, and several prominent leaders of the trade union movement played a part in the formation of the party. The key person was the President of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress, Yeoh Tech Chye, one of the founders of the party and elected as one of its Vice-Chairmen. He successfully contested in the parliamentary elections in Kuala Lumpur in the Bukit Bintang constituency. Through him the party was able to establish very close links with the trade union movement and secure considerable help and support in the elections. Also, the association of V. David, a veteran trade union leader, with the party proved useful.

In Penang, the success of the party in capturing control of the State government was again built on the personal appeal of Dr. Lim Chong Eu and several other important leaders of the party, such as Tan Phock Kin and V. Veerappen. It has been suggested by a prominent leader of the party that the announcement that if the party was elected to power in Penang it would appoint Dr. Lim as the Chief Minister attracted considerable support.⁸

Significance of the Election Results

In conclusion, it is possible to underline four crucial aspects of the election results. A measure of their importance is the fact that they had a direct bearing on what happened in the country immediately after the results were announced. First, a very serious challenge was posed to the Alliance claim that it represented the nation through its three constituent communal organizations, the UMNO, the MCA, and the MIC. In the case of UMNO, its position as the

⁸ A personal statement to this writer by V. Veerappen, 15 August 1969. The following is Dr. Tan Chee Khoo's reply to the author in response to the question: Did Dr. Lim's personality in any way play an important role in securing mass support in Penang?

The people of Penang were tired of the Alliance and wanted a change. Chong Eu undoubtedly played a big part in swaying the votes but he himself would be the first to admit that Chong Eu, Alatas, V. David and Tan Chee Khoo all projected a far better image than any combination of the Alliance.

Personal statement by Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, 22 September 1969.

representative communal organization of the Malays which it had used to build itself as the dominant partner in the Alliance, was seriously threatened by the PMIP. The PMIP was able to secure 23.75 per cent of the total vote in the parliamentary elections in West Malaysia, and this was an exclusively Malay vote. The Malays constitute only about 54 per cent of the total electorate in West Malaysia. The Party Raayat (also exclusively dependent on the Malay vote), secured 1.24 per cent of the total, and a significant number of Malays voted for the non-communal parties such as Gerakan and the DAP. Therefore it is possible to conclude that the Alliance secured less than 29 per cent of the total vote from amongst the Malays, a figure not very much higher than the 23.75 per cent of the total vote secured by the PMIP. This is of the greatest importance and has a crucial bearing on the viability of the inter-communal Alliance.

The undermining of the position of the MCA and the MIC was even greater. Both the communal organizations lost once and for all the basis of their claim that they represented the Chinese and the Indians in Malaysia; thus the *raison d'être* of their very existence was irretrievably demolished. The MCA was able to win only 26 seats in the State elections in 1969 when it had secured as many as 59 in 1959 and 67 in 1964. In the parliamentary elections it was able to win only 13 seats (as against the 19 it had secured in 1959 and as many as 27 in 1964), and in 9 of these 13 parliamentary constituencies the Malays constituted at least 30 per cent of the total electorate (see Table 4 above and Appendix Table 4(a)III). The situation was the same in the State elections. Thus it would be reasonable to suggest that the MCA victories were largely built on the support of the Malay voter secured by UMNO for the MCA candidates. The MIC too was afflicted with the same problem. It was able to win only in two parliamentary constituencies as against the 3 that it had secured in both 1959 and 1964. In the State elections, it suffered more serious losses when it was able to win only 3 seats as against 7 in 1959 and 10 in 1964. A measure of the lack of confidence of the Indian community in the MIC is the fact that a greater number of candidates of Indian origin were elected on the ticket of non-communal parties. Gerakan had 3 Indians elected to the Parliament

TABLE 9

Racial Composition of the Electorate in Selected Constituencies where Gerakan Won

Constituency	Malays	Chinese	Others	Alliance	Gerakan
<i>Parliamentary Elections</i>					
1. Seberang Selatan	39.9	44.2	15.9	34.6	52.3 (Non-Malay)
2. Seberang Tengah	44.9	47.4	7.7	41.7	58.3 (Malay)
<i>State Elections</i>					
1. Alma (Penang)	43.4	48.3	8.3	32.0	51.7 (Malay)
2. Nibong Tebal (Penang)	47.5	36.7	15.8	46.9	50.0 (Non-Malay)
3. Tasek Glugar (Penang)	57.3	32.2	10.5	48.6	51.4 (Malay)

and 5 to State legislatures, the DAP 3 to the Parliament and 5 to State legislatures, and the PPP 2 to the Parliament and 4 to State legislatures.

Secondly, for the first time in the political history of Malaysia a significant number of Malay voters cast their vote in favour of the candidates of the non-communal political parties. Three Malay candidates of the Gerakan, one in parliamentary elections and two in State elections, were returned. Similarly, two Malay candidates of the DAP were returned in the State elections. It would be worthwhile looking at the racial composition of the electorate in some of the constituencies with a sizeable Malay electorate where Gerakan candidates were returned. Similarly, there were constituencies with a sizeable Malay vote where DAP candidates won. It is obvious from Table 9 that the Gerakan candidates in these constituencies could not have won without some shift of the Malay vote away from the Alliance. This is significant for it gives rise to hope that non-communal political parties could be viable in Malaysia. Up to this time the major problem faced by non-communal political parties in Malaysia has been the complete lack of any support from the Malay community, and it is this lack of support which to a significant degree has been responsible for the conversion of genuinely non-communal political parties into essentially non-Malay communal parties.⁹

This was considered a most ominous development by the leadership of UMNO. They have

⁹ See Vasil, *Politics in a Plural Society*, for a full discussion of the argument.

always maintained that the only way the Malays could safeguard their interests was through the solidarity and unity of their own community. Unless the Malays remained united and solidly supported their communal organizations, preferably UMNO, the non-Malays would take over the country.¹⁰

Thirdly, the response of the Malaysian electorate was a serious political defeat for the Malayan Communist Party. Throughout the election campaign and even before that, it persistently called upon the people of Malaysia, especially the non-Malay voter, to boycott the elections. In this the Labour Party had acted as its voice. This call for a boycott of the elections was in fact encouraged by the Alliance for it was thought that it would only affect the opposition parties. It is significant that at least 70 per cent of the electorate ignored this agitation for a boycott of the elections and voted for non-communist and anti-communist parties ranging from the extreme right to moderate left. This was a singular victory for representative government in Malaysia and a defeat for the MCP. But within days it was all destroyed when serious communal riots took place on 13 May.

Finally, and most important, the election results were a serious and unprecedented challenge to the Alliance monopoly of political power in Malaysia. The results gave very clear notice that the Alliance between Chinese compradores and the Malay elite and the bases on which it had operated were no more

¹⁰ See above p. 12, Chapter 2.

acceptable to vast numbers of Malaysians. For the first time in Malaysian political history a non-communal political party had captured political power in one of the States of the federation. In two other very large and economically important States, Perak and Selangor, the Alliance had failed to secure a majority. This was shattering to the Malays. Thus far they had accepted the Alliance arrangement, less extreme than the solution offered by the PMIP, and the idea of representative government, because Malay political domination had been ensured within its framework. Both the Alliance arrangement and

representative government were acceptable to the Malays only on this condition. Once it became obvious, through the results of the 1969 general elections, that this crucial condition could not be sustained indefinitely, they had little use for representative government and the Alliance arrangement based on co-operation between Malay elite and the big business leadership of the MCA. Following the riots on 13 May the Government imposed the regime of the National Operations Council and representative government was temporarily suspended.

THE ELECTIONS IN EAST MALAYSIA (1970)

IN May 1969 the elections were to be held in East Malaysia in the States of Sabah and Sarawak—a week or so after polling had been completed in West Malaysia. However, because of the communal explosion in West Malaysia following the announcement of election results polling in the two States was suspended for an indefinite period. There had been no communal trouble in Sabah and Sarawak despite a fairly vigorous election campaign by all participants, and people in East Malaysia could see no reason for the suspension of the elections. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman in his statement of 15 May 1969, announcing the suspension of the elections, claimed that intimidation and bribery had been responsible for the success of the opposition parties in Malaysia. Referring to intelligence reports that political workers had been sent over to Sabah and Sarawak by the opposition parties he maintained that since the people of East Malaysia were a 'bit less forward or more backward than people in West Malaysia it would be too much to impose on them this abuse of democracy'.¹ This naturally drew loud protests from parties in opposition, especially the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) and the Sarawak National Party (SNAP). Attempts were made by them to persuade the National Operations Council to hold elections at an early date. But they came to nothing for the elections were soon to acquire a much greater significance, and the central government was in no mood to hold them until the problems created by the general elections in West Malaysia and the communal riots there had been resolved.

As stated in Chapter IV, following the riots representative government was suspended and the country was placed under the control of a National Operations Council headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein. The entire communal and political situation was in a melting pot and the clock had been turned back thirteen years to 1956-7, the

¹ Quoted in Bob Reece, 'Longhouse Politics', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 July 1969, p. 162.

time of independence. The basis of politics, established in 1956-7 and based on the *quid pro quo* between the feudal leadership of the UMNO and the big business leadership of the MCA, was seriously threatened by the outcome of the elections. It had become obvious that it could not work for long in the future within the framework of representative democracy. The arrangement providing the basis of politics had to be re-established, and now, unlike at the time of independence, without even the unwilling acceptance by the non-Malay communities. It had also to be entrenched in such a way that it could never again be challenged and threatened by the non-Malays. Tun Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, the Minister of Home Affairs, in an interview in London presented the government's (and the Malay leadership's) view in very clear terms:²

I feel that people ... can question the implementation of the policy of special privileges for the Malays but they should not question the principle which everybody agreed should be set down in the Constitution.³

² Quoted in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 5 May 1970.

³ It would be useful to recall here that the Constitutional Commission which recommended the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya in 1957 had placed the article relating to the special position of the Malays in Part XIII—*Temporary and Transitional Provisions*, of the Draft constitution. It was only later that the article was shifted to Part XII—*General and Miscellaneous*, by the Working Party which finalized the Constitution. The following is what the Constitutional Commission had recommended with regard to the special position of the Malays:

'After the expiration of a period of fifteen years from Merdeka Day but not earlier the appropriate Government shall cause a report to be made to the appropriate legislature as to whether the quotas be continued, reduced or discontinued; and after considering such report the appropriate legislature may continue, reduce or discontinue any quota; and if a quota is not then discontinued similar reports shall be made to the appropriate legislature at intervals of not more than fifteen years.'

It is widely maintained in Malaysia that when the MCA and the MIC had insisted on a fifteen year limit for the special position of the Malays, they were told by UMNO leaders (Tun Abdul Razak's name is especially mentioned) that a fifteen-year limit was not necessary

... I have proposed special provisions to be entrenched in the Constitution which would isolate the contentious racial points from the politics of this multi-racial multi-party country.

Once we isolate the communal issues, we can return to parliamentary democracy. Even if it is a modified form, it is one evolved to meet the special conditions of our country.

The return to parliamentary democracy will now depend entirely on the results of the general election in Sarawak and Sabah.

If the Alliance fails to get the two-thirds majority necessary for approving amendments to the Constitution, then we will have to negotiate with the opposition about support in our wish to isolate in the Constitution the several contentious communal problems.

If they do not agree, then I do not see how we can recall Parliament. The blame for this will rest on the opposition.

Earlier, Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman had said in his Hari Raya Puasa message: 'Nobody is in a particular hurry to return to parliamentary democracy. You can be assured that parliamentary democracy will be restored in good time but first we must make sure that the country is conditioned to accept it.' What all this meant was that parliamentary government was to be restored only after the special position of the Malays and the *quid pro quo* arrangement of 1956-7 were made irrevocable through amendments to the Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution require a two-thirds majority in the Dewan Raayat, and the Alliance, having won

because for all they knew after a few years these may not be necessary any more. Therefore it was best to leave it to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong who would review the situation from time to time and decide if they were necessary or not. The following is what Ong Yoke Lin (who was the sole MCA representative on the Government's Working Party which had finalized the changes in the Constitutional Commission recommendations and had determined the Constitution of Independent Malaya) told a meeting of the Central Working Committee of the MCA on 4 May 1957:

'That the White Paper which the Government proposes to issue will include a note that it will be in the interests of all concerned that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong should review the provisions of this Article (Special Position of the Malays) from time to time.' (*Minutes of Central Working Committee Meeting of the MCA, 4 May 1957.*)

It is important to note that it was only on this basis that the provisions relating to the Malay special position were accepted by the MCA.

only 66 seats out of 104 in West Malaysia, needed to secure at least 30 of the 40 parliamentary seats in East Malaysia. Thus the elections in Sabah and Sarawak were not only to determine who would rule the two States and represent them in the federal legislature but, more important, whether representative government could be restored throughout the entire country.

By early 1970, the racial situation in West Malaysia had improved and the National Operations Council had been able to restore normalcy. More important, the government had taken the necessary steps to ensure that public discussion of issues such as the special position of the Malays and the national language, which had angered the Malays and caused the communal explosion, would not take place again. On 8 May 1970, therefore, the National Operations Council decided to repeal that part of the Emergency Regulations which had suspended elections in Sabah and Sarawak and allow the elections to take place during the months of June and July 1970.⁴ However, the National Operations Council saw to it that the election campaign was carried on only under the most stringent restrictions on political activity. All political meetings, speeches by candidates or their supporters, and any kind of canvassing were strictly prohibited. Political parties and candidates were allowed to distribute only pictures or symbols with the words 'vote for'. Only in those constituencies where new nominations had been called for when all the candidates had either died or been disqualified, were candidates allowed to distribute a manifesto outlining their own or their party's aims and objectives. Even in this case manifestos were not to contain any matter that could generate hostility between the different races or classes, and the government further reserved the right to prohibit the distribution of any such manifestos in the interest of public security.

Further, the National Operations Council prohibited any expression of political opinion by the press and it banned the entry of foreign correspondents into Sabah and Sarawak. The government had taken such an extreme view that even *The Straits Times* was to comment editorially: '...presumably we cannot venture even upon recollection of the state of the parties

⁴ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 9 May 1970.

and the prospects thirteen months ago. We may be excused, nevertheless, if we describe them as having been exceedingly interesting for reasons we cannot disclose.⁵

In Sabah, parliamentary elections were held from 21 to 27 June 1970. No elections for the State Assembly were held because the Sabah legislature had been elected only in 1967 and its term was to come to an end in 1972. On nomination day in April 1969 ten Alliance candidates had been returned unopposed. Another Alliance candidate was elected without a contest when fresh nominations were called for on 10 June 1970 following the death of a candidate and the disqualification of the remaining independent candidate.⁶ Thus elections were held in only 5 of the 16 parliamentary constituencies in Sabah.

To the Alliance the political situation in Sabah was no source of worry; in fact, there was no organized opposition. Until 1967 the State had three political parties: the United Sabah National Organization (USNO), the United Pasok-Momogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO), and the Sabah Chinese Association (SCA).⁷ And all of them together had formed the Sabah Alliance, though USNO, led by Tun Mustapha bin Datu Harun, had been the dominant partner. Though dependent in the main on Muslim support the USNO has attempted to emphasize that it is a party for all the indigenous people. 'Nevertheless the party's submissions to the Cobbold Commission, and its subsequent policies, have emphasized its essentially Malayo-Muslim character.'⁸ The Sabah Chinese Association, like its Malayan counterpart, the Malaysian Chinese Association,

is the communal organization of the Chinese community. But since the Chinese constituted only about a quarter of the total population and not all the Chinese were inclined to support the SCA, it has occupied only a secondary position within the Sabah Alliance.

The other key member organization of the Sabah Alliance was the United Pasok-Momogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO) led by Donald Stephens, a former Chief Minister of Sabah. It represented the non-Muslim indigenous communities in the State. Donald Stephens was appointed the first Chief Minister of Sabah when Malaysia was formed in 1963. But he lost his position towards the end of 1964 when the USNO and the SCA joined hands against him and threatened to initiate a motion of no-confidence in him in the State legislature. For some time he was the Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs but he and his party were further isolated by the combined strength of the USNO (supported by the UMNO-dominated federal government) and the SCA. Following the State elections in Sabah in 1967, Stephens first withdrew his party from government, and then dissolved it and advised its members to join the USNO as individuals. He himself was soon to proceed to Australia as the Malaysian High Commissioner.⁹

Many Kadazans, the largest native ethnic group, believe that Donald Stephens, whom they had considered the Huguang Siou (Courageous Leader) of their community, had badly let them down. He had not only helped to eliminate all effective opposition to the Muslim-dominated Alliance but had 'left the Kadazan people politically emasculated'.¹⁰ Only about a month before the elections in Sabah, in May, Stephens visited the State and 'exhorted his "brother Kadazans" to identify themselves as Malaysians first and foremost and not let outdated Kadazan customs stand in the way of progress and national solidarity'.¹¹

As a result in 1970, the Sabah Alliance did not have to face any organized opposition. It was challenged only by a small number of

⁵ Ibid. 6 June 1970.

⁶ Since elections were suspended in the two States in 1969 only after nominations had been received and accepted, fresh nominations were not called for in 1970 except in the case of those constituencies where death or disqualification had left no candidate.

⁷ See M. Roff, 'Sabah's Political Parties: Changing Perceptions of Communal Identity', *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs*, October-December 1969, pp. 23-9; M. Roff, 'Sabah's Political Parties and the 1967 State Election', *International Studies*, April 1968, pp. 431-56; R.S. Milne, 'Political Parties in Sabah and Sarawak', *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, September 1965, pp. 104-17.

⁸ Roff, 'Sabah's Political Parties: Changing Perceptions of Communal Identity', p. 26.

⁹ In January 1971 he announced his decision to embrace Islam.

¹⁰ 'Malaysia: Back to the Polls', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 June 1970, p. 5.

¹¹ Loc. cit.

independent candidates who were foolhardy enough to contest the remaining seats and, in the view of many Sabahans, 'are not only wasting their time and money but might be courting trouble'.¹²

However, in Sarawak, where the political situation has always been comparatively open, the Alliance faced altogether different conditions. Unlike Sabah, where the two existing parties are partners in the Alliance, Sarawak has a multiplicity of political parties, all feuding against each other, including those within the Alliance. The Alliance in Sarawak has consisted of three parties—the predominantly Iban-based Party Pesaka, the Party Bumiputra consisting almost exclusively of Malays, and the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA).¹³ The opposition to the Alliance consists of the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). The largely Iban SNAP, led by the former Chief Minister Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan, was a member of the Sarawak Alliance until 1966. The SUPP, though originally intended to be a non-communal political party, has emerged as an essentially Chinese organization.

Prior to the general elections in 1969 there was serious disagreement among the three member parties of the Alliance in Sarawak with regard to the distribution of seats and the use of the Alliance symbol. After considerable controversy it was decided in March 1969 that the Party Pesaka, the Party Bumiputra and the SCA would campaign separately and use their own party symbols. They would not use the Alliance symbol and would 'come under the Alliance banner' only after the elections. To the Iban-based Party Pesaka the Alliance symbol, a sailing boat, was a liability, for among the Ibans there was widespread fear of Malay domination. However, despite the agreement not to use the Alliance symbol the Party Bumiputra and the SCA were able to secure the special permission of Tengku Abdul Rahman, the President of the Malaysian Alliance, to use the Alliance symbol.

Thus when elections were held in Sarawak in June-July 1970 the Sarawak Alliance in effect consisted only of the Party Bumiputra and the

¹² Loc. cit.

¹³ See Milne, 'Political Parties in Sabah and Sarawak', and *Government and Politics in Malaysia*, Boston 1967, pp. 99-104.

Sarawak Chinese Association. Party Pesaka contested separately under its own banner. Before the elections, during a visit to Sarawak in March, Tengku Abdul Rahman had initiated negotiations between the leaders of the Party Pesaka and the Party Bumiputra to avoid splitting the Alliance vote. The talks were fruitless and the two parties faced each other in 7 parliamentary and 16 State constituencies.

Despite considerable speculation about the opposition parties getting together or the two Iban-based parties, the SNAP and the Party Pesaka, joining hands to fight the elections, no electoral alliances were effected. The SNAP contested 23 parliamentary and 45 State seats while the SUPP fielded candidates in 18 parliamentary and 38 State constituencies.

The major problem faced by the Alliance was the growing resentment towards the federal government in Kuala Lumpur. This feeling has been strongest among the up-river Ibans and was reflected in the 'Sarawak for the Sarawakians' slogan of Dato Stephen Ningkan's SNAP.¹⁴ The other major opposition party, the SUPP, has also given expression to its dissatisfaction with the working of the federal system and has sought a revision of the status of Sarawak. Though so far no separatist movement has come into existence (except for the Clandestine Communist Organization) suspicion and fear of the federal government is very strong and a number of actions by the federal government in the months before the elections exacerbated federal-state relations.

The elections went smoothly, except for minor communist activity in Sarawak aimed at disrupting them. There were no communal incidents. There was a surprisingly high turn out of voters in both Sabah and Sarawak. In Sabah 72.46 per cent of the electorate cast its vote, and in Sarawak 78.76 per cent participated in the State elections and 79.46 per cent in the parliamentary elections. It is significant that the percentage of voters in Sarawak was better than that in the 1969 general elections in Malaysia.

The election result in Sabah was no surprise. Even before the elections the general feeling in Sabah was: 'Everything is over bar the slaughtering of buffaloes, the eating and drinking

¹⁴ Bob Reece, 'Alliance Troubles', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 June 1970, p. 8.

TABLE 10

Sabah Parliamentary Elections, 1970

	Number of candidates	Seats won	Votes polled	Per cent of total
Alliance	16 ^a	16 ^a	31,947	71.67
Independents	7	—	12,626	28.33
	23	16	44,573	100.00

^a Eleven of these were returned unopposed.

TABLE 11

Sarawak Parliamentary Elections, 1970

	Number of candidates	Seats won	Votes polled	Per cent of total
Alliance	14	7	52,355	21.72
Pesaka	15	2	30,765	12.77
SNAP	23	9	64,593	26.80
SUPP	18	5	71,293	29.59
Independents	24	1	21,975	9.12
	94	24	240,981	100.00

TABLE 12

Sarawak State Elections, 1970

	Number of candidates	Seats won	Votes polled	Per cent of total
Alliance	32	15	62,630	25.84
Pesaka	34	8	33,683	13.91
SNAP	45	12	57,001	23.53
SUPP	38	11	69,313	28.61
Independents	64	1	19,668	8.11
	213	47 ^a	242,295	100.00

^a Result of one seat not available.

and state-wide celebrations to mark the Alliance "victory".¹⁵ All the 5 seats for which the elections were held were won by the Alliance which thus secured the 16 parliamentary seats from Sabah. Of these 13 were won by USNO nominees and 3 by the SCA. Congratulating the Alliance nominees Tun Mustapha said in a statement: 'The results clearly show that the people in this State are solidly behind our party and the Governments of Sabah and Malaysia'.¹⁶

The Sarawak results were very different. In the parliamentary elections the Alliance was able to win only 9 seats—including the 2 secured by the Party Pesaka—out of the total of 24. The SNAP was able to secure 9 seats, the largest number gained by any single party. Of the remainder, 5 seats were won by SUPP nominees and 1 went to an independent candidate. The most significant aspect of these results was that this gave the Malaysian Alliance a total of only 91 seats in the Dewan Raayat, 5 short of the crucial two-thirds majority.

In the Sarawak State elections the Alliance performance was slightly better; it was able to secure 24 of the 48 seats. Of these 15 were won by the Party Bumiputra and the Sarawak Chinese Association which had contested under the Alliance symbol and 9 (including 1 independent who joined the Party Pesaka after the elections) were secured by the Party Pesaka. SNAP was able to win 12 seats and the SUPP 11.

Tun Abdul Razak, the head of the National Operations Council and who was soon to succeed Tengku Abdul Rahman as the Prime Minister, said that he was 'quite happy' with the performance of the Alliance. The general feeling was that it had done better, especially in the State elections, than was expected. *The Straits Times* maintained in an editorial: 'Alliance pleasure at the results of the Parliamentary and State elections in Sarawak (and of course the clean sweep of Parliamentary seats in Sabah) suggests that the Alliance may have prepared itself for loss of control of the Council Negri [State Assembly]'.¹⁷

In its wider implications, the results, especially

the inability of the Alliance to secure a two-thirds majority in the Dewan Raayat, were to create a feeling of uncertainty. There were doubts whether, under these conditions, the government would decide to restore parliamentary government. However, this air of uncertainty was short-lived.

Within two days of the announcement of the election results in Sarawak, on 7 July, Dato Haji Abdul Rahman Yakub, the leader of the Party Bumiputra and the Federal Minister of Education, pulled off the biggest political coup in the history of the State when the surprise announcement was made that he was to head a coalition government comprising of the Party Bumiputra, the Sarawak Chinese Association and the SUPP.¹⁸ It was stated that Stephen Yong, the Secretary-General of the SUPP, would be one of the two Deputy Chief Ministers. The Party Pesaka, realizing that it had been badly outplayed and that with the SUPP in the government it was unlikely to have any bargaining power and influence in the coalition, first responded with a rejection of the offer of seats in the government. But a day later, on 8 July, it reversed its decision and two of its nominees were appointed Ministers, one as a Deputy Chief Minister. The President of the party, Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah, declared that Pesaka 'is definitely within the Alliance and fully supports the coalition government'.¹⁹ According to him the delay in joining the government was caused by Pesaka negotiations with the SNAP to bring the latter into the coalition.

Both the Party Pesaka and the SNAP felt that they had been double-crossed by the SUPP. According to Stephen Kalong Ningkan, representatives of Pesaka, SNAP and SUPP had met all day on 6 July to discuss the formation of a new government. 'Everything was agreed. I am surprised and sad to see the SUPP leaders changing their stand'.²⁰ It is obvious that SUPP's moderate leadership, under pressure from the extremists within the party, saw membership of the coalition as their only means of survival. 'With special branch assistance, SUPP moderates will try to set their own house in order'.²¹

¹⁸ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 8 July 1970.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 10 July 1970.

²⁰ Quoted in Bob Reece, 'Unlikely Alliance', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 July 1970, p. 7.

²¹ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁵ 'Malaysia: Back to the Polls', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 June 1970, p. 6.

¹⁶ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 29 June 1970.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 6 July 1970.

Once Pesaka joined the coalition, Stephen Kalong Ningkan came to have serious fears that if his party were left out it might not survive until the next elections five years later. He was afraid that many of his supporters might be attracted by the Party Pesaka and defect to it. Therefore, he also sought to join the coalition through the good offices of the Pesaka leader, Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah. However, Dato Haji Abdul Rahman Yakub, afraid that SNAP might gang up with Party Pesaka in the coalition, was not at all interested in welcoming SNAP into the government. Thus SNAP was left as the only opposition party in Sarawak.

It is doubtful if the coalition will succeed in solving the grave problems facing the State. Already there have been reports that many in the rank and file of the SUPP are leaving it. It is generally believed that the SUPP will go the way of the Malaysian Chinese Association in West Malaysia and lose a major part of its support from the Chinese community. From a long term point of view this coalition should be as non-viable as its model the Malaysian Alliance unless the Malays and the federal government led by them were willing to be more reasonable than they have been thus far. As a correspondent of *Far Eastern Economic Review* asserted:

The dangers consequent on all-Dayak opposition are obvious enough but there are also the questions of the

federal-state relationship and Kuala Lumpur's policy of 'Malaysianisation' and Islamification. As education minister, Yakub (the new Chief Minister) changed West Malaysia's education system overnight by abolishing English-medium primary schools and he is a strong supporter of the Malay language as a catalyst of national unity.

No doubt he admires the firm measures taken by Tun Mustapha bin Dato Harun in neighbouring Sabah but he will find the Dayaks more recalcitrant than Sabah's demoralised Kadazans.²²

Following the formation of the coalition in Sarawak there was considerable speculation with regard to the convening of the Parliament and the restoration of parliamentary government. At first it was not clear if the 5 SUPP representatives in the Dewan Raayat would support the government. But soon it was confirmed by Stephen Yong, the Secretary-General of SUPP, that his party's MPs would 'be on their own' with regard to issues affecting the State government but in matters of national interest they would not oppose the Alliance.²³

Thus the Alliance, having been assured of a two-thirds majority in the Dewan Raayat to enable it to amend the Malaysian Constitution, the scene was set for the restoration of parliamentary government.

²² Loc. cit.

²³ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 18 July 1970.

APPENDIX I Party Manifestos

I(a): THE ALLIANCE MANIFESTO: POLICY

Introduction

1. We return once again to the people of Malaysia for the continuance of the mandate they have vested in us.
2. We have through dynamic development programmes transformed the economic and social landscape of our country.
3. Our political adversaries will no doubt seek to dismiss and distort all that has been accomplished in the 14 years we have been in office.
4. It is therefore necessary to restate and remind our people of the premises upon which our policies are fashioned, the political imperatives that have inspired these policies and that have made possible the establishment in Malaysia of a prosperous, stable, liberal and tolerant society.

Political Stability

5. The system we uphold is enshrined in the Constitution. It is a system that ensures that the ultimate arbiters of power are the ordinary people of our country. We accept the popular franchise, the dictation of the ballot-box.
6. Our conviction in the democratic process is a primary political faith with us. This process to which we subscribe has been applied under the most trying circumstances, in the face of individuals who have abused it, against forces that have sought to dismantle it. Yet it has survived—and struck firmer roots among our people.
7. We have had a full fare of tensions—racial prejudice, religious bigotry and an armed insurrection. These tensions are still present, though in a much mitigated form. The policies of the Alliance are designed to bring about their eventual elimination. We now confidently look forward to this eventuality within the life-span of our generation.

Our Economic Approach

8. We recognise that the convictions that shape our outlook need to be translated into prosaic reality, visible to all and sundry. No people can live by pure principles or pristine sentiments

alone. If the democratic system is to survive then it must be capable of delivering the goods, of making our people feel in tangible ways that they are its beneficiaries.

9. We have from the outset taken stock of the major economic problems besetting our country and our people. At the moment of Merdeka we were left with a grim legacy; a heavy dependence on rubber and tin, with a steady fall in the price of rubber and a rapid depletion of known tin reserves; a high rate of population growth and all the pressures it has implied on employment opportunities; an unequal distribution of income with a severe disparity between our rural and urban people; a shortage of the requisite skills and expertise with which to carry out development projects.

10. Within the resources available we have had to work out our scale of priorities. The twin targets of these priorities have been to raise the levels of income and to increase employment opportunities.

11. In the drive towards these goals we have also been unsparing in our efforts to rectify the major imbalances present among our people. Our farmers and fishermen constitute 60% of our people. History has neglected them, left them to eke out an existence in the backwaters while urban activity hummed to a fair degree of affluence.

12. Today we have made available to the overwhelming majority of our rural people the amenities hitherto known only to our urban dwellers. Electricity, water, roads, bridges, schools, clinics and community centres have all been laid on.

13. While enjoying these amenities we have also endeavoured to ensure that the means to enjoy them are also made equally available. Through land development schemes, the encouragement of oil palm growing, double cropping of padi, the planting of high yielding rubber, and the provision of financial and other forms of assistance to the farmer and the fisherman, we have steadily raised the income levels of our rural people.

14. With rural development, there has been a concurrent concentration on industrialisation. Our efforts have resulted in a per capita level of income of about \$1,000/- which is one of the highest in Asia. This compares very favourably with \$700/- at the time when we took office. Our planning has been designed to dovetail short-term measures with long-term requirements, towards setting up the basic economic infrastructure upon which industrialisation may proceed at the requisite pace.

15. Transport and communication facilities have been installed, public utilities like electricity and water supply widely established, and community services such as education, health and housing made readily available. All this has been a boost to our industrialisation effort.

16. We intend to proceed along the prongs of economic advance we have charted for ourselves. Through industrialisation on the one hand, and land development and crop diversification on the other, we expect to achieve for our people within the foreseeable future a per capita income of at least \$1,500/-.

17. Our present 3% rate of population growth is a pressure against us. Though our birth rate has fallen, the death rate has fallen even more steeply as a result of the health and other amenities we have provided. But, through family planning programme, we expect to reduce our population growth rate to 2% by 1985.

18. We have hitherto suffered from an inordinate reliance on imports to satisfy our domestic consumer needs. This heritage of our colonial past has over the years been substantially altered by the growth of industries to meet our demands. We shall carry forward our industrialisation policies not just to meet domestic requirements but also to stimulate the export potential.

19. We believe in a mixed economy, in the role of public and private capital. Through tax and investment incentives and through other purposeful expenditure we have prepared the ground for private capital, both local and foreign, to move in and invest in industries on a scale sufficient to cope with the demand for employment and to ensure ever increasing standards of living. More important, as a result of political and economic stability and the expectation that such stability will be maintained, a climate of confidence has been created.

20. We do not share the specious reasoning of many of our critics who believe that foreign capital is exploitative in character. We believe that the foreign investor has a significant role to play in our economic advance. We recognise that he does not come in out of any sense of altruism. He legitimately seeks profits. Through incentives and guarantees we shall encourage him in setting up industries.

21. We believe in free enterprise. The foreign investors are here by invitation. We seek their expertise, some of their capital, and our share in the profits. We show ourselves as their friends by comprehending their interests and making sure that it squares with our own.

Defence and Security

22. Economic advance can only be achieved if there is assurance of political and social stability.

23. When Merdeka was achieved in 1957, an armed insurgent movement was still in existence. We terminated this state of insurgency in three years—1960. However, militant communists, chauvinists and political opportunists continue to pose a threat by stirring emotions of class hatred and racial bigotry in their design to seize power. This menace can only be met through appropriate measures for the maintenance of internal security and economic development.

24. We must continue to maintain the delicate balance between the demands of security and the more vital consideration of fundamental rights, taking risks in the direction of security in order to uphold values embossed in our Constitution.

25. We have at all times possessed the basic military sinews for our national defence. To bolster our defence capability, we have been steadily building up our defence forces. With the complete withdrawal of British military presence from this region, which is imminent, we have to assume additional defence responsibilities, compelling an added expenditure on our armed services to ensure that we may continue to live without any disturbance to our territorial integrity.

26. It is a policy that strikes an inter-related balance between the assurance for stability and the demands of our development projects. Our military commitments cannot be extended to curtail our economic efforts.

27. It is upon this premise and within the

restrictions we have deliberately placed upon ourselves that we have established our relations with neighbouring and other States. We do not believe in postures of defiance, but in policies of peace.

Foreign Affairs

28. With the passage of time there has been a marked detente in the tensions between the communist and non-communist nations, opening up opportunities for the assertion of freer and more independent foreign policies by individual nations. The communist countries no longer confront the rest of the world as a single monolithic bloc.

29. We have aligned our own foreign policy in the light of this radical development. While continuing to preserve our traditional ties of co-operation with the non-communist nations of the world, we have probed the possibilities of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the East European States. The response has been encouraging and we have now established normal diplomatic relations with some of these States.

30. We shall persevere in this policy of coming to the best of terms with all nations that respect our sovereignty, recognising always that we are a small nation and that our major contribution is towards the stability and economic well-being of the region. That is why to our neighbours we have held out the hand of a friend. And to our reluctant neighbours there is still and will always be a standing offer to take that hand.

The Racial Nemesis

31. We have fashioned and applied our policies on the basis that we are a nation made up of many races. We have sought to integrate the varying outlooks of our people into a single Malaysian-centred consciousness. In the short run this has meant accommodating the interests of our adult population. But the integrated outlook can finally be achieved in the long run as the younger generation makes its way through the system of education we have instituted.

32. Historical circumstances have combined to keep the races apart and have somewhat segregated them economically. Our rural people had been left to linger on a subsistence level. As it happens they are predominantly from a single

race. And because we have given them a deserving priority in our attentions, we have been accused by our adversaries of practising racial discrimination.

33. They have with calculated mischief sought to misinterpret the assistance the Government has been giving to the Malays of West Malaysia and the natives of East Malaysia. It must be realised that in assisting them we have been properly and correctly discharging our obligations under Article 153 of the Constitution of Malaysia.

34. Our policy of levelling up the position of the 'have-nots', wherever they may be, to the economic status of the 'haves' will continue to be pursued with vigour.

35. We have repeatedly affirmed that our policies are not designed to deprive anyone of opportunities for advancement. Rather our policies are aimed to extend these opportunities to those who have been denied them. We believe that everyone in this country shall have a place in the Malaysian sun.

36. At the other end of the spectrum are those who condemn us for selling out the interests of the Malays. On the strength of their advocacy of a one-race Government they have gained control of a State and run it into a state of economic chaos.

37. Every opposition party, without exception, has sought to play on racial emotions. Some have done it crudely, others go about it in varying degrees of disguise. But each and everyone of these parties is in the control of its craven core of racial bigots.

38. There can be many and easy appeals to racial sentiments with quick and ready political gains. This is a perverse urge with a callous disregard for the national interest.

39. We have avoided this easy appeal. We have with deliberation opted for a more arduous course, for the more tortuous and trying effort towards a national consensus. It is a course that we have taken against constant and contrary pressures about us.

40. We have held steadfast to the belief born out of experience and conviction that for the survival of a multiracial community such as ours the values of a stable, liberal and tolerant society must be nurtured and made to flourish as an animating force among all our people.

The Alternative

41. Not a single opposition party has shown itself capable of serving the needs and aspirations of a multi-racial society such as ours. Instead, they have acted on the impetus of the moment, capitalising on localised frustrations, and making incitement an inherent element of their politics. Their efforts have been designed to cajole innocent listeners into believing whatever ruse they choose to run.

42. It has fallen on us, time and again, to dispel the latent fears and ugly suspicions that may be present among our people and arrest the spreading contagion of racialist emotions. If the equation of stability in race-relations presently established is ever upset, there may well set in an irreversible process of disintegration with all the consequential carnage too hideous for anyone to envisage.

43. The failure of the Opposition to consider the effects of its activity must be a burning concern among all thinking Malaysians. The opposition parties, acting separately or in concert, do not and cannot constitute a credible alternative government.

Why the Alliance?

44. No government in the world can claim to be without a measure of its own mistakes and shortcomings. When results have not proved satisfactory in any sector of our national life, we have not remained complacent or slurred over the fact. We have at all times reckoned with the shortcomings and sought to rectify them.

1(b): DAP GENERAL ELECTIONS MANIFESTO, 'OUR TRIPLE OBJECTIVE' TOWARDS A MALAYSIAN MALAYSIA!

Dear Fellow Malaysians,

We submit, for your earnest consideration, the following triple objective of the DAP—political democracy, social and economic democracy, and cultural democracy.

1. Political Democracy

In a political democracy, all citizens, regardless of race, language, or religion, enjoy equal political status, rights and opportunities. But Alliance policies tend to divide Malaysians into two unequal classes of citizens—'bumiputras' and 'non-bumiputras'. This must be opposed if a firm basis is to be laid for genuine unity. All

45. Our public servants, in their silent and anonymous manner, have at all times been alert to the needs of the nation and have advised the Government and implemented its policies with a keen and impartial dedication to duty that has made them unmatched in Southeast Asia.

46. We have always observed a strict financial discipline. The soundness of our conduct has now been reflected by the strength and stability of the Malaysian Dollar and its ready acceptance as an international currency of exchange.

47. We do not believe in prestige splurges. We believe in the rational allocation of our resources directed to generate an overall economic advance of our people. Ours is a pragmatic outlook.

48. On both previous occasions when we went to the country for the verdict of our people, we did so with confidence born of achievement. We now return to our people in this same mien and manner, seeking to hold high for public view the facts of our record and our precise programme for the future.

A Final Word

49. We have not and shall never hold out vain promises. The only promise that our people may legitimately expect is the hard slog and the long haul ahead. It is through diligence that we shall lead our people to happiness, prosperity, and the well-being of our nation.

50. FOR A STABLE, LIBERAL AND TOLERANT SOCIETY, ADVANCE ALL THE WAY WITH THE ALLIANCE!

Malaysians must have an equal place under the Malaysian sun. Hence our plea for 'A Malaysian Malaysia'.

The increasing repressive powers of the Police in the country, and the abuses that arise therefrom, are also not compatible with the principle of political democracy.

A review of the provisions of the Internal Security Act, and other Police regulations, to ensure that these are not abused for partisan and other purposes, which have nothing to do with the legitimate concern for the maintenance of internal security, is also called for.

2. Social and Economic Democracy

Social and economic democracy means the ending of the exploitation of man by man, class by class or race by race. It is an Alliance-sponsored lie that the DAP is anti-Malay. We think it is a crime for Malaysians to be anti-Malay, anti-Chinese, anti-Indian or anti any section of our multi-racial nation.

We give full support to all genuine moves to eradicate poverty and backwardness among our rural population. It must be the paramount concern of all Malaysians to eradicate the economic, social and educational imbalance between our rural and urban sectors. Malaysian prosperity and progress are indivisible. The elimination of Malay peasant poverty and the raising of rural incomes and of the standards of living of the Malay peasantry must therefore be given a major priority.

The Alliance government, however, ignores the principle of the indivisibility of Malaysian prosperity and social justice. They often forget that the have-nots in Malaysia are of all races. They are found in rural areas as well as in urban slums. The campaign against poverty and backwardness must accordingly be a national campaign, based on the criteria of need and not on that of race. Unfortunately, the Alliance government have managed to give a racial twist and bias to all their social, economic and educational programmes.

Social and economic democracy means, among other things,

- (a) THE ELIMINATION of unemployment and underemployment in both rural and urban areas, through a massive programme of dynamic, many-sided and accelerated economic growth, and the encouragement of foreign capital investment in the country on the basis of an equal partnership between local and foreign capital.
- (b) PURSUIT of a modern and progressive educational policy to eliminate rural poverty and backwardness.
- (c) FISCAL and taxation policies, aimed at a more equitable distribution of wealth in the country, and which do not impose unequal burdens on Malaysians in the middle and lower-income groups.
- (d) REVISION of labour laws to ensure industrial justice for workers, and the establishment of a minimum wage for all manual workers.

- (e) LAND for landless farmers, regardless of race, the basic criteria being that of need.
- (f) STATE SOCIAL SECURITY for the aged, infirm, sick, redundant and unemployed.
- (g) A MASSIVE provision of low-cost housing for the people both in urban and rural areas; and
- (h) ELIMINATION of corruption at all levels of public life, including the very high levels.

3. Cultural Democracy

An equal multi-racial society presupposes that no one race exercises political, social or cultural hegemony over the others. The theory and practice of cultural democracy is compatible and consistent with the development of national unity and the sense of national identity. This has been proved by the success of multi-racial and multi-lingual nations like Switzerland, Canada, the Soviet Union and others.

Alliance policies have given rise to a deep feeling of cultural insecurity on the part of non-Malay Malaysians. The DAP will strive for the following objectives of cultural democracy in Malaysia:

- (a) OFFICIAL STATUS for the Chinese, Tamil and English languages, and acceptance of Malay as the national language to serve as the common language of expression and communication among Malaysians.
- (b) FREE USE of Chinese, Tamil and English in the Parliament, State Assemblies, and in public notices and government correspondence.
- (c) ABOLITION OF THE distinction between national and national-type schools.
- (d) ADOPTION of an integrated education system, where schools using the major languages as media of instruction and examination are recognised as National Schools, provided the content of education imparted is Malaysian-oriented and the National Language is taught as a compulsory second language.
- (e) RETENTION of the services of an impartial Cambridge Examinations Syndicate to conduct the School Certificate and Higher School Certificate examinations, to remove any possibility of the use of racial criteria in the marking of examination papers, if this was done under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.
- (f) IMMEDIATE solution of the question of recognition of Nanyang, Formosan, Indian, Middle Eastern and Indonesian degrees and

qualifications, on the basis of internationally accepted standards of assessment.

(g) GOVERNMENT SUPPORT for the National University and the Merdeka University projects.

(h) DEVELOPMENT OF a Malaysian culture from the free interplay and interaction of the diverse cultural elements in Malaysia, and not proceeding from the hegemony of any one culture.

Our other major objectives are:

(1) AN INTELLIGENT FOREIGN POLICY, which will seek the friendship and goodwill of all the nations of the world, who will respect our sovereignty and territorial integrity and will refrain from interference in our internal affairs.

(2) THE STRENGTHENING OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION in South East Asia, and the achievement of closer economic co-operation

including a mutually advantageous common market arrangement with our nearest neighbour, Singapore, as a first step towards the achievement of wider regional co-operation.

(3) THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE CAPACITY, based on co-operation with friendly powers, and on the development of multi-racial national defence forces.

Such, in brief, are the basic objectives of the DAP. We believe that it is vital for the future of the Malaysian nation that there should be in the country an honest, consistent and efficient opposition which will strive sincerely for the basic triple objective of political, social and cultural democracy.

We appeal for your support.

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY

1(c): GERAKAN RAKYAT MALAYSIA:

(1) POLICY STATEMENT 15 APRIL 1965

We, loyal and patriotic citizens of Malaysia, who have come together to share a common struggle and destiny, in our attempt to bring about a just, prosperous, tolerant, harmonious, and dignified society, hereby affirm our faith in the following objectives and principles:

1. Our ideal is the attainment of a state wherein all the citizens, male and female, have an adequate means of livelihood, wherein the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and the means of production to the detriment of the citizens, wherein the working population are not abused, wherein the citizens are not compelled by the force of circumstances to enter into a vocation unsuitable to their health and dignity, wherein the youth and children are protected against exploitation and against moral and material desertion, wherein women shall have equal pay with men for equal work, wherein those who toil in agriculture, fisheries and the industries, and other sectors are provided with suitable wages, working conditions and sufficient opportunity for the enjoyment of leisure and cultural life.

2. We believe that the most favourable political order to live and struggle in is a constitutional

and parliamentary democracy. Only in such a political order can we hope to attain our objectives free from fear and oppression. Hence we honour the Constitution, the Sovereignty of the Nation and the Rule of Law, in letter and spirit.

3. The just and equitable distribution of wealth requires that certain vital means of production be owned by the community. We believe in the public ownership of the vital means of production if the benefit accruing therefrom is more than the previous status before the transfer of ownership. We classify such transfer into two types, destructive and constructive. A constructive transfer is one that

(a) does not incur serious losses to the community,

(b) does not lower efficiency, and

(c) does not curtail the freedom of the workers to strive for their legitimate interests.

4. Though our immediate aim is to attain social economic welfare, we do not, philosophically speaking, believe in the primacy of the material as against the spiritual. They are inseparable and conditional to each other. Hence in our effort to raise the standard of living and effect a just distribution of wealth, we shall not ignore the spiritual values such as honesty, the sense of

justice, dedication, ability, soberness, and enthusiasm. Those striving for or already enjoying social economic welfare must possess these qualities, without which man will be ruined; it is a grave error to plan for economic progress without also planning for a moral and intellectual reform.

5. We strive for the individual ownership of economic lots of land by the peasants and workers and its efficient and profitable exploitation by co-operative and joint management.

6. We shall encourage, strengthen and protect a trade union movement in the country to safeguard the interests of the workers. The freedom and nature of the trade union movement reflect the state of democracy and the rule of law in the country. The trade union movement can be a source of reform and progress in the educational and cultural aspects of the worker's life.

7. We recognise the need to accord special attention and emphasis on the economically weak Malays and other indigenous peoples. Their problems require a special approach and special remedies. They should be protected from exploitation and assisted to compete with other communities on a just basis in business, trade and the professions.

8. We recognise the need to accord special attention and emphasis on

(a) the problems of the people in the rural areas

(b) the problem of the fishing community

(c) fragmentation of estates and other problems of estate workers

(d) the problems of those affected by resettlement in new villages

(e) the problems of the slum dwellers, the squatters and the urban poor.

9. We shall preserve and encourage non-monopolistic commercial and industrial enterprises. They are essential to the prosperity of the nation and provide an important source of employment.

10. We strive for a state that would introduce modern natural and social sciences and technology in the various aspects of our social life. Consequently we consider scientific research oriented towards our national problems vital to the progress of the nation. We should give the proper recognition and employment status to

our scientific experts and professionals in all fields. They should not be devaluated and treated as of incidental importance.

11. We strive for a Malaysian nationhood evolved out of the existing communities in Malaysia. The process of formation should be left to historical growth. The state participates in its formation by eliminating obstacles to harmony and inter-community acculturation. It should not impose cultural elements or indulge in artificial experiments such as introducing a common dress, dance, ritual and ceremony without regard to the receptivity of the communities in Malaysia. We emphasise common experience and the sense of a common destiny as the decisive essentials of nationhood rather than cultural, religious or ethnic uniformity.

12. We encourage serious and genuine respect for the religious life of our communities. We recognise religion as the fountain of faith and moral values, as a source of meaning and happiness in the struggle of living. It is a constructive force in character building and the attainment of peace. We shall oppose any trend that intends to eliminate religion from our national life. We believe that the great religious traditions in Malaysia such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and the Chinese religion, stress tolerance, goodwill, compassion, mutual help and understanding between peoples.

13. We believe that the institution of the family is a highly significant condition in the development of the social life of man. The state should protect the institution of the family from corrosive forces that tend to undermine it as a basic unit of social life. It should devote sufficient attention to promote the happiness, progress and cohesiveness of family life.

14. We believe in the cooperation between classes as the true and practical method of achieving our aim rather than in the conflict between them. We do not deny a certain amount of conflict between class or group interests but this conflict we hope to resolve by an integrative philosophy emphasizing the ultimate unity of human values and basic interests, stressing mutual aid rather than class warfare.

15. We believe that a political party should not be preoccupied only with election. It

should educate the masses and provide leadership in thinking and problem solving regarding issues of direct relevance to our national well-being. Its views on different topics of interest must be based on solid facts and sound reasoning.

16. We do not subscribe to the generalization that politics is necessarily impure. Politics, like other activities in social life, can be clean or dirty depending on the attitude of the individual participants. We reject the philosophy that the end justifies the means irrespective of what the end is. Hence in our political life we shall leave no room for unethical methods such as character assassination, whipping up communal or religious sentiments, exploiting the goodwill or services of those who help us, or denying any merit to those who are in different parties. We abhor any form of fanaticism be it religious, racial, cultural, political, ideological, linguistic or class.

17. We believe in the identity of Malaysia as an Asian nation and we consider that interaction with Western civilization is the most decisive factor in the development and destiny of our people. The modernization of Malaysia should be guided by certain principles of selection. Not everything from the Western civilization and social life is desirable. Neither should everything from our Asian historical legacy be preserved. We want to preserve what is useful, respectable, good and human in our Asian heritage and assimilate modern science and technology, together with some other desirable elements from the Western civilization. We shall encourage among others the following from our Asian heritage:

(a) Respect for the old and the infirm.

(b) The sense of responsibility and duty to look after the wellbeing not only of our wives and children but also our parents, our brothers and sisters or other relatives if they in a justified manner, need our help.

(c) Respect for those who practice genuine religious devotion devoid of selfish and material desires as exemplified by the great religious founders and saints in Asia.

(d) Respect for the individual as a sacred entity even though he may be poor, weak and uneducated.

18. In Asia and Africa, corruption has been a scourge that destroys the happiness and well-being of the people. Essentially it is a betrayal and abuse of well meaning trust placed upon those who govern by those who are governed. The misery and suffering of the people is directly or indirectly brought about by corruption. Where there is exploitation there is corruption. We emphasize vigorously that the government should uproot this evil without discrimination as to the rank and the power of those who betray the public by corruption.

We appeal to the citizens of all communities to rally around our banner and strive for the Malaysia we have in mind, a Malaysia governed by thinking, responsible and sincere men inflamed by a passion for social justice and national harmony. Like the Olympic flame passing from hand to hand, our ideals will pass from mind to mind. Let me conclude by quoting a great Persian revolutionary of the 19th century, 'You can stop the messenger from arriving, but never the message.'

Dated: Prof. Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas,
15th April 1968. Pro-Tem Chairman,
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia.

ELECTION MANIFESTO: 3rd GENERAL ELECTIONS 1969:

(III) *EQUALITY, JUSTICE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL: OUR AIMS*

(All listed below are equally important and the numbers have no special significance).

1. To reduce the Alliance majority in Parliament in order to DENY THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY they need to further abrogate our constitutional rights and guarantees.
2. To ensure that there is an EFFECTIVE AND INTELLIGENT OPPOSITION in Parliament to keep the Alliance on its toes, and to prevent it

from further abusing its powers.

3. To Maintain and foster DEMOCRACY and adhere to the Principle of the RULE OF THE LAW.

4. To encourage respect for one's RELIGION, one's FAMILY and one's ELDERS.

5. To expose and wipe out CORRUPTION and MALPRACTICES which are prevalent today.

6. To protect the rights of our WORKERS and PEASANTS to organise and bargain collectively.

7. To restrain the Alliance from using indiscriminately the many ARBITRARY POWERS usurped by them in particular the Internal Security Act.
8. To safeguard the RIGHTS and LIBERTIES of our people from corrosive and abusive legislation and ministerial decrees which undermine the Constitution.
9. To uphold the status and position of our NATIONAL LANGUAGE as provided for in our Constitution.
10. To press for the LEGITIMATE USE OF ALL LANGUAGES and a status consistent with the official provisions on the status of all within the National Constitution as it is only human and just to do so at the present stage of development of our multi-racial society.
11. To press for PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT of the different media of instruction in our educational institutions from primary to tertiary levels.
12. To press for EXAMINATIONS in the main medium of instruction AND to ensure that the results of all examinations are equated in terms of scholastic achievement.
13. To press for support for both the NATIONAL AND MERDEKA UNIVERSITIES in order to preserve the use and study of Malay, Tamil and Chinese up to and including university levels.
14. To promote the STUDY AND RAPID DEVELOPMENT of our National Language in order that it may soon become a more meaningful unifying force within our multi-racial society and to that end to make every endeavour for it to be accepted as a compulsory subject in all educational institutions.
15. To press FOR JUST EQUITABLE TREATMENT of all schools teaching Malaysian students and to ensure the equalising of opportunities for employment of all students on leaving school.
16. To remove EDUCATION from the control

of politicians and have it in the hands of an independent body charged with divising and implementing policies designed to benefit the Nation as a whole and not the schemings of politicians.

17. To establish an INTEGRATED SOCIETY of Malaysians sharing a common outlook and a common destiny.
18. To eliminate EXPLOITATION of man by man and promote CO-OPERATION between man and man and in particular between labour and capital for the mutual benefit of both and the general industrialisation of the Nation.
19. TO ABOLISH DISCRIMINATION of every kind and in particular against women and to work for a Women's Charter to this end.
20. To eliminate the causes that create POVERTY, SUFFERING, ILL-HEALTH and INERTIA especially in the rural areas.
21. To prevent Malay privileges from being abused by unscrupulous leaders.
22. To eliminate administrative delay and other unjust obstacles to acquire citizenship.
23. To review the position of STATELESS RESIDENTS and to find the most humane measures to overcome their various problems.
24. To solicit SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY to enable it to be in a position to defend the rights and liberties of our people and to serve the people in every way possible.
25. To solve the problem of UNEMPLOYMENT which now number more than 400,000.
26. To urge the modification of our DIVORCE LAWS.
27. To press for review of the system of TAXATION in order to provide better reliefs.
28. To lower the VOTING AGE to 18 years.
29. To press for SOCIAL SECURITY and NATIONAL ASSISTANCE for both urban and rural people.
30. To take whatever other measures necessary to ensure SOCIAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY and HUMAN WELFARE.

(III) WORKERS CHARTER

The *Malaysian People's Movement* fully recognises the rights of workers to organise without hindrance and the right of their trade union organisations to collective bargaining. The People's movement is firmly committed to Freedom of Association and protection of the rights of workers to organise in the manner of

their own choosing. The Party believes in free and democratic trade unionism and its policy is to encourage and foster the growth of trade union organisations. The GRM also believes in the principle of equal remuneration and is determined to do all in its power to achieve this objective as soon as possible.

The GRM is fully conscious that the trade union movement in Malaysia has been placed under severe restraints and undemocratic restrictions through the introduction by the Alliance Government of a series of anti-labour legislations such as:-

- (a) The Trade Unions Ordinance of 1959.
- (b) The Industrial Relations Act 1967.

The Party is firmly committed to do away with these and other undemocratic and distasteful regulations as a matter of great urgency.

The existing trade union laws in Malaysia run contrary to all International labour standards, deny workers their legitimate and fundamental rights and give the Government unlimited powers to curb, control and if necessary, crush the workers' movement in the country. It is the aim of the GRM to fight for the labour laws that may restore the workers to their rightful positions.

The Party will resolutely struggle for the revocation of the laws which divide the workers, the rules which separate them and the provisions which prevent them from forming strong and effective unions.

The Gerakan advocates a New Deal for the workers and towards this, the following declaration is made:-

1. An adequate living wage as the minimum and lowest salary base, shall be legally established in each occupation and industry.
2. The workers shall be legally protected against indiscriminate termination of their employment, and job security shall be assured by legislative protection.
3. Reasonable compensation for unjustified dismissals and adequate redundancy benefits shall be guaranteed.
4. Social Security Schemes providing for safeguards against unemployment, invalidity, injury, sickness, and old age shall be introduced.
5. Equality of opportunity for advancement, at all levels in Social, Educational, and Economic fields in Malaysia without discrimination or

regard to race, religion, colour, creed or sex. (Equal pay for equal work.)

6. Extension of Government and Municipal enterprise for the provision of social necessities and services.
7. Proper provisions for the adequate participation of the workers in the control and management of public services and industries.
8. Adequate and proper housing accommodation for the workers within their economic means.
9. Ratification, acceptance and implementation of International Labour Standards in industries and establishments in Malaysia.
10. Recognition of workers unhindered rights to organise, to meet, to discuss and to propagate their views in safety and without fear of reprisals.

Human Factor

The Gerakan upholds that among all factors the human factor is the most important factor in the industry. The worker's individual freedom and his basic rights as a worker and citizen shall be respected and protected. His rights to join a trade union and associate himself with any social or political organisations or activities after his working hours shall be permitted without hindrance by law or by any quarters.

Unemployment

Unemployment is a threat to the nation's peace and progress. The Alliance Government had miserably failed to introduce a full employment policy. The Gerakan feels that the level of economic activity in the Community must be sufficient to provide jobs for all. The Gerakan is convinced that this can only be assured through intelligent management of the economy and constructive planning. Towards this task research and planning will be undertaken to absorb the manpower available. Human resources will be placed in full use in accordance with intellectual capacity, skill and talent. The Gerakan believes that the Government owes an opportunity of living to all its citizens indiscriminately.

1(d): PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF MALAYA MANIFESTO 1969

MALAYSIA FOR MALAYSIANS

1. Once again on the 10th of May, 1969, the people of Malaysia will exercise their constitutional right to elect their representatives in

Parliament and the various State Assemblies.

2. It is with a feeling of confidence that the People's Progressive Party of Malaya faces the

electorate. This feeling of confidence pervades us because our national leader D.R. Seenivasagam up to the moment of his death devoted his whole time and energy to ensure that the P.P.P. kept faith with the people. His absolute sincerity and courage in championing the cause of the people have won for him and the P.P.P. a place which will never fade away in the hearts of the people of Malaysia.

A Malaysian Malaysia

3. The P.P.P. remains true to the ideals and the principles of the concept of a Malaysian Malaysia.
4. What is a Malaysian Malaysia? The demand for a Malaysian Malaysia was reaffirmed and subscribed to at the first meeting of the Malaysian Solidarity Convention convened by the Opposition Parties in Malaysia. On behalf of the People's Progressive Party of Malaya the Joint Declaration signed by D.R. reads as follows:

'A MALAYSIAN MALAYSIA means that the nation and the State is not identified with the Supremacy, well-being and the interests of any one particular community or race'.

5. It was further pointed out that a Malaysian Malaysia is the antithesis of a Malay Malaysia. They cannot co-exist.

Welfare State

6. The basic objective of the People's Progressive Party is and always has been a democratic Welfare State based on the principles of Socialism adapted to the needs and desires of the people of Malaysia.

Equal Rights

7. A fundamental requirement of a united Malaysian Malaysia is that every citizen of Malaysia shall be equal.

8. It is idle to dream of a united nation if any section of its citizens is made to feel that it is inferior or superior to any other section.

9. The "special rights" clause in the Constitution has been grossly abused by the UMNO dominated Alliance Government to the detriment of the non-Malay citizens of this nation. It is becoming more and more evident that the Alliance intends to preserve this obnoxious provision as a permanent feature of the Constitution.

10. Special rights and privileges have brought no material or other benefits to the Malay Ra'ayat who after 10 years of independence find them-

selves in the same social and economic plight they were in before Merdeka.

11. What has happened is that the Alliance has abused its powers and under the guise of enforcing the special rights, has created a Malay capitalist class which is now exploiting the Malay masses.

12. The result of this policy is that without bringing any benefits to the Malay Ra'ayat it has served as a constant irritant to non-Malays disrupting the unity of the people and perpetuating racial prejudices.

13. It will be the determined object of the P.P.P. to continue to strive to have the Constitution amended to abolish privileges granted to any particular race.

Education Policy

14. The education policy pursued by the Alliance in the past and intended to be pursued in the future has proved totally unacceptable. A Malay outlook rather than a Malaysian outlook determines the policy which has caused resentment and disgust throughout the country.

15. The P.P.P. will continue to demand that an independent Committee be set up to formulate a policy suitable and acceptable to the needs and aspirations of the people of this country.

16. Such an independent Committee can succeed only if it is composed of educationalists drawn from various Communities and who are without political or racial bias or favour.

17. We will demand an education policy which, among other things, will provide:

(1) Free and compulsory primary education for every child.

(2) Free but not compulsory secondary education.

(3) Medium of instruction and examination to be in accordance with the wishes of the parents—Malay, Chinese, Tamil or English.

(4) Fair and equal treatment for all educational institutions irrespective of race.

(5) All students after completion of their studies shall be treated equally in the matter of selection for jobs, irrespective of whichever school or college they were educated in.

Higher Education

18. Many brilliant students are denied the opportunity of higher education because of the poverty of their parents.

19. We will strive for the establishment of many more scholarships. The present number available is ridiculous when compared to the number of those students who are eligible and deserving.

Official Languages

20. We shall continue our struggle for the recognition of Chinese and Tamil to be recognised as official languages in addition to Malay. In a multi-racial nation like Malaysia where the non-Malay population forms the majority it is manifestly undemocratic and unjust that official status is denied to the languages of the Chinese and Indians who constitute the two other major races in Malaysia.

Citizenship Laws

21. The procedure to secure citizenship is cumbersome and people qualified to obtain citizenship are barred by technicalities from obtaining their Certificate of Citizenship.
22. We will demand the abolition of the different classes of citizens and strive to ensure that once a person becomes a citizen he shall for all purposes be an equal with all other citizens of whatever race, religion or colour. We will seek to abolish the arbitrary powers of Government to revoke citizenship.

Immigration Policy

23. The Immigration Policy continues to be harsh and aggressive resulting in sorrow and suffering to large numbers of people in this country.
24. There must be a radical review of the present policy and a new policy more just and humane in outlook must be introduced.

Foreign Policy

25. Malaysia's foreign policy should be one of establishing and maintaining friendly relations with all those who desire friendship without regard to their political ideologies.
26. We cannot however have any relations whatsoever with countries like South Africa or the present illegal regime in Rhodesia where apartheid is practised.
27. We will oppose any attempt to form an alliance or bloc on grounds of racial or religious affinity only with any other nation or group of nations.

28. In a multi-racial country like Malaysia it must be remembered that it is impossible to make any claim of such racial or religious affinity.

Finance

29. We shall scrutinise Government expenditure with a view to eliminating extravagance and waste of public funds on prestige projects. All available funds must be utilised for strictly welfare projects for the benefit of the people irrespective of race, colour or creed.

Freedom of the Press

30. Freedom of the Press is nothing but a sham in Malaysia. The right to publish a newspaper is dependent on the arbitrary powers of the Government.
31. Blatant and unashamed attempts have often been made to muzzle the Press by regular conferences at which "advice" is given to the Press.
32. When it is realised that this "advice" comes from the Government or its nominee then it is obvious that it is in effect an order which a newspaper can disregard only at the peril of having its licence cancelled or not renewed in due course.
33. There are adequate laws in Malaysia to deal with sedition or other offences relating to newspapers. The restrictions now imposed on the Press amount to intimidation and must be abolished.

Radio and T.V.

34. There has been a shameless abuse of Radio and T.V. by the Alliance. These two institutions have been unscrupulously turned into Alliance Party propaganda machines.
35. Legislation must be introduced to provide for non-political statutory bodies to control and administer the facilities for Radio and T.V.

Internal Security Law

36. Experience has proved that the Internal Security Act and the Prevention of Crime have been grossly, shamelessly and cruelly abused.
37. Without even the pretence of a fair trial people have been deprived of their liberty for the greater part of their useful lives. We cannot allow this crime against humanity to go without protest.
38. We shall demand that the Constitution be amended to provide for the judicial enforcement

of fundamental rights. At present the Constitution makes no more than a bare declaration of so-called fundamental rights and has provided that the Courts shall not enforce them.

39. We shall demand that the present Internal Security Act and Prevention of Crime Ordinance must be radically revised to guarantee a fair judicial trial. The present system which reminds one of the Japanese Occupation system where people were detained on the statements of unidentified accusers, must be abolished.

Police Powers

40. The Police are vested with wide and arbitrary powers. This is inconsistent with the rights of citizens of a nation which claims to be a democracy.

41. It is with great concern that we have noted the ever increasing number of complaints of torture being inflicted on persons in police custody. It is common for the police to refuse to allow relatives or even lawyers to visit or interview arrested persons.

42. We will demand that appropriate legislation be introduced to ensure that the people are not exposed to the dangers of abuse of powers by the Police.

Student Activities

43. All attempts by the Alliance to emaciate the Student movement will be opposed vigorously. At this stage in the development of this nation it is essential that Students should be allowed to participate in the shaping of their destiny.

44. We will demand that the present humiliating and undemocratic restrictions on the student movement in Malaysia be abolished.

Bribery and Corruption

45. The whole country is now riddled with bribery and corruption at all levels extending from the lowest levels in State administration to the highest levels in the Federal Government.

46. It is impossible to eradicate this evil when, as in Malaysia, persons in high positions have been corrupted and are susceptible to corruption.

47. We will, as in the past, expose all corruption brought to our notice and will demand that measures be introduced to eliminate opportunities to corrupt or be corrupted.

Road Transport Department

48. Racial discrimination and corruption is rife in the matter of road transport permits.

49. There must be a public inquiry into the working of this Department with a view to putting an end to corrupt practices and communalism in this Department.

Administration of Justice

50. It will be our duty to be ever vigilant to ensure the impartial and efficient dispensation of Justice. We can never tolerate even the slightest tendency to interfere with or influence the course of Justice in Malaysia.

Local Government

51. We shall oppose any move to abolish or curtail elected local government in Malaysia.

52. Cases of maladministration, corruption or inefficiency in local government are of no greater frequency or magnitude than are to be found in State and Federal administration.

53. Any move to abolish elected local government would be as unjustifiable as to demand that elected State Governments should be done away with because of the undoubted corruption and maladministration prevalent in State administrations.

54. We consider that any attempt to deny elected local government to the people can only be interpreted as undemocratic and dictatorial tactics devised by the UMNO to seize control of non-Malay towns and urban areas where Opposition political parties have almost always been returned to power in local government elections.

Housing

55. Low cost housing projects are now being concentrated by the Alliance in rural areas where only one race will benefit.

56. We shall demand that low cost housing schemes be extended to all areas irrespective of race.

Squatter Problem

57. The squatter problem has been grossly neglected by the Alliance. Thousands of people, mainly Chinese and Indians, live in constant fear of eviction by Government, tin miners and other capitalists.

58. A Special Committee must be set up to

examine the situation and recommend allocation of land forthwith without racial bias.

Trade Unions and Labour

59. As a Party which is committed to a Socialist policy we will demand that the present Trade Union laws be revised to give labour genuine protection against exploitation and victimisation.
60. The present laws relating to Trade Unions and labour consist of little more than a nebulous declaration of rights without any powers of enforcement being available to the workers.

Food and Agriculture

61. Industrialisation must proceed at a steady pace but we deplore the tendency to encourage the rural population to migrate to the urban areas.
62. The urban areas are already over populated and there are sufficient people to fill the requirements of factories and industrial estates.
63. Instead of promoting migration to urban areas of the rural population, thereby creating the present unemployment problem, the policy should be to make land available without discrimination as to race and to encourage cultivation of food crops with a view to making Malaysia self-sufficient in food.

Health Services

64. Under Alliance rule the Health services remain in a disgraceful and pitiful state. Rather than face humiliation and degradation in most hospitals in Malaysia there are many who prefer to suffer and die at home. This is the fate that befalls those who cannot afford to pay.
65. Funds which are raised for the welfare of the people are diverted to prestige projects and other

purposes, with a scandalous disregard for public opinion.

66. The P.P.P. will press for the establishment of modern hospitals throughout the country staffed by Doctors and Nurses who dedicate themselves to the ideals of their profession.

New Villages

67. After years of Alliance rule the people of the New Villages in Malaya cannot yet see any ray of hope for their future under a capitalist dominated Government.
68. It will be one of our principal objectives to demand a dynamic approach to solve the plight of these people in the New Villages by the setting up of a special organisation on the lines of MARA. Since MARA concerns itself with the welfare of Malays it is only fair that a corresponding organisation should be immediately set up to ensure the welfare of the New Villages which consist mainly of Chinese and some Indians.

Conclusion

69. The People's Progressive Party of Malaya will for ever strive to maintain and advance the ideals, hopes and aspirations of its founder, the late D.R. Seenivasagam, who dedicated his whole life to the cause of being a fearless and courageous champion of the rights and liberties of the people of Malaysia.

70. In pursuing our policies and promoting our ideals we shall not be deterred by threats or intimidation from any source.

Dated this 2nd day of May, 1969.

Dato S.P. Seenivasagam, DPMP., JP.
President

People's Progressive Party of Malaya.

1(e): MANIFESTO OF PARTAI RAKYAT MALAYA FOR THE 1969 GENERAL ELECTION

UNITE UNDER THE BANNER OF SOCIALISM OF PARTAI RAKYAT

I: General

Introduction:

Three times, since the 1955 election, the people have returned the Alliance to power. Why do they do so? The people want freedom and change in their livelihood. But have their hopes and aspirations been fulfilled 13 years after Alliance rule? The facts are abundant to show that the answer is a definite "No".

Alliance Policies Are No Different From Colonial Policies:

In theory and appearance, this country has been independent under the Alliance since 31 August 1957. But in practice and in reality it is far from being so.

After "Merdeka" the British continue to dominate the economy of this country. British

monopoly capital own and control 2/3 of the Malayan economy, i.e. 3/4 of the estates and 2/3 of the mines and import-export trade. As a result of this control and ownership, they are able to drain away as much as \$600 million a year.

Their economic domination and plunder are protected by their own military might. The British imperialists continue to station between 40,000 to 60,000 of their own and allied troops, and retain land, sea and air bases in this country. This situation is provided for by the Defence Agreement between Britain and "Malaysia".

It is the presence of this economic domination that is defended by British military power that has turned the Alliance Government into the tool of the British and other international capitalists, and that has made it almost impossible for the Alliance to replace the old colonial policies.

In the political field we are not free. The people are strangled by regulations inherited from colonial days. The Internal Security Act restricts the freedoms of thought, speech, assembly and association. The Trade Unions Act, the Industrial Relations Act and the Employment Act, all restrict the freedom of labour to protect themselves from exploitation by the capitalists.

In the economic field, there is no policy to develop a national economic system in place of the colonial one. The national income still depends largely on the export of rubber and tin which are mainly owned and controlled by British capital.

There is no land reform. About two million acres of fertile land are monopolised by the international capitalists, whereas between 50-60% of the peasantry are landless. There is no security of tenancy. There is no protection for the market of peasant produce, and facilities for credits are lacking.

The FLDA schemes do not solve the problems of land hunger and peasant marketing. There is no self-sufficiency in rice, which is the staple food of the people; we still import 1/3 of our requirement.

In the industrial field, there is no policy to develop national industries. But foreign capitalists are exempted from tax and they are free to establish their factories and exploit the country and the people.

The unemployment figure is now around

250,000 and every year it increases by about 80,000.

In the field of education and language, we find that English education and language occupy the most important positions, although the Alliance Government claim that they want to develop a national education system and promote Malay as the main medium of instruction in the system. The number of schools, students and teachers at English secondary level far exceed the "national" ones.

Imperialist culture disseminated through yellow books, magazines and films are allowed to flow in freely to warp the minds of the people and destroy the morals of youths, whereas the cultures of the various national groups in the form of their languages, literature, dances and music survive under serious suppression.

In matters of defence, the Alliance Government still depends on the imperialist military strength. In foreign affairs the Government pursues pro-imperialist and pro-Western policies, and are unfriendly to some socialist states and independent and neutral countries of Asia and Africa.

All these concretely prove that the policies of the Alliance Government for the past 13 years are mere continuation of the old colonial policies.

Major Changes Necessary To Save the Country:

During the 13 years the Alliance Government has been in power, the country has been steadily reduced into becoming a neo-colony. The process will continue if the people do not act fast to check it and reverse the political direction of the country. A major change is necessary. Minor reforms and patch-works to redress certain shortcomings will never solve basic problems we are faced with.

To achieve this major change, oppressed people of all races must act positively, unite under the banner of Socialism of Partai Rakyat and strive to establish a Government of the peasants and workers which is nationalist, democratic and progressive in character.

Partai Rakyat fights for socialist policies, because only these policies can unite the peasants and workers, and the oppressed people of all races, in order to attain true national independence and sovereignty, democracy and progress and social justice.

Partai Rakyat is opposed to the policies of liberal parties outside the Alliance; they mislead the people with their anti-Alliance stand based on racial and religious sentiments. They never stand up against the imperialists and feudalists, and in reality they are no different from the Alliance.

Partai Rakyat categorically states: exploitation recognizes neither race nor creed. The Malay feudalists and the big Chinese and Indian capitalists who unite within the Alliance Party, with the support of international capitalists, have always and continue to exploit the peasants, workers, fishermen, petty officials and traders etc. of all races in this country.

Partai Rakyat has four prime objectives. First, to destroy the Anglo-American neo-colonial systems in order to achieve genuine and complete national independence and sovereignty. Second, to establish a new democratic form of government representing all races in place of the present reactionary and semi-fascist government. Third, to set up a new national and progressive economic system to replace the present semi-feudal and semi-colonial one. Fourth, to develop a new national, democratic and progressive culture instead of the present backward culture which abounds with feudal, imperialist and fascist influences.

Demands by Partai Rakyat in the Present Election:

The purpose of Partai Rakyat in participating this election is not to capture power. Our present objective is to represent the exploited people, in particular the workers, peasants and fishermen, and voice their demands through Parliament and the state legislatures. Our demands now are as follows:—

Politics

1. Abolish all laws, decrees and regulations that restrict freedoms of thought, speech, assembly and association e.g. the Internal Security Act, and to restore these freedoms;
2. Reinstate local council elections;
3. Abolish the Trade Union Act, 1959 and 1967, the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and the Employment Act, 1955.

Economics and Welfare

4. Abolish annual tax for peasant land holdings

- 6 acres and under, give land to the landless, increase taxes and quit rents on mines and estates belonging to foreign capitalists, abolish tax exemption on pioneer industries, and stop the annual outflow of \$600 million worth of profits and transfers in order to finance new industries;
5. Abolish middle-men capitalists in rural areas and promote, with Government aid, peasant organisations to provide credits and handle marketing of their own produce;
6. Abolish education and irrigation taxes, and reduce taxes on necessary goods;
7. Institute minimum wage for agricultural and industrial workers, introduce 8 hour and 5 day week system, and abolish labour contract system;
8. Stop sub-division of estates, pay compensation and give land to victims of sub-division;
9. Improve the material conditions of government servants in Divisions III and IV, including police and soldiers, protect and uphold the rights of women, provide kindergartens, old age pensions and social security for the disabled and unemployed;

Education and Culture

10. Abolish all fees for primary and secondary education, provide bursaries to poor students in secondary schools, increase financial aids to poor students in the University,
11. Stop the system of changing text-books more than once in five years,
12. Provide equal opportunities for education—irrespective of social and economic background—through an education system with Malay as the main medium, use Malay as a medium for as many subjects as possible, abolish the teaching of English as a subject at primary level, encourage the learning of languages of the people, provide other international and scientific languages like French, Russian, German and Chinese as subjects at secondary level;
13. Restrict the entry of yellow culture through pornographic magazines, books and films, encourage and aid literary and cultural organisations in order to produce new and popular creations of high standards;

Defence and Foreign Affairs

14. Abrogate the defence agreement with Britain, establish cordial and friendly relations with neighbouring countries, equip and modernise the army for defence;

15. Sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with China, pursue external policies based on peace, friendship and non-alignment to any power bloc, support the struggle of the Arab people against Israel aggression to liberate Palestine, and the struggle of the people in South Vietnam against American aggression in order to achieve national independence and freedom for the people of South Vietnam and reunification with North Vietnam.

II: Specifically for Pahang, Melaka and Perlis

In Melaka, Pahang and Perlis Partai Rakyat is standing in half or nearly half of the total state seats. Should the people in these states give Partai Rakyat the mandate to form the government on its own or in coalition with other party/parties, we give priority to the following in addition to the above 15 point programme:—

1. To give land to the landless;
2. Abolish annual tax on peasant holdings 6 acres or below, and increase taxes on estates and mines belonging to foreign capital and monopoly trade;

3. Abolish education and irrigation taxes;
4. Reduce licence fees for petty trade;
5. Take over marketing etc. for peasant produce and provide credit facilities to them, and
6. Encourage private industries which provide mutual benefit for both labour and capital.

III: Conclusion

Partai Rakyat is a realistic party. We do not promise anything that we cannot do. What we promise we hope to fulfill. We call upon all oppressed people of different races, all patriotic and anti-imperialist persons who love independence and freedom, to support the socialist struggle of Partai Rakyat, unite under the socialist banners of Partai Rakyat and give their votes to Partai Rakyat candidates.

Unite Under the Banner of Partai Rakyat to Save the Country!

Long Live the Unity of Malayan People From All Races!

Long Live the Unity of Peasants and Workers!
Long Live Partai Rakyat Malaya!

APPENDIX II

PARLIAMENTARY AND STATE ELECTION RESULTS (1959, 1964 and 1969)

TABLE I(a)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Total)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled -% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	140	164	133	191	189	187	36.98	37.70	33.50
M.C.A.	59	67	26	78	82	80	16.29	17.39	12.71
M.I.C.	7	10	3	13	11	10	2.25	2.53	1.74
	206	241	162	282	282	277	55.52	57.62	47.95
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	2	n.a.	—	9	n.a.	—	1.28
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	29	n.a.	15	48	n.a.	0.90	10.48
	—	—	31	—	15	57	—	0.90	11.76
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	2	n.a.	n.a.	9	n.a.	n.a.	0.97
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	24	n.a.	n.a.	28	n.a.	n.a.	7.81
	—	—	26	—	—	37	—	—	8.78
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	1	—	1	4	3	2	0.64	0.21	0.30
Non-Malay Candidates	7	5	11	35	23	14	5.11	4.30	4.49
	8	5	12	39	26	16	5.75	4.51	4.79
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	43	25	40	200	158	179	20.80	15.25	22.80
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	3	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	37	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	1.53
<i>7. Independents</i>	5	—	3	76	39	38	3.61	1.09	2.29
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay candidates	1	—	n.a.	76	77	n.a.	3.76	4.83	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	15	7	n.a.	48	90	n.a.	5.95	11.47	n.a.
	16	7	—	124	167	—	9.71	16.30	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	28	n.a.	n.a.	1.01	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	36	n.a.	n.a.	2.93	n.a.
	—	4	—	—	64	—	—	3.94	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	4	—	n.a.	96	17	n.a.	4.29	0.39	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	6	—	n.a.	0.32	—	n.a.
	282	282	277	823	768	641	100.00	100.00	99.90 ^b

^a During 1959 and 1964 Party Rakyat was a member of the Socialist Front and therefore votes polled by it are included in the Socialist Front vote.

^b 0.10 per cent of the total polled by the United Malaysian Chinese Organization in Negri Sembilan.
n.a. = Not applicable

TABLE 1(b)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Johore)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled -% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	20 ^a	20 ^a	19 ^b	21 ^d	20 ^a	20 ^b	45.07	43.57	43.63
M.C.A.	7	11	9 ^a	10	11	10 ^a	19.47	21.94	19.27
M.I.C.	1	1	1	1	1	1	2.50	2.02	2.22
	28	32	29	32	32	31	67.04	67.53	65.12
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	- ^d	-	n.a.	- ^d	3	n.a.	- ^d	3.79
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	- ^d	1	n.a.	3 ^d	9	n.a.	0.42 ^d	14.25
	-	-	1	-	3	12	-	0.42	18.04
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	2	n.a.	n.a.	1.21
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	0.74
	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	1.95
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Malay Candidates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	-	-	-	9	11	9	2.61	2.98	6.00
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	c	c	-	c	c	3	c	c	0.60
<i>7. Independents</i>	1	-	1	9	6	7	5.15	1.97	8.29
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay candidates	-	-	n.a.	5	5	n.a.	4.74	4.17	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	3	-	n.a.	5	18	n.a.	5.02	19.60	n.a.
	3	-	-	10	23	-	9.76	23.77	-
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	5	n.a.	n.a.	1.47	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	3	n.a.	n.a.	1.86	n.a.
	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	3.33	-
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	-	-	n.a.	23	-	n.a.	15.44	-	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.
	32	32	31 ^e	83	83	65	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 3 unopposed^b 1 unopposed^c During 1959 and 1964 Party Rakyat was a member of the Socialist Front and therefore votes polled by it are included in the

Socialist Front vote.

^d Votes for the PAP^e Result of one seat is not available.
n.a. = Not applicable

TABLE 1(c)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Kedah)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled –% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance									
U.M.N.O.	17	18	12	18	18	18	52.88	50.35	41.58
M.C.A.	5	5	2	5	5	5	14.78	14.41	10.05
M.I.C.	1	1	—	1	1	1	3.21	3.02	1.85
	23	24	14	24	24	24	70.87	67.78	53.48
2. Democratic Action Party									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.00
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	2	n.a.	n.a.	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.97
	—	—	2	—	—	3	—	—	4.97
4. People's Progressive Party									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	1	—	8	23	21	24	23.83	25.21	41.55
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Independents	—	—	—	2	1	—	0.27	0.57	—
8. Socialist Front									
Malay candidates	—	—	n.a.	2	4	n.a.	1.46	0.85	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	3	4	n.a.	1.67	3.94	n.a.
	—	—	—	5	8	—	3.13	4.79	—
9. United Democratic Party									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	0.28	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	2	n.a.	n.a.	1.37	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	1.65	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	21	—	n.a.	1.90	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	24	24	24	75	57	51	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 1(d)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Kelantan)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O	1	8	10	27	29	29	23.41	40.63	45.49
M.C.A.	1	1	1	3	1	1	3.52	2.24	1.98
M.I.C.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2	9	11	30	30	30	26.93	42.87	47.47
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	28	21	19	30	30	30	63.79	57.13	52.23
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	—	—	—	11	—	6	1.81	—	0.30
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	18	—	n.a.	1.91	—	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	2	—	n.a.	0.36	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	20	—	—	2.27	—	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	21	—	n.a.	5.20	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	30	30	30	112	60	66	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 uncontested.

TABLE 1(e)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Malacca)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled -% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	13	13	11	13	13	12	48.14	44.61	33.59
M.C.A.	7	4	4 ^a	7	6	7 ^a	18.78	17.76	13.03
M.I.C.	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	2.68	1.71
	20	18	15	20	20	20	66.92	65.05	48.33
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	-	-
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	4	n.a.	4	5	n.a.	2.61	12.79
	-	-	4	-	4	5	-	2.61	12.79
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	4.45
	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	4.45
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Malay Candidates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	-	-	-	11	12	14	14.47	5.31	17.13
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	16.05
<i>7. Independents</i>	-	-	-	2	1	2	0.33	0.09	1.25
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	-	-	n.a.	4	14	n.a.	6.71	14.07	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	-	2	n.a.	5	6	n.a.	4.66	12.87	n.a.
	-	2	-	9	20	-	11.37	26.94	-
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	-	-	n.a.	5	-	n.a.	6.91	-	n.a.
	20	20	20	47	57	58	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 uncontested.

TABLE 1(f)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Negri Sembilan)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	11	14	11 ^a	14	14	14 ^a	34.53	33.78	28.73
M.C.A.	7	9	4 ^a	8	9	9 ^a	16.96	22.18	15.07
M.I.C.	2	1	1	2	1	1	4.32	2.76	2.40
	20	24	16	24	24	24	55.81	58.72	46.20
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	1	n.a.	—	3	n.a.	—	5.94
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	7	n.a.	—	13	n.a.	—	30.49
	—	—	8	—	—	16	—	—	36.43
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.75	—
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1.24	—
	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1.99	—
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	—	—	—	18	7	11	11.44	3.29	10.60
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.54
<i>7. Independents</i>	1	—	—	14	10	8	10.94	3.75	4.30
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay candidates	—	—	n.a.	2	8	n.a.	2.75	6.76	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	3	—	n.a.	9	10	n.a.	15.10	13.96	n.a.
	3	—	—	11	18	—	17.85	20.72	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	7	n.a.	n.a.	3.07	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	10	n.a.	n.a.	8.46	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	17	—	—	11.53	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	4	—	n.a.	3.96	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	24	24	24	71	78	60	100.00	100.00	98.07 ^b

^a 1 unopposed.^b UMCO put up 12 candidates and received a total of 2,131 votes. It won no seats.

TABLE 1(g)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Pahang)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	18 5 ^a —	17 7 ^a —	16 ^b 4 —	18 5 ^a 1	17 7 ^a —	17 ^b 7 —	52.29 9.66 1.65	52.58 15.83 —	39.38 15.72 —
	23	24	20	24	24	24	63.60	68.41	55.10
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	— —	— 1	n.a. n.a.	— —	— 1.71
	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1.71
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	1 —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	1 —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	2.00 —
	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2.00
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	—	—	—	20	12	14	22.49	8.54	16.83
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	2	—	—	11	—	—	10.63
7. Independents	1	—	1	9	8	8	6.26	3.88	13.73
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	6 1	9 8	n.a. n.a.	6.29 1.36	7.10 11.47	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	7	17	—	7.65	18.57	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— 1	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— 0.60	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.60	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	24	24	24	60	62	59	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 unopposed.^b 3 unopposed.

TABLE 1(h)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Penang)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	10 ^a	10	4	11 ^a	10	10	27.05	23.38	17.61
	6	6	—	11	12	12	20.58	19.66	13.95
	1	2	—	2	2	2	3.25	4.14	3.03
	17	18	4	24	24	24	50.88	47.18	34.59
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	n.a.	—	3	n.a.	3	3	n.a.	0.52	8.36
	—	—	3	—	3	3	—	0.52	8.36
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	4.60
	n.a.	n.a.	15	n.a.	n.a.	15	n.a.	n.a.	42.23
	—	—	16	—	—	19	—	—	46.83
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.33	—	—
	—	—	—	11	1	3	5.71	0.33	0.36
	—	—	—	12	1	3	6.04	0.33	0.36
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	—	—	—	9	4	5	8.07	2.10	7.00
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1.15
7. Independents	—	—	—	8	1	3	4.89	0.22	1.71
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	5	9	n.a.	3.10	9.44	n.a.
	7	2	n.a.	13	15	n.a.	26.18	22.68	n.a.
	7	2	—	18	24	—	29.28	32.12	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	5	n.a.	n.a.	2.18	n.a.
	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	16	n.a.	n.a.	15.35	n.a.
	—	4	—	—	21	—	—	17.53	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	3	—	n.a.	0.84	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	24	24	24	74	78	58	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 uncontested.

TABLE 1(i)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Perak)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled -% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i> U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	21 9 1	22 12 1	18 1 —	23 15 2	22 16 2	22 17 1	31.38 21.48 1.79	30.79 21.61 2.34	27.43 15.45 0.75
	31	35	19	40	40	40	54.65	54.74	43.63
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— —	1 5	n.a. n.a.	— —	1 7	n.a. n.a.	— —	0.80 8.71
	—	—	6	—	—	8	—	—	9.51
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— 2	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— 2	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— 3.83
	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	3.83
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	1 7	— 5	1 11	3 21	2 17	2 11	3.09 21.23	0.90 19.79	1.55 23.00
	8	5	12	24	19	13	24.32	20.69	24.55
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	1	—	1	29	20	28	15.26	11.34	18.38
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	—	—	—	8	8	1	1.90	1.42	0.10
<i>8. Socialist Front</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	10 4	6 13	n.a. n.a.	2.59 1.28	2.08 5.22	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	14	19	—	3.87	7.30	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	10 4	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	2.04 2.47	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	4.51	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	40	40	40	115	120	92	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 1(j)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Perlis)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	10	9	11	10	10	12	52.35	48.71	53.51
	2	2	—	2	2	—	11.46	12.18	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	12	11	11	12	12	12	63.81	60.89	53.51
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	—	1	1	10	11	12	31.70	37.13	43.84
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	2.65
7. Independents	—	—	—	2	1	—	3.20	0.46	—
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	2	1	n.a.	1.29	1.52	n.a.
	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	2	1	—	1.29	1.52	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	12	12	12	26	25	29	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 1(k)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Selangor)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	14	13	12 ^a	14	13	13 ^a	30.22	25.62	19.89
M.C.A.	8 ^a	9	1	10 ^a	12	12	22.62	24.22	17.50
M.I.C.	1	3	1	4	3	3	4.71	5.70	4.17
	23	25	14	28	28	28	57.55	55.54	41.56
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	2	n.a.	—	2.59
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	9	n.a.	5	10	n.a.	5.06	28.47
	—	—	9	—	5	12	—	5.06	31.06
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.15
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	7	n.a.	n.a.	15.35
	—	—	4	—	—	8	—	—	16.50
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	3	4	—	3.93	2.66	—
	—	—	—	3	4	—	3.93	2.66	—
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	—	—	—	17	7	12	11.64	3.44	9.61
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	2	—	1	5	1	2	5.74	0.08	1.27
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	1	—	n.a.	5	10	n.a.	5.94	9.11	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	2	3	n.a.	6	16	n.a.	11.74	24.11	n.a.
	3	3	—	11	26	—	17.68	33.22	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	4	—	n.a.	2.05	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	1	—	n.a.	1.41	—	n.a.
	28	28	28	69	71	62	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 unopposed.

TABLE 1(i)

State Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Trengganu)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled, -% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	5	20	9	22	23	20	31.22	52.80	48.42
M.C.A.	2	1	-	2	1	-	3.98	2.54	-
M.I.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	7	21	9	24	24	20	35.20	55.34	48.42
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Malay Candidates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	13	3	11	24	23	20	36.88	32.79	51.44
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>7. Independents</i>	-	-	-	6	2	1	3.54	0.78	0.14
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	-	-	n.a.	17	11	n.a.	8.11	3.54	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.
	-	-	-	17	11	-	8.11	3.54	-
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	4	-	n.a.	20	17	n.a.	16.27	7.55	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.
	24	24	20 ^a	91	77	41 ^a	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a Results of 4 seats are not available.

TABLE 2(a)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Total)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	52	59	51	70	68	67	35.94	38.14	33.67
M.C.A.	19	27	13	31	33	33	14.82	18.68	13.50
M.I.C.	3	3	2	3	3	3	1.02	1.55	1.24
	74	89	66	104	104	103	51.78	58.37	48.41
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	1	n.a.	—	0.32
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	1	13	n.a.	11	23	n.a.	2.06	13.41
	—	1	13	—	11	24	—	2.06	13.73
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	3	n.a.	n.a.	2.14
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	7	n.a.	n.a.	11	n.a.	n.a.	6.43
	—	—	8	—	—	14	—	—	8.57
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	1	1	—	0.04	0.06	—
Non-Malay Candidates	4	2	4	18	8	6	6.26	3.59	3.87
	4	2	4	19	9	6	6.30	3.65	3.87
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	13	9	12	58	52	59	21.27	14.45	23.75
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	1.24
<i>7. Independents</i>	3	—	—	27	8	2	4.76	0.66	0.34
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	1	—	n.a.	11	30	n.a.	2.86	6.02	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	7	2	n.a.	27	33	n.a.	10.06	10.13	n.a.
	8	2	—	38	63	—	12.92	16.15	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	8	n.a.	n.a.	0.56	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	19	n.a.	n.a.	3.74	n.a.
	—	1	—	—	27	—	—	4.30	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	1	—	n.a.	9	4	n.a.	2.11	0.36	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	1	—	n.a.	2	—	n.a.	0.86	—	n.a.
	104	104	103 ^a	257	278	213	100.00	100.00	99.91 ^b

^a Election in 1 constituency postponed.^b 0.09 per cent of total polled by UMCO in Negri Sembilan.

TABLE 2(b)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Johore)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	11 ^a	11 ^b	11 ^c	11 ^a	11 ^b	11 ^c	46.08	47.94	42.21
	5	5	5 ^a	5	5	5 ^a	19.59	23.79	25.40
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	16	16	16	16	16	16	65.67	71.73	67.61
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	1	n.a.	—	3.34
	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	3	5	n.a.	0.95	18.19
	—	—	—	—	3	6	—	0.95	21.53
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	2	n.a.	n.a.	4.18
	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	4.18
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	1	—	—	1.01	—	—
	—	—	—	1	—	—	1.01	—	—
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	—	—	—	3	2	2	2.34	1.43	4.04
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Independents	—	—	—	5	—	1	7.44	—	2.64
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	1	2	n.a.	2.11	2.60	n.a.
	—	—	n.a.	6	9	n.a.	12.09	19.56	n.a.
	—	—	—	7	11	—	14.20	22.16	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.19	n.a.
	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	3	n.a.	n.a.	2.54	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	3.73	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	6	—	n.a.	9.34	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	16	16	16	38	36	27	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 uncontested.^b 2 uncontested.^c 4 uncontested.

TABLE 2(c)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Kedah)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i> U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	10 2 —	10 2 —	7 2 —	10 2 —	10 2 —	10 2 —	54.05 11.25 —	56.48 12.10 —	45.20 8.29 —
	12	12	9	12	12	12	65.30	68.58	53.49
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	— — —
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— 2 2	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— 5.45 5.45
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	—	—	3	10	12	12	26.66	25.11	41.06
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.82	—	—
<i>8. Socialist Front</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— — —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	2 2 4	1 3 4	n.a. n.a. —	3.53 3.69 7.22	0.72 4.03 4.75	n.a. n.a. —
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— 2 2	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— 1.56 1.56	n.a. n.a. —
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	12	12	12	27	30	26	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 2(d)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Kelantan)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i> U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	1 — — —	2 — — —	4 — — —	10 — — —	10 — — —	10 — — —	31.44 — — —	42.94 — — —	47.50 — — —
	1	2	4	10	10	10	31.44	42.94	47.50
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	— —	— —
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	9	8	6	10	10	10	68.38	56.86	52.40
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.10
<i>8. Socialist Front</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	— —	1 —	n.a. n.a.	— —	0.20 —	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.20	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	1	—	n.a.	0.18	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	10	10	10	21	21	21	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 2(e)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Malacca)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1964	1959	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	2 1 —	2 2 —	1 1 —	2 2 —	2 2 —	1 2 —	30.07 29.32 —	34.64 31.53 —	19.24 25.92 —
	3	4	2	4	4	3	59.39	66.17	45.16
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— ^a — ^a	— 1	n.a. n.a.	— ^a 1 ^a	— 1	n.a. n.a.	— ^a 3.37 ^a	— 22.76
	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	3.37	22.76
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	—	—	—	3	2	2	16.31	3.67	18.45
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	13.63
7. Independents	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	1 1	3 1	n.a. n.a.	3.86 7.81	16.40 10.39	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	2	4	—	11.67	26.79	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	— —	n.a. n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	1	—	n.a.	1	—	n.a.	12.63	—	n.a.
	4	4	3 ^b	10	11	8	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a Votes polled by the PAP.^b Result of 1 seat is not available.

TABLE 2(f)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Negri Sembilan)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled — % of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	3	3	3 ^a	4	3	3 ^a	48.96	34.89	24.37
M.C.A.	—	2	—	1	2	2	2.84	17.16	15.38
M.I.C.	1 ^a	1	—	1 ^a	1	1	—	6.87	6.61
	4	6	3	6	6	6	51.80	58.92	46.36
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	3	n.a.	1	3	n.a.	4.70	35.50
	—	—	3	—	1	3	—	4.70	35.50
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1.17	—
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1.17	—
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	—	—	—	3	—	3	16.66	—	16.32
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	2	—	—	3	2	—	14.61	2.24	—
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	—	2	n.a.	—	6.12	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	2	4	n.a.	10.92	16.87	n.a.
	—	—	—	2	6	—	10.92	22.99	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	3	n.a.	n.a.	4.90	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	3	n.a.	n.a.	5.08	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	9.98	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	1	—	n.a.	6.01	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	6	6	6	15	22	12	100.00	100.00	98.18 ^b

^a 1 uncontested.^b In 1969 UMCO put up 3 candidates, all of whom lost and collected only 1,808 votes (1.82% of total)

TABLE 2(g)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Pahang)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i> U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	5 1 —	5 1 —	5 ^a 1 ^a —	5 1 —	5 1 —	5 ^a 1 ^b —	55.95 10.96 —	59.01 12.31 —	60.83 <i>e</i> —
	6	6	6	6	6	6	66.91	71.32	60.83
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	— — —
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i> <i>6. Party Rakyat</i> <i>7. Independents</i>	— — —	— — —	— — —	3 — —	3 — —	4 2 —	11.63 — —	10.44 — —	24.41 14.76 —
<i>8. Socialist Front</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	— — —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	2 1 3	3 1 4	n.a. n.a. —	14.95 6.51 21.46	11.82 6.42 18.24	n.a. n.a. —
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i> Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —	n.a. n.a. —	— — —	n.a. n.a. —
<i>10. Party Negara</i> <i>11. Malayan Party</i>	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.	— —	— —	n.a. n.a.
	6	6	6	12	13	12	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 2(h)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Penang)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Voted polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	3	4	1	3	4	4	23.26	28.01	24.34
	2	2	1 ^a	5	4	4 ^a	20.87	19.25	12.51
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	5	6	2 ^a	8	8	8 ^a	44.13	47.26	36.85
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	n.a.	—	1	n.a.	1	1	n.a.	0.38	11.15
	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	0.38	11.15
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	8.95
	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	35.60
	—	—	5	—	—	5	—	—	44.55
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	2	—	1	2.86	—	0.42
	—	—	—	2	—	1	2.86	—	0.42
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	—	—	—	5	3	2	10.87	2.69	7.03
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Independents	—	—	—	4	—	—	3.87	—	—
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	—	3	n.a.	—	10.90	n.a.
	3	1	n.a.	6	5	n.a.	38.27	20.70	n.a.
	3	1	—	6	8	—	38.27	31.60	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	6	n.a.	n.a.	18.07	n.a.
	—	1	—	—	6	—	—	18.07	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	8	8	8	25	26	17	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 uncontested.

TABLE 2(j)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Perak)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	9	9	7	10	9	9	24.84	24.19	22.91
M.C.A.	5	8	1	9	10	10	22.42	28.83	18.37
M.I.C.	1	1	1	1	1	1	2.35	2.40	1.88
	15	18	9	20	20	20	49.61	55.42	43.16
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	5	n.a.	—	6	n.a.	—	16.11
	—	—	5	—	—	6	—	—	16.11
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	3.67
	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	3.67
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	1	—	—	0.19	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	4	2	4	12	7	5	26.70	17.40	18.78
	4	2	4	13	7	5	26.89	17.40	18.78
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	—	—	1	11	9	12	15.39	10.24	17.88
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	1	—	—	5	6	1	5.25	2.67	0.40
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	2	5	n.a.	1.96	3.49	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	2	4	n.a.	0.90	4.41	n.a.
	—	—	—	4	9	—	2.86	7.90	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	0.67	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	5	n.a.	n.a.	5.70	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	6.37	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	20	20	20	53	60	45	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 2(j)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Perlis)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled -% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	2	2	2	2	2	2	59.63	68.93	51.15
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2	2	2	2	2	2	59.63	68.93	51.15
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	—	—	—	2	2	2	40.37	31.07	42.14
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	6.71
7. Independents	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10. Party Negara	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	2	2	2	4	4	5	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 2(k)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Selangor)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
<i>1. Alliance</i>									
U.M.N.O.	5	6	6	7	6	6	22.48	23.27	18.58
M.C.A.	3	5	2	6	7	7	17.60	25.43	21.88
M.I.C.	1	1	1	1	1	1	4.24	5.17	3.51
	9	12	9	14	14	14	44.32	53.87	43.97
<i>2. Democratic Action Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	1	3	n.a.	5	7	n.a.	11.08	31.39
	—	1	3	—	5	7	—	11.08	31.39
<i>3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	2	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	17.46
	—	—	2	—	—	4	—	—	17.46
<i>4. People's Progressive Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	3	1	—	3.96	0.82	—
	—	—	—	3	1	—	3.96	0.82	—
<i>5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</i>	—	—	—	4	3	4	7.94	2.41	7.18
<i>6. Party Rakyat</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>7. Independents</i>	—	—	—	6	—	—	11.38	—	—
<i>8. Socialist Front</i>									
Malay Candidates	1	—	n.a.	2	7	n.a.	5.82	13.53	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	4	1	n.a.	7	6	n.a.	24.55	18.29	n.a.
	5	1	—	9	13	—	30.37	31.82	—
<i>9. United Democratic Party</i>									
Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>10. Party Negara</i>	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
<i>11. Malayan Party</i>	—	—	n.a.	1	—	n.a.	2.03	—	n.a.
	14	14	14	37	36	29	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE 2(i)

Parliamentary Elections: Seats Won and Votes Polled by Parties (Trengganu)

Parties	Seats Won			Seats Contested			Votes polled —% of the total		
	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969	1959	1964	1969
1. Alliance U.M.N.O. M.C.A. M.I.C.	1 ^a	5	4	6 ^a	6	6	37.42	56.52	49.99
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1	5	4	6	6	6	37.42	56.52	49.99
2. Democratic Action Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. People's Progressive Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	4	1	2	4	6	6	47.63	32.10	50.01
6. Party Rakyat	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Independents	—	—	—	3	—	—	2.22	—	—
8. Socialist Front Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	—	—	n.a.	1	3	n.a.	0.88	4.57	n.a.
	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	1	3	—	0.88	4.57	—
9. United Democratic Party Malay Candidates Non-Malay Candidates	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10. Party Negara	1	—	n.a.	1	4	n.a.	11.85	6.81	n.a.
11. Malayan Party	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.	—	—	n.a.
	6	6	6	15	19	12	100.00	100.00	100.00

^a 1 uncontested.

TABLE 3(a)

Seats won by the United Malays National Organisation and the racial composition of the electorate, Parliamentary elections

Constituency	Racial composition—in per cent		
	Malays	Chinese	Indians and others
<i>1. 1959 Elections</i>			
<i>A. Predominantly Malay States</i>			
1. Kuala Kedah	87.6	11.7	0.7
2. Kota Star Utara	90.2	7.2	2.6
3. Kota Star Selatan	80.9	13.8	5.3
4. Kubang Pasu Barat	90.2	8.2	1.6
5. Jitra-Padang Terap	84.7	8.2	7.1
6. Jerai	87.2	12.1	0.7
7. Kedah Tengah	77.3	14.8	7.9
8. Sungei Patani	55.7	36.6	7.7
9. Baling	—	—	—
10. Kulim Utara	42.7	43.0	14.3
11. Ulu Kelantan	88.1	9.3	2.6
12. Perlis Utara	78.6	21.4	—
13. Perlis Selatan	89.1	10.9	—
14. Kemaman	85.4	13.5	1.1
<i>B. Other States</i>			
1. Johore Timor	59.7	36.4	3.9
2. Johore Bahru Timor	44.9	48.0	7.1
3. Johore Bahru Barat	52.4	42.5	5.1
4. Pontian Selatan	57.0	43.0	—
5. Pontian Utara	79.9	19.9	0.2
6. Batu Pahat Dalam	67.4	31.1	1.5
7. Muar Selatan	83.9	16.1	—
8. Muar Utara	51.2	44.1	4.7
9. Muar Dalam	58.1	39.9	2.0
10. Segamat Utara	42.3	48.3	9.4
11. Johore Tenggara	62.4	31.7	5.9
12. Malakka Utara	72.4	27.6	—
13. Malakka Selatan	57.8	42.2	—
14. Jelebu-Jempol	51.1	39.6	9.3
15. Kuala Pilah	62.2	35.0	2.8
16. Rembau-Tampin	64.3	24.8	10.9
17. Lipis	64.0	30.4	5.6
18. Raub	55.3	33.9	10.8
19. Temerloh	76.4	20.7	2.9
20. Kuantan	58.5	37.1	4.4
21. Pekan	98.2	1.5	0.3
22. Seberang Utara	75.1	20.6	4.3
23. Seberang Tengah	45.7	45.8	8.5
24. Penang Selatan	34.4	61.0	4.6

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25. Krian Laut	78.7	16.6	4.7
26. Krian Darat	66.4	14.8	18.8
27. Batang Padang	43.4	44.6	12.0
28. Larut Utara	70.8	15.0	14.2
29. Ulu Perak	61.0	34.5	4.5
30. Kuala Kangsar	68.2	24.7	7.1
31. Parit	93.5	3.0	3.5
32. Hilir Perak	98.2	0.9	0.9
33. Bagan Datoh	60.4	19.6	20.0
34. Sabak Bernam	79.5	14.6	5.9
35. Kuala Selangor	58.1	24.8	17.1
36. Langat	47.9	42.0	10.1
37. Kuala Langat	53.9	25.8	20.3
38. Kapar	49.7	34.8	15.5

II. 1964 Elections

A. Predominantly Malay States

1. Kota Star Utara	90.2	7.6	2.2
2. Kota Star Selatan	81.7	13.5	4.8
3. Kubang Pasu Barat	88.2	10.3	1.5
4. Kuala Kedah	83.6	15.2	1.2
5. Baling	58.8	40.1	1.1
6. Jerai	83.8	15.1	1.1
7. Jitra Padang Terap	83.8	9.8	6.4
8. Kedah Tengah	74.9	14.5	10.6
9. Kulim Utara	60.4	24.0	15.6
10. Sungei Patani	47.0	36.4	16.6
11. Kota Bahru Hilir	82.4	16.3	1.3
12. Ulu Kelantan	88.2	9.7	2.1
13. Perlis Utara	76.0	20.7	3.3
14. Perlis Selatan	85.1	12.7	2.2
15. Kemaman	84.7	14.0	1.3
16. Trengganu Tengah	98.3	1.6	0.1
17. Kuala Trengganu Utara	98.8	1.1	0.1
18. Kuala Trengganu Selatan	88.1	11.2	0.7
19. Dungun	90.6	8.2	1.2

B. Other States

1. Muar Selatan	83.3	16.4	0.3
2. Johore Timor	60.6	36.1	3.3
3. Muar Utara	51.1	44.1	4.8
4. Pontian Selatan	52.8	46.5	0.7
5. Batu Pahat Dalam	67.4	31.0	1.6
6. Muar Dalam	59.3	36.6	4.1
7. Segamat Utara	38.7	53.2	8.1
8. Pontian Utara	78.8	21.0	0.2
9. Johore Tenggara	52.4	41.5	6.1
10. Johore Bahru Timor	45.9	44.8	9.3
11. Johore Bahru Barat	45.6	47.8	6.6
12. Malakka Utara	70.3	23.9	5.8

13. Malakka Selatan	58.3	31.8	9.9
14. Jelebu-Jempol	48.5	43.4	8.1
15. Rembau Tampin	62.9	26.8	10.3
16. Kuala Pilah	73.3	23.5	3.2
17. Pekan	93.2	6.2	0.6
18. Kuantan	54.1	40.8	5.1
19. Temerloh	74.5	22.1	3.4
20. Raub	41.5	49.6	8.9
21. Lipis	65.7	29.5	4.8
22. Kuala Kangsar	66.1	26.5	7.4
23. Batang Padang	40.3	48.8	10.9
24. Ulu Perak	62.4	32.1	5.5
25. Larut Utara	73.1	15.5	11.4
26. Bagan Datoh	58.1	21.7	20.2
27. Krian Darat	66.5	16.9	16.6
28. Hilir Perak	93.0	2.8	4.2
29. Parit	90.1	6.4	3.5
30. Krian Laut	69.7	24.7	5.6
31. Seberang Tengah	45.9	47.0	7.1
32. Penang Selatan	36.3	58.8	4.9
33. Seberang Selatan	40.7	44.0	15.3
34. Seberang Utara	75.0	21.7	3.3
35. Rawang	21.4	57.0	21.6
36. Kapar	49.4	37.7	12.9
37. Langat	44.5	47.3	8.2
38. Sabak Bernam	76.9	17.2	5.9
39. Kuala Langat	50.6	33.7	15.7
40. Kuala Selangor	51.3	32.5	16.2

III. 1969 Elections^a

A. Predominantly Malay States

1. Baling	58.8	40.1	1.1
2. Jerai	83.8	15.1	1.1
3. Jitra-Padang Terap	83.8	9.8	6.4
4. Kuala Kedah	83.6	15.2	1.2
5. Kulim Utara	60.4	24.0	15.6
6. Sungei Patani	47.0	36.4	16.6
7. Kedah Tengah	74.9	14.5	10.6
8. Kota Bahru Hilir	82.4	16.3	1.3
9. Tanah Merah	93.5	4.6	1.9
10. Tumpat	89.0	4.6	6.4
11. Ulu Kelantan	88.2	9.7	2.1
12. Perlis Selatan	85.1	12.7	2.2
13. Perlis Utara	76.0	20.7	3.3
14. Besut	98.0	1.9	0.1
15. Kemaman	84.7	14.0	1.3
16. Trengganu Tengah	98.3	1.6	0.1
17. Kuala Trengganu Utara	98.8	1.1	0.1

^a Racial composition of the electorate for the 1969 elections is not available except for the State of Penang. Therefore, the figures for the 1964 elections have been used. In the case of constituencies in Penang the 1969 figures are given in parenthesis. As

can be seen the difference between the 1964 and 1969 figures is insignificant. As a result it can safely be assumed that the lack of figures for the 1969 elections does not significantly affect the validity of the conclusions put forward in this study.

B. Other States			
1. Batu Pahat Dalam	67.4	31.0	1.6
2. Johore Bahru Barat	45.6	47.8	6.6
3. Johore Bahru Timur	45.9	44.8	9.3
4. Johore Tenggara	52.4	41.5	6.1
5. Johore Timor	60.6	36.1	3.3
6. Muar Dalam	59.3	36.6	4.1
7. Muar Selatan	83.3	16.4	0.3
8. Muar Utara	51.1	44.1	4.8
9. Pontian Selatan	52.8	46.5	0.7
10. Pontian Utara	78.8	21.0	0.2
11. Segamat Utara	38.7	53.2	8.1
12. Malakka Utara	70.3	23.9	5.8
13. Jelebu Jempol	48.5	43.4	8.1
14. Kuala Pilah	73.3	23.5	3.2
15. Rembau Tampin	62.9	26.8	10.3
16. Kuantan	54.1	40.8	5.1
17. Lipis	65.7	29.5	4.8
18. Pekan	93.2	6.2	0.6
19. Raub	41.5	49.6	8.9
20. Temerloh	74.5	22.1	3.4
21. Seberang Utara	75.0 (74.0)	21.7 (21.5)	3.3 (4.5)
22. Bagan Datoh	58.1	21.7	20.2
23. Hilir Perak	93.0	2.8	4.2
24. Krian Darat	66.5	16.9	16.6
25. Kuala Kangsar	66.1	26.5	7.4
26. Larut Utara	73.1	15.5	11.4
27. Ulu Perak	62.4	32.1	5.5
28. Kapar	49.4	37.7	12.9
29. Kuala Langat	50.6	33.7	15.7
30. Kuala Selangor	51.3	32.5	16.2
31. Langat	44.5	47.3	8.2
32. Rawang	21.4	57.0	21.6
33. Sabak Bernam	76.9	17.2	5.9
34. Krian Laut	69.7	24.7	5.6

TABLE 3(b)

Seats not won by the United Malays National Organisation and the racial composition of the electorate, Parliamentary elections

Constituency	Racial composition—per cent			Votes polled—per cent of total
	Malays	Chinese	Indians and others	
<i>I. 1959 Elections</i>				
A. Predominantly Malay States ^a				
1. Tanah Merah	92.7	5.1	2.2	34.7 (PMIP—65.3)
2. Pasir Puteh	97.6	2.1	0.3	35.1 (PMIP—64.9)
3. Bachok	97.7	2.2	0.1	21.3 (PMIP—88.7)
4. Pasir Mas Hilir	95.6	3.7	0.7	20.1 (PMIP—79.9)
5. Pasir Mas Ulu	94.1	5.4	0.5	27.2 (PMIP—72.8)
6. Tumpat	86.5	8.3	5.2	38.4 (PMIP—61.6)
7. Kelantan Hilir	98.7	1.2	0.1	25.8 (PMIP—74.2)
8. Kota Bharu Hilir	84.9	14.0	1.1	40.0 (PMIP—60.0)
9. Kota Bharu Ulu	97.6	2.3	0.1	20.2 (PMIP—79.8)
10. Besut	98.0	1.8	0.2	29.7 (PMIP—70.3)
11. Kuala Trengganu Utara	98.8	1.1	0.1	45.6 (PMIP—50.7)
12. Kuala Trengganu Selatan	88.7	10.4	0.9	40.2 (Negara—59.8)
13. Trengganu Tengah	98.4	1.5	0.1	34.1 (PMIP—59.3)
14. Dungun	93.6	5.7	0.7	37.8 (PMIP—56.8)
B. Other States				
1. Seremban Barat	34.2	48.0	17.8	27.9 (Independent Chinese—38.9)
2. Bruas	36.9	47.4	15.7	33.9 (Independent Chinese—38.8)
3. Setapak	33.3	55.7	11.0	30.9 (Socialist Front—44.3)
4. Rawang	26.3	49.2	24.5	33.9 (Socialist Front—57.0)
<i>II. 1964 Elections</i>				
A. Predominantly Malay States				
1. Tumpat	89.0	4.6	6.4	49.5 (PMIP—50.5)
2. Kelantan Hilir	98.9	0.9	0.2	33.8 (PMIP—66.2)
3. Pasir Mas Hilir	95.5	3.8	0.7	28.1 (PMIP—71.9)
4. Bachok	97.8	1.6	0.6	39.5 (PMIP—60.5)
5. Kota Bharu Ulu	97.8	1.9	0.3	33.6 (PMIP—66.4)
6. Pasir Mas Ulu	95.1	3.2	1.7	35.8 (PMIP—64.2)
7. Pasir Puteh	97.7	1.5	0.8	46.8 (PMIP—53.2)
8. Tanah Merah	93.5	4.6	1.9	48.4 (PMIP—51.6)
9. Besut	98.0	1.9	0.1	49.7 (PMIP—50.3)
B. Other States				
—				
<i>III. 1969 Elections^a</i>				
A. Predominantly Malay States				
1. Kota Star Selatan	81.7	13.5	4.8	48.0 (PMIP—52.0)

^a Racial composition of the electorate for the 1969 elections is not available except for the State of Penang. Therefore, the figures for the 1964 elections have been used. In the case of constituencies in Penang the 1969 figures are given in parenthesis. As can be seen

the difference between the 1964 and 1969 figures is insignificant. As a result it can safely be assumed that the lack of figures for the 1969 elections does not significantly affect the validity of the conclusions put forward in this study.

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2. Kota Star Utara	90.2	7.6	2.2	46.3 (PMIP-53.7)
3. Kubang Pasu Barat	88.2	10.3	1.5	49.8 (PMIP-50.2)
4. Bachok	97.8	1.6	0.6	45.6 (PMIP-54.4)
5. Kelantan Hilir	98.9	0.9	0.2	39.3 (PMIP-60.7)
6. Pasir Mas Hilir	95.5	3.8	0.7	36.9 (PMIP-63.1)
7. Pasir Mas Ulu	95.1	3.2	1.7	45.7 (PMIP-54.3)
8. Pasir Puteh	97.7	1.5	0.8	49.5 (PMIP-50.5)
9. Kota Bahru Ulu	97.8	1.9	0.3	40.0 (PMIP-60.0)
10. Dungun	90.6	8.2	1.2	44.4 (PMIP-55.6)
11. Kuala Trengganu Selatan	88.1	11.2	0.7	45.6 (PMIP-54.4)
B. Other States				
1. Penang Selatan	36.3 (34.2)	58.8 (59.8)	4.9 (6.0)	41.3 (Gerakan-58.7)
2. Seberang Selatan	40.7 (39.9)	44.0 (44.2)	15.3 (15.9)	34.6 (Gerakan-52.3)
3. Seberang Tengah	45.9 (44.9)	47.0 (47.4)	7.1 (7.7)	41.7 (Gerakan-58.3)
4. Batang Padang	40.3	48.8	10.9	49.6 (DAP-50.4)
5. Parit	90.1	6.4	3.5	48.6 (PMIP-51.4)

TABLE 4(a)

Seats won by the Malayan Chinese Association and the racial composition of the electorate, Parliamentary elections

Constituency	Racial composition—in per cent			Votes polled—per cent of total
	Malays	Chinese	Indians and others	
<i>I. 1959 Elections</i>				
1. Kluang Selatan	27.2	64.8	8.0	65.8
2. Kluang Utara	26.7	65.0	8.3	56.9
3. Batu Pahat	38.3	59.9	1.8	67.9
4. Muar Pantai	47.3	52.7	—	53.2
5. Segamat Selatan	26.6	55.2	18.2	61.6
6. Alor Star	23.9	69.2	6.9	82.4
7. Kulim Bandar Bahru	48.9	25.4	25.7	69.5
8. Malakka Tengah	67.8	32.2	—	74.5
9. Bentong	29.2	63.1	7.7	62.7
10. Bagan	34.4	49.8	15.8	34.7
11. Penang Utara	25.3	63.8	10.9	50.0
12. Tanjong Malim	35.9	40.1	24.0	62.7
13. Larut Selatan	33.9	55.4	10.7	63.5
14. Sitiawan	23.9	65.2	10.9	41.6
15. Telok Anson	30.1	56.1	13.8	63.8
16. Kampar	30.3	61.3	8.4	48.5
17. Bukit Bintang	27.5	62.6	9.9	37.3
18. Ulu Selangor	32.9	47.6	19.5	56.0
19. Sepang	32.4	45.4	22.2	46.7
<i>II. 1964 Elections</i>				
1. Kluang Selatan	23.1	69.4	6.5	64.9
2. Kluang Utara	25.7	64.9	9.4	53.4
3. Batu Pahat	38.3	59.9	1.8	60.7
4. Muar Pantai	43.4	54.4	2.2	72.9
5. Segamat Selatan	27.5	56.3	16.2	63.3
6. Alor Star	52.5	40.2	7.3	64.6
7. Kulim Bandar Bahru	54.4	30.7	14.9	68.7
8. Malakka Tengah	64.0	33.2	2.8	74.1
9. Bandar Malakka	15.6	76.2	8.2	49.4
10. Bentong	29.2	62.8	8.0	65.7
11. Bagan	30.1	54.9	15.0	51.4
12. Penang Utara	24.6	65.6	9.8	52.1
13. Tanjong Malim	34.9	46.4	18.7	64.5
14. Larut Selatan	34.3	53.4	12.3	63.2
15. Bruas	37.0	49.6	13.4	53.3
16. Sitiawan	26.7	61.3	12.0	60.4
17. Telok Anson	27.7	56.3	16.0	57.1
18. Ulu Kinta	25.3	61.8	12.9	46.3
19. Batu Gajah	20.2	69.2	10.6	51.8
20. Kampar	26.8	64.8	8.4	48.5

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21. Seremban Barat	27.2	56.4	16.4	53.8
22. Seremban Timor	24.1	59.6	16.3	44.0
23. Ulu Selangor	30.3	53.0	16.7	69.1
24. Setapak	25.3	62.3	12.4	50.3
25. Bukit Bintang	20.1	72.0	7.9	42.5
26. Damansara	13.6	67.7	18.7	43.6
27. Sepang	30.9	52.3	16.8	63.4
<i>III. 1969 Elections^a</i>				
1. Batu Pahat	38.3	59.9	1.8	Uncontested
2. Kluang Selatan	23.1	69.4	6.5	64.3
3. Kluang Utara	25.7	64.9	9.4	53.0
4. Muar Pantai	43.4	54.4	2.2	65.9
5. Segamat Selatan	27.5	56.3	16.2	73.6
6. Alor Star	52.5	40.2	7.3	36.3
7. Kulim Bandar Bahru	54.4	30.7	14.9	69.2
8. Malakka Tengah	64.0	33.2	2.8	52.1
9. Bentong	29.2	62.8	8.0	Uncontested
10. Tanjong Malim	34.9	46.4	18.7	46.2
11. Sepang	30.9	52.3	16.8	55.7
12. Ulu Selangor	30.3	53.0	16.7	55.0
13. Bagan	30.1 (31.7)	54.9 (53.1)	15.0 (15.2)	Uncontested

^a See footnote *a* in Table 12.

TABLE 4(b)

Seats not won by the Malaysian Chinese Association and the racial composition of the electorate, Parliamentary elections

Constituency	Racial composition—in per cent			Votes polled—per cent of total
	Malays	Chinese	Indians and others	
<i>I. 1959 Elections</i>				
1. Bandar Malacca	13.9	86.1	—	45.8
2. Seremban Timor	31.5	50.2	18.3	14.5
3. Seberang Selatan	43.4	52.6	4.0	34.5
4. Tanjong	5.8	81.5	12.7	32.4
5. Dato Kramat	14.3	74.3	11.4	31.9
6. Ipoh	11.1	76.4	12.5	32.2
7. Menglembu	11.5	83.1	5.4	28.7
8. Ulu Kinta	28.1	58.6	13.3	35.6
9. Batu Gajah	27.1	62.5	10.4	42.5
10. Batu	18.4	71.0	10.6	42.3
11. Bungsar	11.7	73.6	14.7	21.0
12. Damansara	13.9	63.0	23.1	38.5
<i>II. 1964 Elections</i>				
1. Tanjong	3.6	85.9	10.5	22.0 (UDP-45.3)
2. Dato Kramat	12.3	78.5	9.2	29.5 (SF-38.7)
3. Ipoh	11.9	72.8	15.3	35.6 (PPP-55.2)
4. Menglembu	12.5	80.5	7.0	40.5 (PPP-50.8)
5. Batu	13.9	78.5	7.6	43.7 (SF-45.2)
6. Bungsar	9.4	79.8	10.8	25.5 (PAP-35.3)
<i>III. 1969 Elections^a</i>				
1. Bandar Malacca	15.6	76.2	8.2	24.0 (DAP-60.8)
2. Seremban Barat	27.2	56.4	16.4	36.9 (DAP-59.4)
3. Seremban Timor	24.1	59.6	16.3	36.1 (DAP-60.3)
4. Dato Kramat	12.3 (15.1)	78.5 (74.8)	9.2 (10.1)	24.5 (Gerakan-75.5)
5. Penang Utara	24.6 (22.4)	65.6 (66.4)	9.8 (11.2)	38.9 (DAP-61.1)
6. Tanjong	3.6 (6.6)	85.9 (83.1)	10.5 (10.3)	18.0 (Gerakan-78.8)
7. Batu Gajah	20.2	69.2	10.6	34.1 (DAP-61.3)
8. Bruas	37.0	49.6	13.4	38.9 (PPP-41.2)
9. Ipoh	11.9	72.8	15.3	17.9 (PPP-82.1)
10. Larut Selatan	34.3	53.4	12.3	34.3 (Gerakan-49.8)
11. Menglembu	12.5	80.5	7.0	18.9 (PPP-81.1)
12. Sitiawan	26.7	61.3	12.0	40.7 (DAP-59.3)
13. Kampar	26.8	64.8	8.4	30.1 (DAP-59.9)
14. Teluk Anson	27.7	56.3	16.0	38.3 (DAP-55.2)
15. Ulu Kinta	25.3	61.8	12.9	41.4 (PPP-58.6)
16. Batu	13.9	78.5	7.6	27.8 (Gerakan-72.2)
17. Bukit Bintang	20.1	72.0	7.9	33.0 (Gerakan-67.0)
18. Bungsar	9.4	79.8	10.8	20.6 (DAP-79.4)
19. Damansara	13.6	67.7	18.7	43.7 (DAP-52.3)
20. Setapak	25.3	62.3	12.4	44.7 (DAP-55.3)

^a See footnote *a* in Table 12.

TABLE 5(a)

Seats won by the Pan Malayan Islamic Party and the racial composition of the electorate, Parliamentary elections

Constituency	Racial composition—in per cent		
	Malays	Chinese	Indians and others
<i>I. 1959 Elections</i>			
1. Tanah Merat	92.7	5.1	2.2
2. Pasir Puteh	97.6	2.1	0.3
3. Bachok	97.7	2.2	0.1
4. Pasir Mas Hilir	95.6	3.7	0.7
5. Pasir Mas Ulu	94.1	5.4	0.5
6. Tampar	86.5	8.3	5.2
7. Kelantan Hilir	98.7	1.2	0.1
8. Kota Bharu Hilir	84.9	14.0	1.1
9. Kota Bharu Ulu	97.6	2.3	0.1
10. Besut	98.0	1.8	0.2
11. Kuala Trengganu Utara	98.8	1.1	0.1
12. Dungun	93.6	5.7	0.7
13. Trengganu Tengah	98.4	1.5	0.1
<i>II. 1964 Elections</i>			
1. Tampar	89.0	4.6	6.4
2. Kelantan Hilir	98.9	0.9	0.2
3. Pasir Mas Hilir	95.5	3.8	0.7
4. Bachok	97.8	1.6	0.6
5. Kota Bharu Ulu	97.8	1.9	0.7
6. Pasir Mas Ulu	95.1	3.2	1.7
7. Pasir Puteh	97.7	1.5	0.8
8. Tanah Merat	93.5	4.6	1.9
9. Besut	98.0	1.9	0.1
<i>III. 1969 Elections</i>			
1. Kota Star Selatan	81.8	13.5	4.7
2. Kota Star Utara	90.2	7.6	2.2
3. Kubang Pasu Barat	88.2	10.3	1.5
4. Bachok	97.8	1.6	0.6
5. Kelantan Hilir	98.9	0.9	0.2
6. Pasir Mas Hilir	95.5	3.8	0.7
7. Pasir Mas Ulu	94.2	5.4	0.4
8. Pasir Puteh	97.7	1.5	0.8
9. Kota Bharu Ulu	97.8	1.9	0.3
10. Dungun	90.6	8.2	1.2
11. Kuala Trengganu Selatan	88.1	11.2	0.7
12. Parit	90.1	6.4	3.5

TABLE 5(b)

Seats not won by the Pan Malayan Islamic Party and the racial composition of the electorate, Parliamentary elections

Constituency	Racial composition—in per cent			
	Malays	Chinese	Indians and others	
Malay States	23.9	69.2	6.9	A. Predominantly Malay
	87.6	11.7	0.7	1. Alor Star
	90.2	7.2	2.6	2. Kuala Kedah
	80.9	13.8	5.3	3. Kota Star Utara
	90.2	8.2	1.6	4. Kota Star Selatan
	84.7	8.2	7.1	5. Kubang Pasu Barat
	87.2	12.1	0.7	6. Jitra Padang Terap
	77.3	14.8	7.9	7. Jerai
	—	—	—	8. Kedah Tengah
	42.7	43.0	14.3	9. Baling
	88.1	9.3	2.6	10. Kulim Utara
	78.6	21.4	—	11. Ulu Kelantan
	89.1	10.9	—	12. Perlis Utara
				13. Perlis Selatan
	79.9	19.9	0.2	B. Other States
	83.9	16.1	—	1. Pontian Utara
	42.3	48.3	9.4	2. Muar Selatan
	67.8	32.2	—	3. Segamat Utara
	72.4	27.6	—	4. Malakka Tengah
	57.8	42.2	—	5. Malakka Utara
	51.1	39.6	9.3	6. Malakka Selatan
	62.2	35.0	2.8	7. Jelebu-Jempol
	31.5	50.2	18.3	8. Kuala Pilah
	64.0	30.4	5.6	9. Seremban Timor
	58.5	37.1	4.4	10. Lipis
	98.2	1.5	0.3	11. Kuantan
	34.4	49.8	15.8	12. Pekan
	75.1	20.6	4.3	13. Bagan
	45.7	45.8	8.5	14. Seberang Utara
	43.4	52.6	4.0	15. Seberang Tengah
	34.4	61.0	4.6	16. Seberang Selatan
	78.7	16.6	4.7	17. Penang Selatan
	66.4	14.8	18.8	18. Krian Laut
	43.4	44.6	12.0	19. Krian Darat
	61.0	34.5	4.5	20. Batang Padang
	33.9	55.4	10.7	21. Larut Utara
	61.0	34.5	4.5	22. Larut Selatan
				23. Ulu Perak
	93.5	3.0	3.5	25. Parit
	98.2	0.9	0.9	26. Hilir Perak

27. Bagan Datoh	60.4	19.6	20.0
28. Kampar	30.3	61.3	8.4
29. Sabak Bernam	79.5	14.6	5.9
30. Kuala Selangor	58.1	24.8	17.1
31. Kuala Langat	53.9	25.8	20.3
32. Kapar	49.7	34.8	15.5

II. 1964 Elections

A. Predominantly Malay States

1. Kota Star Utara	90.2	7.6	2.2
2. Kota Star Selatan	81.7	13.5	4.8
3. Kubang Pasu Barat	88.2	10.3	1.5
4. Kuala Kedah	83.6	15.2	1.2
5. Alor Star	52.5	40.2	7.3
6. Baling	58.8	40.1	1.1
7. Jerai	83.8	15.1	1.1
8. Jitra Padang-Terap	83.8	9.8	6.4
9. Kedah Tengah	74.9	14.5	10.6
10. Kulim Utara	60.4	24.0	15.6
11. Kulim Bandar-Bahru	54.4	30.7	14.9
12. Sungei Patani	47.0	36.4	16.6
13. Perlis Utara	76.0	20.7	3.3
14. Perlis Selatan	85.1	12.7	2.2
15. Kota Bahru Hilir	82.4	16.3	1.3
16. Ulu Kelantan	88.2	9.7	2.1
17. Kemaman	84.7	14.0	1.3
18. Trengganu Tengah	98.3	1.6	0.1
19. Kuala Trengganu Utara	98.8	1.1	0.1
20. Kuala Trengganu Selatan	88.1	11.2	0.7
21. Dungun	90.6	8.2	1.2

B. Other States

1. Johore Timor	60.6	36.1	3.3
2. Pontian Utara	78.8	21.0	0.2
3. Malakka Tengah	64.0	33.2	2.8
4. Malakka Utara	70.3	23.9	5.8
5. Pekan	93.2	6.2	0.6
6. Kuantan	54.1	40.8	5.1
7. Temerloh	74.5	22.1	3.4
8. Lipis	65.7	29.5	4.8
9. Kuala Kangsar	66.1	26.5	7.4
10. Ulu Perak	62.4	32.1	5.5
11. Larut Utara	73.1	15.5	11.4
12. Bagan Datoh	58.1	21.7	20.2
13. Krian Darat	66.5	16.9	16.6
14. Hilir Perak	93.0	2.8	4.2
15. Parit	90.1	6.4	3.5
16. Larut Selatan	34.3	53.4	12.3
17. Krian Laut	69.7	24.7	5.6
18. Bagan	30.1	54.9	15.0
19. Seberang Selatan	40.7	44.0	15.3

20. Seberang Utara	75.0	21.7	3.3
21. Kapar	49.4	37.7	12.9
22. Sabak Bernam	76.9	17.2	5.9
23. Bukit Bintang	20.1	72.0	7.9

III. 1969 Elections

A. Predominantly Malay States

1. Alor Star	52.5	40.2	7.3
2. Baling	58.8	40.1	1.1
3. Jerai	83.8	15.1	1.1
4. Jitra Padang-Terap	83.8	9.8	6.4
5. Kuala Kedah	83.6	15.2	1.2
6. Kulim Bandar Bahru	54.4	30.7	14.9
7. Kulim Utara	60.4	24.0	15.6
8. Sungei Patani	47.0	36.4	16.6
9. Kedah Tengah	74.9	14.5	10.6
10. Kota Bahru Hilir	82.4	16.3	1.3
11. Tanah Merah	93.5	4.6	1.9
12. Tumpat	89.0	4.6	6.4
13. Ulu Kelantan	88.2	9.7	2.1
14. Perlis Selatan	85.1	12.7	2.2
15. Perlis Utara	76.0	20.7	3.3
16. Besut	98.0	1.9	0.1
17. Kemaman	84.7	14.0	1.3
18. Trengganu Tengah	98.3	1.6	0.1
19. Kuala Trengganu Utara	98.8	1.1	0.1

B. Other States

1. Johore Timor	60.6	36.1	3.3
2. Pontian Utara	78.8	21.0	0.2
3. Malakka Tengah	64.0	33.2	2.8
4. Malakka Utara	70.3	23.9	5.8
5. Jelebu-Jempol	48.5	43.4	8.1
6. Kuala Pilah	73.3	23.5	3.2
7. Port Dickson	33.3	46.2	20.5
8. Kuantan	54.1	40.8	5.1
9. Lipis	65.7	29.5	4.8
10. Pekan	93.2	6.2	0.6
11. Temerloh	74.5	22.1	3.4
12. Seberang Selatan	40.7	44.0	15.3
13. Seberang Utara	75.0	21.7	3.3
14. Bagan Datoh	58.1	21.7	20.2
15. Batu Gajah	20.2	69.2	10.6
16. Bruas	37.0	49.6	13.4
17. Hilir Perak	93.0	2.8	4.2
18. Krian Darat	66.5	16.9	16.6
19. Kuala Kangsar	66.1	26.5	7.4
20. Larut Selatan	34.3	53.4	12.3
21. Larut Utara	73.1	15.5	11.4
22. Tanjong Malim	34.9	46.4	18.7
23. Kampar	26.8	64.8	8.4

24. Teluk Anson	27.7	56.3	16.0
25. Ulu Perak	62.4	32.1	5.5
26. Kapar	49.4	37.7	12.9
27. Kuala Langat	50.6	33.7	15.7
28. Kuala Selangor	51.3	32.5	16.2
29. Sabak Bernam	76.9	17.2	5.9

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